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Preface 
Brij V. Lal 
Pacific historiography is uneven in its coverage of the different periods in the 
region's past. In its salad days, the discipline's main focus was on the problems 
and themes of culture contact, on missionary activity and conversion, on trading 
and labour recruitment, and on the lives and times of colonial officials and 
island elites. The main thrust of the research was to demonstrate islander 
agency. The early part of the 20th century received some attention from 
historians as, more prominently, did the latter half when the islands were caught 
in the grip of turbulent events : coups in Fiji, the secessionist movement in 
Melanesia, the Bougainville crisis . World War Two was covered in great detail 
by historians and anthropologists as were the politics and processes of 
decolonisation and the challenges of the post-independence era. Very little work 
was done on the period from the end of the W odd War Two to the advent of 
decolonisation in the mid-1 960s. 
To fill that gap, the Division of Pacific and Asian History at The Australian 
National University organised a workshop in December 2003, and this volume 
is a partial result of that occasion. Not all the papers presented at the workshop 
are included here. Some have found other outlets while others, presented as 
work-in-progress, were unable to be re-worked in time for publication. But the 
papers which are included here give a good sense of the tenor and texture of 
what was discussed at the workshop. 
The papers show that while the post-war years might not have been as dramatic 
or as colourful as some other periods in Pacific islands history, they were 
important in laying the foundation for later developments in the region. In a 
number of places, especially in Melanesia, the convulsions caused by the war 
produced what we have come to call 'cargo cults' and haphazard proto­
nationalist movements, such as the Masina Rule in the Solomon Islands and the 
John Frum movement in the New Hebrides (Vanuatu) . Communications 
revolution-air and sea transport, radio and cable-touched the lives of even 
the remotest communities in the islands in this period. The South Pacific 
Commission was established in Canberra in 1 947 by the six colonial powers in 
the region-Australia, France, the Netherlands, New Zealand, the United 
Kingdom and the United States-to coordinate developments particularly in 
agriculture, communications, forestry, fisheries, health, labour, housing and 
education, and facilitate technical and scientific research. On the geo-political 
front, territories under the League of Nations Mandate were transferred to the 
Trusteeship Council of  the United Nations. 
R.G. Ward writes about the advent of systematic planning for social and 
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economic developments in the islands that came from new demands for 
governance, the need for accurate data for planning purposes, and from broader 
intellectual trends emphasising the critical government role in planning and 
executing developments. Significant investigations into the population and 
natural resources of Fiji by Sir Alan Burns and into the economic and social 
prospects for the Fijian people by Professor O.H.K. Spate, to name only two, 
held important implications for Fiji and the Fijian people. The establishment of 
local universities in Papua New Guinea and in Fiji, in 1 966 and 1 968 
respectively, provided the platform for manpower training in the islands for the 
post-independence period. It can be argued that the setting up institutions of 
higher learning constituted an important turning point in the modern history of 
the Pacific islands. 
Hank Nelson and William Clarke provide a finely-grained account of the 
exigencies and the practical difficulties of kiap administration in Papua New 
Guinea. Census taking, a routine exercise at most times, was fraught in the 
Highlands, writes Nelson, quoting P.K. Moloney who complained that 'he could 
not find the 'owners of many of the names he called' because 'people adopted 
different names at different stages of their lives and some could not remember 
the name they had given at the time of te last patrol.' Clarke writes about his 
own personal experience of a 'patrol of contact' in the lower Jimi Valley. He 
emphasises the tenuous nature of the Australian control of Papua New Guinea, 
and the kiaps' reliance on indigenous helpers and carriers. In the 1 950s, 
independence seemed a very remote prospect for PNG, perhaps a couple of 
generations away, and yet political processes were set in motion which resulted 
in independence in 1 975.  
Pacific islands have had their fair share of colourful personalities with their 
peculiar, sometimes eccentric, visions for their people. Apoloso Nawai of Fiji 
comes to mind immediately, a man critical of chiefs and the colonial officialdom 
and agitating for economic freedom for his people, but without success in part 
because of the enormous pressures against him and in part because of his own 
muddled thinking. Tom Kabu was not Apolosi, but he too had a vision for his 
people. As Anthony Yeates writes, Kabu wanted to 'develop the region of his 
birth to a level approximating that of Australia as he had experienced it during 
the war.' He focussed on cooperative economic activity but also sought to 
introduce his people to Christianity and western-style dwellings. His activity 
inevitably aroused suspicion among officials who saw him as a threat to their 
vision for Papua New Guinea. Kabu failed. Yeates concludes that 'a valuable 
opportunity was missed when the momentum of indigenous desire for 
development, so overwhelming after the war, was lost, frustrated, and worn 
down by the unfulfilled promises of the Administration and its officers in the 
11 
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field. '  
Donovan Storey and Donald Shuster take us away from Melanesia to political 
developments in Samoa and Palau respectively. The Samoan experience of 
decolonisation is well known, thanks in large part to the work of Jim Davidson. 
But Storey takes issue with the conventional view that the 1 940s represented a 
'blind spot' in New Zealand-Samoan history. He sees Prime Minister Peter 
Fraser's visit to Samoa was a 'pivotal moment in New Zealand's evolving policy' 
towards that island, and situates New Zealand attitude in the broader context of 
international developments such as the setting up of the Trusteeship Council in 
which Fraser played an important role. Shuster's account of the beginnings of 
elected government in Palau tells the story of tension between traditional and 
modern styles of leadership and of attempts to incorporate, as far as possible, 
traditional institutions into modern democratic politics .  Nonetheless, by the 
early 1 960s, a democratic legislature had been established, political parties 
formed and a new and western-educated elite at the helm. That process would 
be replicated in other Pacific islands later in the decade. 
Susan Woodburn's chapter is about a minor episode in the history of the central 
Pacific British colony of Gilbert and Ellice islands, but it illustrates with 
admirable clarity the way in which policy was often actually formulated as 
opposed to how many people would normally assume it was made. Sir Phillip 
Mitchell, the governor of Fiji and the Western Pacific High Commissioner 
during world War Two, proposed to pare down the administration of the colony 
and to transfer as much of the routine duties as possible to the islanders 
themselves. Harry Maude, who later became the Resident Commissioner had 
other ideas and effectively undermined Mitchell's proposal while appearing to 
be duly deferential to his former boss and giving the impression of endorsing it. 
A chronically shy person, Maude was ever alert to his own interests and 
concerns. Woodburn says that 'when we look at the reality of the creation of 
such documents, and see the myriad and very human elements of conviction, 
experience, theoretical leanings, personal ambition, insecurities, conflicting 
demands and imperatives that went into their creation and adoption, it provides 
a nice counterfoil to cliched view of some monolithic power called colonialism 
or colonial policy against which historians of particular periods and other post­
colonial critiques have been wrong to rage or moralise. ' 
The final two chapters by Jacqui Leckie and Christine Weir take us to the fields 
of health and education. Leckie looks at the changing technologies and 
discourses of mental health in Fiji, and explores the way in which diagnostic 
techniques and attitudes changed. She shows how cultural understandings and 
assumptions of mental health problems hampered the efficacy of the new 
iii 
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technologies and how the role of the mental hospital changed in the post-war 
years from exercising a custodial function to one providing psychiatric care. 
Christine Weir's account of the education at All Saints' Anglican School at 
Labasa might at fist glance appear atypical of the rest of Fiji, but in its broader 
configurations, it mirrors wider educational developments in the colony. The 
non-Christian primary and secondary schools in the post-war years also had to 
grapple with the question of arriving at the right balance between providing 
moral or spiritual instruction on the one hand and secular education on the 
other. Like all educational institutions, All Saints' had to adapt to the changing 
needs of the times. In this case, by the mid-1 960s, the Anglicans had come to 
accept the 'inevitability of very limited evangelical success', and concentrated on 
academic excellence and the extension of the school of secondary level in the 
mid-1 970s. 
To repeat the point I made at the beginning, the much-neglected post war years 
may not have seen dramatic changes that some other periods in Pacific islands 
past witnessed, yet they were a time of silent but nonetheless significant 
developments as the papers in this volume have suggested. I am grateful to the 
contributors for revising their papers for publication. Oanh Collins has, as 
always, been a cheerful helper in the Division of Pacific and Asian History and 
Maxine MacArthur kindly proof-read the manuscript and assisted in its 
preparation for publication. Many thanks to the Division of Pacific and Asian 
History too for its financial and technical assistance in holding the workshop 
which gave rise to this volume. 
Brij V. Lal 
lV 
The 1950s and 1960s-an Information Age 
for the South Pacific Islands 
R. Gerard Ward 
In the years following the end of W odd War II colonial administrations and 
governments in the Pacific Islands were faced with a range of new goals, new 
attitudes towards the roles of government, and consequent new tasks. 
Brookfield's comment that in Papua New Guinea 'these were years of 
gradualism and enlightened paternalism in political affairs, coupled with rapid 
economic expansion that shifted more and more firmly toward emphasis on the 
indigenous population' (1 972:98) is applicable to several other Pacific territories .  
The desire to foster and re-orient economic and social development required 
changes in the methods and complexity of administration. New and expanding 
roles of government led to growth of existing departments and the 
establishment of new departments, agencies or bureaus, often with primarily 
technical roles. One consequence of this change was a new demand for 
information about the lands and peoples of the colonial territories. 
The changing attitudes towards colonial governance grew from new intellectual 
and political contexts within the colonial powers. In the 1 930s the need to 
counter the effects of the world-wide depression and the development of 
Keynesian ideas of governments manipulating national economies led to the 
'New Deal' in the United States, and similar policies in other metropolitan 
countries (Brookfield, 1 975:24-8) . The mobilisation of industrial and 
agricultural production for wartime goals, and controls over the civilian 
population, such as rationing and manpower allocation, made the people of 
colonial powers such as Britain, Australia and New Zealand familiar with living 
in a form of planned economy and society. Some aspects of this style of 
government, linked with Keynesian economic policies, were carried over into 
the processes of post-war reconstruction. Governments adopted a more 
explicitly directorial role in guiding economic and social development than had 
been common pre-war. In Britain, for example, the rebuilding of towns and 
cities required central planning and management to integrate the many activities 
involved. There was recognition that the need to rebuild old, or create new 
suburbs and towns provided the opportunity to raise the quality of urban and 
suburban life through application of the ideas of the relatively new disciplines of 
urban and regional planning. It was clear that if such development were to be 
successful, it had to be based on accurate data about resources, land availability 
and quality, population growth and movement, and new social and economic 
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indicators. Such data could only be obtained from scientifically based social, 
economic and resource studies and the execution of such studies became an 
accepted task of government agencies. 
Against this metropolitan background, it is not surprising that attitudes towards 
economic and social development were changing in the colonial administrations 
of Britain, Australia and New Zealand in accord with the new practices in the 
home countries. In the Pacific Islands there was more conscious recognition 
that indigenous involvement in commercial agriculture was increasing and that 
these new commercial farmers needed assistance. Their complex systems of 
agriculture-mixing subsistence production and cash cropping-needed to be 
understood, and access to inputs and marketing arrangements provided. Other 
associated social trends were emerging. Indigenous people were starting to live 
outside their villages in larger numbers. Some, depending on non-traditional 
forms of labour mobilisation, set up farms at a distance from their traditional 
settlements while others moved into towns. Colonial regulations, which had 
controlled people's movements and residences, were becoming less effective. In 
several Pacific colonies or territories it was clear that populations were now 
increasing, after the declining or relatively static numbers of the first half of the 
century. There would have to be an expansion of the area of land under 
agriculture. In the new intellectual climate seeping into the administrations of 
some Pacific colonies and territories it was felt that governments would have to 
take the initiative in leading development. This would be costly. Whereas an 
older view was that colonies should pay for their own administration, there was 
now recognition that money would have to be spent to promote development. 
Thus programmes such as the British Colonial Development and Welfare Fund 
were established; aid programmes initiated; and, in some countries, foundations 
and other private organisations began to foster studies of colonial territories. 
As in the metropolitan countries, colonial planners needed much more 
information about land, resources, people and societies than had been available 
hitherto. It is remarkable, from the viewpoint of the early 21  st century, how 
little information was available in the interwar years of the 1 920s and 1 930s on 
the resources, environments and agricultural economies of the indigenous 
populations of the Pacific Islands. In Fiji, administration of 'native affairs' was 
largely through a form of indirect rule with relatively little attempt by the 
colonial government to change indigenous life styles or subsistence-based rural 
village economies. Indeed a number of regulations deliberately limited the 
opportunities for Fijians to live outside their home villages and move away from 
the control of their chiefs and their 'traditional' communal obligations. In 
Papua New Guinea, rural administration was primarily concerned with 
maintaining peace, while allowing rural life to continue relatively unchanged. 
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'Government by patrol' was, for the most part, a light imposition (Clarke, 2005) 
even if, as Bulmer (1 972: 1 22-3) points out, its main goal was 'the inhibition of 
feud[s] ' with the 'main sanction' being 'intimidation'. The information flowing 
back from rural areas to headquarters was limited -head counts of villagers ; 
comments on general health; and reports on matters of law and order. The 
contributions of governments to rural welfare were often minimal. Even in the 
early 1 970s Bulmer could report that while western medicine had brought great 
benefits and population growth rates of up to 3 per cent per annum to coastal 
areas in Papua New Guinea, in remote areas communities were still 'dying off at 
an even faster rate without these [benefits] ' (Bulmer, 1 972: 121 ) .  
The 'economy' of the colonies of most concern to administrations in  the 1 920s 
and 1 930s was that of expatriate enterprise. Agricultural departments, often one 
of very few technical departments in the administrations, dealt primarily with 
the expatriate plantation sector. Areas beyond the plantation or mining 
perimeter were largely ignored, being almost terra incognita. Descriptions of 
island environments were often sketchy. For example, when read today, an 
article on the Cook Islands published in The New Zealand Journal of Science and 
Technology in 1 928, and presumably then giving new information, is surprising for 
the very limited nature of the 'scientific' information then available on island 
environments (Anon. 1 928) .  Even 25 years later, basic data were often absent: 
for example there was still no information on rainfall for the island of Mitiaro in 
1 953 (Grange and Fox 1 953:25) .  
Censuses o f  population were one o f  the few types o f  systematic surveys 
conducted before World War II, but these were often little more than head 
counts . Although censuses had been taken in Western Samoa at five-yearly 
intervals from 1 921 ,  'the 1 9  5 1  census was the first at which an attempt was 
made to obtain detailed demographic data, chronological age and information 
relating to fertility, in particular, not being available from earlier censuses' Qupp 
1 958:4) .  The first census in Tonga to attempt an effective enumeration by age 
was that of 1 939 (McArthur 1 967:84) ,  while in French Polynesia such data were 
still not recorded consistently even in the mid-1 950s (McArthur 1 967:325-34) .  
The 'first full and separate census report fo r  the Cook Islands' was published in 
1 968 (Premier's Department 1 968: 1 ) .  This absence of detailed demographic 
data was true for many other parts of the region in the interwar and immediate 
post-war years . 
One important increment in printed information during the wartime period 
came with the production of four volumes on the Pacific Islands in the British 
Naval Intelligence Division's series of Geographical Handbooks (Naval 
Intelligence Division 1 943-5) . These four 'Admiralty Handbooks' were printed 
3 
R. Gerard Ward The 1 950s and 1 960s-an Information Age 
between November 1 943 and August 1 945 'for official use only', and were 
written and edited in large part by historian Jim Davidson and anthropologist 
Raymond Firth (Ward 1 994) .  They represent the best compendium of 
knowledge on the region available up to that period. Volume 1 provides region­
wide surveys of geology, climate, vegetation, history, peoples, economies, 
administration and communications. The remaining three volumes give detailed 
accounts of each of the territories of the region, covering similar topics as well 
as material on languages, social structures, art and traditional and colonial law. 
Unfortunately, concerns about confidentiality and copyright prevented them 
from becoming available to the public until the early 1 960s when they were 
quietly released and sold at a low price. Had they been available sooner they 
would have been invaluable as Pacific Island administrations began planning 
development programmes in the late 1 940s and early 1950s. 
The deficiencies in population and resource data were untenable if colonial 
administrations were to promote economic and social development and draw 
the indigenous peoples into the modern commercial economy in roles other 
than as labour units. As Hasluck said of Papua New Guinea in the late 1 9  50s, 
'we need to have much more wisdom and understanding in the next 30 years 
than we were required to have in the past 30 years' (1958:  84) .  The recognition 
that scientifically based data were needed in a number of fields ushered in a 
decade or more of surveys-of agriculture, health, social conditions and, 
especially, resources. What followed was a very rapid expansion of the 
information available to administrators in many fields. The remainder of this 
paper outlines this growth in a few representative fields, but the pattern was 
repeated in many other fields, through the gathering of medical, economic, 
social and anthropological data, and the field work of rapidly expanding 
departments such as agriculture, education, forestry, labour and public works. 
Government became much more complex and much of its expansion of 
activities depended on the gathering and use of the new information. For 
scholars following later this becomes an era with almost a surfeit of data 
compared with the pre-war years. 
New maps: delimiting the resources 
A basic deficiency in information in the pre-war period was the lack of detailed 
topographical maps. The charting of coastlines and location of hazards to 
navigation had proceeded for almost two centuries and was, in the main, 
thorough. But even in the late 1 930s the detail of inland landforms was often 
sketchy. The main task of lands and survey departments was to prepare 
cadastral maps identifying the boundaries of land holdings held by expatriates 
and governments under non-traditional tenure. Such holdings were mostly near 
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the coast, to which the sea provided access .  Land held by indigenous 
communities was very rarely surveyed, except in the case of Fij i  where the 
variety of customary practice had been codified and generalised by government 
commissions. Here the boundaries of mataqali holdings were surveyed during 
the first half of the 20th century but the maps showed little topographic 
information other than rivers and streams, and were not widely available. 
Military requirements in the 1 940s resulted in a rapid expansion of map 
production for actual or possible campaign areas. In particular, between 1 943 
and 1 945 several series of maps were produced by the Australian Army Survey 
Company and the United States Army Corps of Engineers for the northeastern 
parts of New Guinea, especially the coastal areas, at scales of between 1 :20,000 
and 1 :253,440. They were made possible by the use of the relatively new 
techniques of aerial photography and photo interpretation. Although used to 
some extent pre-war, particularly by geologists in New Guinea, aerial 
photographs could now be taken quickly over large areas and photo 
interpretation enabled the rapid production of large-scale photo mosaics and 
topographic maps covering areas that were still largely inaccessible on the 
ground. Although the military maps were not widely available for public use, 
they did show how much data could be generated. The value of such materials 
for development planning quickly became obvious. 
In the late 1 940s and early 1 950s civilian authorities, recognising the needs of 
postwar development, took up the task. The British Directorate of Overseas 
Surveys (DOS), in association with the Fiji Department of Lands and Survey, 
commissioned aerial photography for mapping purposes . Between 1 95 1  and 
1 954 virtually the whole of Fiji was photographed at approximately 1 :40,000 
scale, with the coastal and more densely settled parts of the country being 
covered at the larger scale of 1 : 1 6,000 (Ward 1 965:248) . Preparation of a series 
of topographic maps by DOS, at a scale of 1 :50,000, began promptly and sheets 
of the first edition, without contours, were published in 1 9  56. The second 
edition, with contours, appeared in 1 958. 
These topographic maps and photographs became basic tools for further 
surveys of geology, soils and land use. They allowed the Geological Survey 
Department to begin a systematic geological survey of the whole of Fiji, the first 
bulletin being published in 1 958 (Houtz 1 958) .  The first systematic soil survey 
of Fij i  involved collaboration between the New Zealand Soil Bureau and the Fiji 
Department of Agriculture. Most of the fieldwork was completed by the end of 
the 1 950s and land classification maps at  a scale of 1 : 1 26,720, showing the 
potential of land for different uses were published in the mid-1 960s (Twyford 
and Wright 1 965) .  
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In the early 1 950s population growth in Western Samoa was causing concern 
within the administration but there were still no maps of Western Samoa at a 
scale large enough to use as the base for detailed resource surveys. The need for 
accurate and scientific information on resources was recognised and in 1 9  53-4 
Western Samoa was covered by aerial photography at a scale of approximately 
1 :21 ,000 (Fox 1 962:23) . The photographs, and an excellent series of photo 
mosaics at a scale of 1 :20,000, were used in the mid-1 950s as the bases for major 
studies of three key resource topics - geology, soils and land use. Photo 
interpretation by the New Zealand Department of Lands and Survey was later 
field checked by the Department of Lands and Survey, Western Samoa, and an 
excellent series of 1 :20,000 topographic maps was drawn by the Samoan 
Department of Lands and Survey and published in the late 1 960s. 
In the mid-1 950s a geological survey of Western Samoa was conducted by the 
New Zealand Geological Survey (Kear and Wood 1 959) and a soil survey by the 
N.Z. Soil Bureau (Wright 1 963:8) .  As in Fiji, the Western Samoa soil survey 
included maps of 'land classification' which sought to show areas suitable for 
different crops. Although the scale of these maps sometimes proved to be too 
small for detailed planning of individual projects they were an invaluable starting 
point, and the base for subsequent more detailed special purpose mapping by 
national lands and survey or agricultural departments. 
Photography and topographical mapping continued in other territories through 
the following decades, with metropolitan organisations, such as the Directorate 
of Overseas Surveys, the French Institut Gfographique National (IGN) , and the 
New Zealand Department of Lands and Surveys producing series for the 
Solomon Islands, Kiribati, New Hebrides, New Caledonia, French Polynesia 
and the Cook Islands. 
After the soil surveys, land use studies in Samoa, Fiji and the Cook Islands 
determined what land was currently in use, and what might be available for 
future development. In Western Samoa land use surveys were conducted by the 
Lands and Survey Department and the Department of Geography, University of 
Auckland, the former resulting in a series of unpublished land use maps at  a 
scale of 1 :20,000 and the latter in detailed studies of land use and related matters 
in sample villages, plantations and settlements, and general land use maps at 
approximately 1 :200,000 (Fox and Cumberland 1 962). 
The land use survey of Fiji involved fieldwork between 1 958 and 1 96 1  and aerial 
photo interpretation in London using photography made available by the 
Directorate of Overseas Surveys. The initial land use maps, covering the three 
main islands, were at a scale of 1 :50,000 and used the new topographic maps as 
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a base. Final publication was at a scale of 1 :250,000 (Ward 1 965) . Other land 
surveys were completed in 1 968 and 1 978 at scales of 1 : 50,000 by DOS and the 
Land Use Section of the Fiji Ministry of Agriculture and Forests respectively, 
thus providing a unique opportunity for examining land use changes in relation 
to land quality over two decades (Ward 1 985) .  
The much smaller size of  the Cook Islands made i t  possible for  the soils of the 
southern Cook Islands to be studied and mapped at a reconnaissance level in 
1 950 without the benefit of large scale topographic maps (Grange and Fox 
1 953) .  Land use surveys of part of Rarotonga were conducted by academic 
researchers from the University of Canterbury in 1 950- 1  Oohnston 1 959) .  
Subsequently, aerial photographs taken in the early 1 960s allowed the 
production of detailed topographic maps at a scale of 1 : 1 5 ,840 by the New 
Zealand Lands and Survey Department. More extensive land use studies by 
geographers from Massey University followed, leading to the publication of land 
use maps at the very large scale of 1 :7,920 (e.g. Allen 1 971) .  
In Papua New Guinea the Australian Commonwealth Scientific and Industrial 
Research Organization (CSIRO) addressed the need for more knowledge of 
physical resources. In the context of very limited existing information and 
difficult land to traverse, the CSIRO used aerial photographs and field checks to 
identify areas with 'relatively uniform land components (land units) . . .  arranged 
in larger spatially contiguous but recurrent patterns to form complexes (land 
systems)'. Each land system had 'an assembly of land units which are 
geographically and/ or geomorphologically related, and throughout which there 
is a recurring pattern of landform, soils, and vegetation' (Bellamy 1 986:8) .  The 
land systems approach enabled extensive areas of difficult country to be 
surveyed relatively quickly. Teams from the CSIRO completed a series of land 
resources reports on different parts of Papua New Guinea and these were 
published from 1 964 onwards. Subsequently, thematic maps and systematic 
studies of the geomorphology (Loffler 1 977) ,  vegetation (Paijmans 1 976) and 
soils (Bleeker 1 983) of the whole country were published. 
The volume of published material produced by the Land Research Division of 
CSIRO in the 1 960s and early 1 970s is extraordinary. Of 562 titles of 
publications related to Papua New Guinea's geography which were published in 
the years 1 961  to 1 975, and listed in a bibliography of that country's 
geographical studies (Lea et al. 1 975) ,  at least 205 were produced by people 
working in that Division. 
The Australian Commonwealth Bureau of Mineral Resources also established 
projects in Papua New Guinea and expanded knowledge of the area's geological 
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and mineral resources. Extended by the work of private sector prospectors, and 
drawing on the pre-war prospecting reports, this knowledge laid the basis for 
the great expansion of the country's mineral industry after the mid-1 960s. 
In the Solomon Islands a DOS team also used a land systems approach in their 
surveys, and then distinguished a set of 43 'agricultural opportunity areas' which 
had 'above average potential' for an expansion of commercial agriculture 
(Hansell and Wall, 1 975: 1 35-8) . Here, as in Papua New Guinea, these surveys 
formed a base for the more detailed surveys needed for planning individual 
projects. 
In the New Hebrides, New Caledonia and French Polynesia, the French Office 
de la Recherche Scientifique et Technique Outre-Mer (ORSTOM) undertook 
many studies of the physical and social environments and published many 
specialist reports and thematic and topographic maps. Subsequently, these 
studies and the IGN's topographical maps were the bases for detailed atlases of 
these territories (Quantin 1 966-78; ORSTOM 1 981) . 
As the trend towards independence accelerated in early 1 970s, the extraordinary 
burst of environmental and land use surveys by individual scholars, government 
agencies, or advisers commissioned by governments in the previous two 
decades, meant that most Pacific territories were, in the main, extremely well 
served with the basic environmental information needed for development 
planning. They were no longer terra incognita in this respect. Nevertheless work 
has continued until the present on refining and extending understanding of 
resource and land utilisation in most countries. The advent of computer-driven 
Geographical Information System (GIS) techniques has been important in 
allowing much more efficient access to the resource, land use and other spatial 
data of the original and later surveys, especially in Papua New Guinea (see 
Vovola and Allen 2001) .  Indeed, Papua New Guinea's land resources and land 
use are now better described by detailed maps, GIS and other data bases than 
most other countries in Asia and the Pacific. 
Jiconornies and sociedes 
The need for understanding of the economic and social structures of the 
colonies was also becoming obvious in the immediate post-war years and 
governments funded a number of studies. For example, the first nutrition 
survey in Papua New Guinea was made in 1 947 (Hipsley and Clements 1 950) .  
In  the 1 950s Wilson studied the economic structure of the New Hebrides 
(Wilson 1 966) ;  Stace reported on Samoa (1 956) and H. Belshaw and Stace on 
the Cook Islands (n.d.) ;  Davidson and Aikman became advisers in designing the 
constitutions for Western Samoa and the Cook Islands (Davidson 1 967) ; Spate 
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studied the problems of and prospects for The Fjjian People (1 959) ;  and the Burns 
Commission reported on population growth, resources and development 
strategies for Fiji (Burns et al. 1 960) . Similar reports were commissioned for 
several other territories, though not all were published. For example in the late 
1 940s the Australian Minister for Territories , Paul Hasluck, commissioned 
O.H.K. Spate, C.S. Belshaw and T.W. Swan to report on the problems of 
economic development of Papua and New Guinea and, in Hasluck's words, 
they provided 'a basic document in any study of the post-war economic policy' 
(Hasluck 1 976: 1 41) .  Yet this important report was not published. 
The establishment of the South Pacific Commission (SPC) in 1 948 added an 
international dimension to the flow of material related to development by 
disseminating information which might be valuable across a number of 
territories. Many specialist reports were commissioned by the SPC, over 90 
being published in its first 8 years, 1 949 to 1 956. These studies ranged over 
many fields including co-operative movements, community development, plant 
and animal quarantine, education, medical and nutritional problems, 
management of crops such as cocoa, coffee and coconuts, and fisheries 
resources. In the 1 970s and later years, after many Pacific Island countries had 
achieved independence, other multinational agencies, such as the Asian 
Development Bank and the World Bank, became major contributors. An 
increasing number of regional institutions such as the South Pacific Forum 
(1 97 1) ,  South Pacific Bureau of Economic Cooperation (1 972) ,  the Committee 
for Coordination of Joint Prospecting for Mineral Resources in South Pacific 
Offshore Areas (1 972) ,  and the South Pacific Regional Environment 
Programme (1 980) were established to undertake research and provide data and 
advice on development and other matters of regional importance. The flow of 
reports from such organizations has continued unabated. 
At a national level, with the increasing demand for accurate and quantifiable 
information, departments or bureaus of statistics were set up in most of the 
Pacific Island territories. The amount of statistical material regularly available to 
governments increased rapidly. Subsequently the setting up of planning offices 
in many territories marked the acceptance that governments had a primary role 
in fostering and directing economic and social development. 
In Fiji, budget planning for development began soon after the Second World 
War but 'more sophisticated planning was closely tied to the introduction by the 
United Kingdom of the Commonwealth Development and Welfare grant 
scheme. Under the scheme British colonies were required to submit 
development plans in order to qualify for financial aid' (Central Planning Office 
1 970: 5) .  Fiji's first development plan covered the years 1 949-1 958, with later 
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plans covering five-year periods . The first five-yearly plans of both Tonga and 
Samoa covered the years 1 966-1 970 and both series have been maintained since 
then. The Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony also published a plan in the late 
1 960s and since independence Kiribati and Tuvalu have published development 
plans regularly. In the early 1 960s Australia invited the World Bank to prepare a 
five-year development plan for Papua New Guinea and this was published in 
1 965 (World Bank 1 965) .  In the late 1 960s the Office of Programming and Co­
ordination, the precursor to the Central Planning Office, was established and it 
commissioned a second plan prepared by consultants from the University of 
East Anglia (Overseas Development Group 1 973; Allen 1 983:225) . 
Statistical and planning offices have continued to produce economic and social 
plans, population and agricultural censuses, and official surveys and reports on a 
host of themes. Sometimes these were not formally published and thus not 
readily available outside the countries concerned. This is still true in some cases. 
Nevertheless they represent a very large increment in information compared to 
that available to administrators in the pre-war decades. 
The detail and volume of this new body of data are revealed in works published 
by several operational departments. For example, road construction and 
improvement became a major goal in Papua New Guinea in the 1 960s. 
Engineering consultants produced reports on many existing and proposed roads 
and the Coordinator of Transport provided funding for academics in the 
University of Papua New Guinea and the Australian National University's New 
Guinea Research Unit to undertake work under a 'Joint Programme of Studies 
in the Transport Process', and several monographs were published (eg. 
Bouchard 1 972 and 1 973) . Consultancies and surveys by staff enabled the 
Department of Public Works to produce a &ad Inventory consisting of 5 1  maps 
at a scale of 1 :250,000 showing every road in the country, its quality and 
characteristics, and the location, type of construction and load-bearing capacity 
of every bridge (Department of Public Works 1 967) . For a developing territory 
it was a remarkably detailed source. By the late 1 960s comparable major data 
sources could be found in fields such as agriculture, forestry, health, education 
and public works in many Pacific Island countries. 
A Oood of academics 
In the first decades of the 20th century the Pacific Islands attracted the interest 
of a few university-based scholars, the majority of whom were anthropologists . 
In the 1 930s F.E. Williams was appointed Government Anthropologist in 
Papua, indicating the administration's recognition of the need to know more 
about indigenous societies. Although several 'expeditions' comprising groups of 
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academics were mounted, in the main the academic contributions to knowledge 
of the Pacific Islands prior to the Second World War were relatively few and 
were contributed by individuals, including missionaries. Few were related to the 
requirements of government policies. 
This situation changed soon after the Second World War. With the growing 
direct involvement of metropolitan governments, both in shaping their own 
economies, and in fostering development in their colonies, came recognition of 
the need to build human capital, both at home and in the dependent territories. 
Social sciences became more popular disciplines and their relevance to 
developing colonies was signalled in the United Kingdom by the establishment 
of the Colonial Social Science Research Council which funded many studies in 
British colonies, including several in the Pacific. 
Universities expanded rapidly in size and number in metropolitan countries and 
colonial powers. Research also became a relatively more important function in 
these institutions and policy issues often guided research themes. All these 
trends led to a growing reservoir of academics, based in developed countries, 
interested in undertaking research in the dependent territories of the Pacific 
Islands. 
The land use studies of Western Samoa, Fiji and the Cook Islands were early 
examples of the very rapid expansion of university-based research studies in the 
Pacific Islands in the 1 950s and the following decade. Anthropology, linguistics, 
geography and economics were amongst the most prominent disciplines in the 
1 950s but geology, botany, zoology and other physical sciences were 
represented. Historians and sociologists were also involved. Papua New 
Guinea became a particular focus for anthropologists and Bulmer documented 
the post-war expansion of intensive ethnographic studies in that country. Of 
1 29 'traditional societies which have [by 1 969] been the subject of [1 39] 
intensive ethnographic enquiries', 20 had been studied by 1 929, a further 23 
between 1 929 and 1 949, 3 1  in the decade to 1959 and another 65 in the next 
decade to 1 969 (Bulmer 1 970: 93-6) .  A similar pattern is evident in studies 
related to the geography of the country. Of 646 studies recorded by Lea et al. 
(1 97 5) , only 51 were published before 1 9  5 1 ,  33 between 1 9  51 and 1 960, 3 1 5  
between 1 961 and 1 970, and a further 247 by mid 1 975. Many o f  the academic 
studies of the Pacific Islands in the 1 960s were undertaken by PhD students and 
their theses became a great source of information in several disciplines. 
Another example of academics providing what became a base line socio­
economic study was that carried out in Kiribati and Tuvalu by academics from 
Victoria University of Wellington between 1 971 and 1 974. The reports were 
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republished as a series, beginning in 1 982 (Geddes et al. 1 982-4), and have since 
proved invaluable as a datum against which to assess change in these two 
countries .  For example, in 1 989 the Government of Kiribati and UNDP 
supported a study by Lawrence to 'assess changes on Tamana between 1 971 -7 4 
and 1 989 in relation to the impact of the loss of phosphate income, continuing 
rural-urban migration, indigenous development initiatives and the impact of the 
UNDP Integrated Atoll Development Project' (Lawrence 1 989: 2) . Studies such 
as that of Kiribati in 1 97 1 -7 4, and the others described above, now provide very 
valuable benchmarks for the assessment of socio-economic change in the region 
and allow present-day scholars to give a much better time perspective than was 
possible for their predecessors of the 1 950s. 
Fostering education for the indigenous people was another key post-war goal 
and while the focus was initially placed on the primary level, the need for people 
trained at secondary and higher levels soon became clear. Many public, as 
distinct from mission, high schools were established throughout the region in 
the 1 950s, followed by teacher training and technical institutions and finally, in 
the mid-1 960s, universities .  The University of Papua New Guinea started 
teaching in 1 965; the University of the South Pacific, Fiji, in 1 968. While the 
training of students who were expected to take leading roles in their own 
countries was the universities' primary task, staff at both universities began 
research studies in many fields. 
In Papua New Guinea the Australian National University's Research School of 
Pacific Studies had established the New Guinea Research Unit in Port Moresby 
in 1 961 . The NGRU became a base for many researchers and, over the next 1 4  
years, published over 60 monographs, mostly on themes related to economic 
and social development. The wave of research results was reflected in the 
starting of several new academic journals focused on the Pacific Islands in the 
1 950s and 1960s, and subsequently to the emergence of specialist publishers, 
notably the Institute of Pacific Studies, University of the South Pacific, whose 
aim was to encourage writing by Pacific Islanders. 
The late 1 9 60s saw students and graduates of the Pacific Island universities 
joining the expatriate academics who had hitherto dominated publications on 
the region. In 1 968, at the Second Waigani Seminar held in the University of 
Papua New Guinea only 3 of 31 papers were presented by indigenous islanders 
(Inglis 1 969) .  Only two years later, at the Fourth Waigani Seminar, Pacific 
Islanders contributed almost one-third of the papers (Ward 1 970) .  From the 
early 1 970s the process of 'localisation' speeded up as trained indigenous staff 
replaced expatriate public servants. The formulation of policy started to be 
'indigenised' as independence approached but much of the provision of 
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technical information has continued to be largely in the hands of expatriates. 
The era of consultants 
As the colonial administrations needed more and more information and advice 
for policy formation in the early 1 950s it was obvious that they had to look 
outside their own resources, especially as emphasis in recruitment of 
administrative officers had tended in the past to be placed on generalists rather 
than technical experts. As shown above, apart from contributing to the 
dramatic expansion of knowledge about the colonial territories, some academics 
became important advisors to the colonial governments and administrations. 
They ushered in the age of the 'expert' (Spate 1 961) ,  and it was fortunate they 
were able to draw on the foundation provided by the new maps, census results, 
databases and academic monographs that flooded out after 1 950. 
From the early 1 960s the amount of foreign aid given to the Pacific Islands, and 
other developing regions, by the colonial powers and other developed countries 
increased rapidly. The process of aid giving also became more bureaucratic and 
formalized. Studies required to assess needs and to plan projects were 
increasingly put out to tender and consultancy firms increased in number, range 
of expertise and size. Professional consultants became the major source of 
advice to governments and administrations in many fields. One result of this 
has been that although the overall volume of studies related to development 
issues in the region increased greatly in and after the 1 970s, a smaller relative 
proportion of total studies in the region have been formally published and thus 
have entered the public domain. Much of the material produced in consultancy 
reports has had very limited circulation and has not found its way into secure 
deposit or university libraries. Unfortunately there is a high risk that much of 
this material, costly to provide, will prove ephemeral. It could even happen that 
historians of social and economic change in the middle of the 21 st century will 
find that, in some fields, the body of material available to them from the 1 950s 
and 1 960s is greater than that from the 1 990s. 
After the 1 950s and 1 960s the roles and styles of government and 
administration had changed irrevocably from those of the 1 930s. The 
information explosion of the 1 9  50s and 1 960s was both part cause and part 
consequence of this change. 
1 3  
R. Gerard Ward The 1 9  50s and 1960s-an Information Age 
References: 
Allen, BJ. 1 97 1 .  Land Use Map of Mangaia, 1 :7,920, Government Printer, 
Wellington, 2 sheets. 
Allen, BJ. 1 983. 'Paradise Lost? Rural development in an export-led economy: 
the case of Papua New Guinea', in D.A.M. Lea and D.P. Chaudri (eds) , Rural 
Development and the State, Methuen, London, pp.21 5-40. 
Anon, 1 928. 'The Cook Islands', New Zealand Journal of Science and Technology, Vol. 
IX, No. 6, pp.360-73. 
Bellamy, J .A. (ed.) 1 986. Papua New Guinea Inventory of natural resources, Population 
Distribution and Land Use, Natural resources Series No. 6, Commonwealth 
Scientific and Industrial Research Organization, Canberra. 
Belshaw, H. and V.D.Stace, n.d. A Programme for Economic Development in the Cook 
Islands, Government Printer, Wellington. 
Bleeker, P. 1 983. Soils of Papua New Guinea, Commonwealth Scientific and 
Industrial Research Organization and Australian National University Press, 
Canberra. 
Bouchard, J .F. 1 972. The Impact of Roads on the Monetary Activites of Subsistence 
Economies in the Okapa Region of Papua New Guinea, Department of Geography 
Occasional Paper No. 4, University of Papua New Guinea, Port Moresby. 
Bouchard, J .F. 1 973. The Impact of Roads in the Gumine Region of Papua New Guinea, 
Department of Geography Occasional Paper No. 5 ,  University of Papua New 
Guinea, Port Moresby. 
Brookfield, H.C. 1 972. Colonialism, Development and Independence: the case of the 
Melanesian islands in the South Pacific, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Brookfield, H.C. 1 975. Interdependent Development, Methuen, London. 
Bulmer, R.N.H. 1 970. 'Intensive ethnographic studies', in R.G. Ward and 
D.A.M. Lea, (eds) , 1 970. An Atlas of Papua and New Guinea, University of Papua 
and New Guinea and Collins-Longman, London, pp. 93-6. 
Bulmer, R.N.H. 1 972. 'Victims of progress: the plight of ethnic minorities in 
undeveloped areas', in M.W. Ward (ed.) 1 972. Change and Development in Rural 
Melanesia, The Australian National University, Canberra, pp. 1 1 9-29. 
Burns, A. et. al. 1 960. Report of the Commission of Enquiry into the Natural Resources 
1 4  
R. Gerard Ward The 1 950s and 1 960s-an Information Age 
and Population Trends of the Colony of Fijz� 19 59, Fij i Legislative Council Paper 
1 /1 960, Government Printer, Suva. 
Central Planning Office, 1 970. Fi;i"'s Sixth Development Plan 1971- 1975, Ministry 
of Finance, Suva. 
Clarke, W.C. 2005. 'Taim bilong IVap: Looking back at Government by patrol in 
Papua New Guinea', The Defining Years Pacific Islands, 1945-65, The Australian 
National University, Canberra, pp. 39-61 . 
Davidson, J .W. 1 967. Samoa mo Samoa: the Emergence of the Independent State of 
Western Samoa, Oxford University Press, Melbourne. 
Department of Public Works, 1 967. Road Inventory, Department of Works, 
Territory of Papua New Guinea, [Port Moresby] . 
Fox, J .W. 1 962. 'Introduction: the problem posed', in Fox and Cumberland, 
1 962: 1 3-28. 
Fox, J .W. and K.B. Cumberland (eds) , 1 962. Western Samoa: Land, Life and 
Agriculture in Tropical Pofynesia, Whitcombe and Tombs, Wellington. 
Geddes, W.H. et al. 1 982-4. Atoll Economy: Social Change in IV'n"bati and Tuvalu, 6 
vols, Development Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra. 
Grange, L.I. and J .P. Fox, 1 953. Soils of the Lower Cook Group, Soil Bureau 
Bulletin 8, Government Printer, Wellington. 
Hansell, J .R.F. and J .R.D. Wall, 1 976. Land Resources of the Solomon Islands, Land 
Resources Division, Ministry of Overseas Development, Surbiton. 
Hasluck, P. 1 958. 'Present tasks and policies', in J .  Wilkes (ed.) 1 958, New 
Guinea and Australia , Angus and Robertson, Sydney, pp.75-1 1 7. 
Hasluck, P. 1 976. A Time for Building: Australian Administration in Papua and New 
Guinea, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne. 
Hipsley, E.H. and E.W. Clements, 1 950. New Guinea Nutn"tion Suro� Expedition, 
194 7, Department of External Territories, Canberra. 
Houtz, R.E. 1 958.  Geology of North Tailevu, Viti Levu, Geological Survey Bulletin, 
No. 1 ,  Government Press, Suva. 
Inglis, K.S. (ed) , 1 969. The History of Melanesia, The Australian National 
University, Canberra. 
1 5  
R. Gerard Ward The 1 950s and 1 960s-an Information Age 
Johnston, W.B . 1 959.  'The Cook Islands: land use in an island group of the 
South-west Pacific', The Journal if Tropical Geograpf?y, Vol. 1 3, Dec. 1 959, pp.38-
57. 
Jupp, K.M. 1 958 .  R.eport on the Population Census, 1956: Tem"tory if Western Samoa, 
Government Printer, Wellington. 
Kear, D. and G.L. Wood, 1 959. The Geology and Hydrology if Western Samoa, N.Z. 
Geological Survey Bulletin, No. 63, Government Printer, Wellington. 
Lawrence, R. 1 992. Tamana Fifteen Years on: a Survey ef Changes in the Household 
Economy Since 1974, Report prepared for the Ministry of Home Affairs and Rural 
Development, Kiribati. 
Lea, D.A.M., N. Clarke and R.G. Ward, 1 975. 'Geographers in Papua New 
Guinea: a preliminary bibliography', Australian Geographer, Vol. 1 3, pp. 1 04-1 45. 
Loffler E. 1 977. Geomorphology ef Papua New Guinea, Commonwealth Scientific 
and Industrial Research Organization and Australian National University Press, 
Canberra. 
McArthur, N. 1 967. Island Populations ef the Pacific, Australian National University 
Press, Canberra. 
Naval Intelligence Division, 1 943-5. Pacific Islands, 4 vols, His Majesty's 
Stationery Office, Frame and London. 
ORSTOM, 1 981 . Atlas de fa nouveffe Cafedonie et dependances, Editions de l'Office 
de la Recherche Scientifique et Technique Outre-Mer, Paris. 
Overseas Development Group, 1 973. A R.eport on Development Strategies for Papua 
New Guinea, Office of Programming and Co-ordination, Port Moresby. 
Paijmans, K. (ed.) 1 976. New Guinea Vegetation, Commonwealth Scientific and 
Industrial Research Organization and Australian National University Press, 
Canberra. 
Premier's Department, 1 968. Cook Islands Population Census 1966, Government 
of the Cook Islands, Rarotonga. 
Quantin, P. 1 966-78. At/as des Sofs et de Quefques Miffieu Nature/, ORSTOM, Paris. 
Spate, O.H.K. 1 959 .  The Fijian People: Economic Problems and Prospects, Fiji 
Legislative Council Paper 1 3/ 1 959, Government Printer, Suva. 
1 6  
R. Gerard Ward The 1 950s and 1960s-an Information Age 
Spate, O.H.K. 1 96 1 .  'On being an expert', Quadrant, Vol. 5, Pt 2, pp.25-34. 
Stace, V.D. 1 956.  Western Samoa: an Economic Surory, S .P.C. Technical Paper, No. 
9 1 .  
Twyford, I.T. and A.C.S. Wright, 1 965. The Soil Resources ef the Fiji Islands, 
Government Printer, Suva. 
Vovola, P. and B.J .  Allen, 200 1 .  'Computer managed databases relevant to 
agriculture in PNG', Food Securiry far Papua New Guinea, Aciar Proceedings No. 
99, Canberra, pp.467-8 1 .  
Ward, M.W. (ed) , 1 970. The Politics ef Melanesia, The Australian National 
University, Canberra. 
Ward, R.G. 1 965. Land Use and Population in Fiji, Her Majesty's Stationery 
Office, London. 
Ward, R.G. 1 985. 'Land, land use and land availability in Fiji', in H.C. 
Brookfield, F. Ellis and R.G. Ward, Land, Cane and Coconuts: Papers on the Rural 
Economy ef Fiji, Department of Human Geography Publication HG/ 1 7, 
Australian National University, Canberra, pp. 1 5 -64. 
Ward R.G. 1 994. 'Davidson's contributions to the "Admiralty Handbooks,'" 
Journal if Pacific History, Vol. 29, No. 2, pp.238-40. 
Wilson, J .S.G. 1 966. Economic Surory ef the New Hebrides, Her Majesty's Stationery 
Office, London. 
World Bank, 1 965. The Economic Development ef the Tem"tory ef Papua and New 
Guinea, Johns Hopkins University Press, and World Bank, Baltimore. 
Wright, A.C.S. 1 963. Soils and Land Use if Western Samoa, Soil Bureau Bulletin 22, 
Government Printer, Wellington. 
1 7  
The View from the Sub-District 
Hank Nelson 
In 1 953 the two Australian Territories of Papua and New Guinea were divided 
into 1 5  Districts and these were further divided into 51  Sub-Districts . 1 The 
Department of District Services and Native Affairs had a total of 385 officers, 
and after accounting for those on leave, on courses, or retained at headquarters, 
it had about 300 to distribute through the districts and sub-districts.2 Over fifty 
were in just two districts, the long-contacted Central District and New Britain. 
In other districts there were around ten to twenty officers. In the Southern 
Highlands there were 1 1 ,  Western District 1 4  and Gulf 1 3. That is, 38 men were 
responsible for the administration of over half the population and area of 
Papua. No government officers from any other departments served in the 
Southern Highlands, in the Gulf just four, and from the Western District five 
(one Works, one Education and two from Public Health) . The whole of the 
highlands were then divided into just three districts, Southern, Western and 
Eastern. They were administered by 5 1  officers from DDSNA. Public Health, 
the Department with the next greatest number of officers, had just 1 3. The 
distribution of Australian officers was much the same in Northern, Sepik and 
Bougainville; the total numbers of service department officers exceeded those 
from DDSNA only in Central, Manus, New Britain and Morobe.3 In 1 953 for 
most people in Papua and New Guinea Australian administration was whatever 
was done by the kiaps, the field officers of DDSNA. 
For most people, government was the patrol. In the year ending on 30 June 
1 953 the Australian administration had carried out 402 patrols, each averaging 
about 24 days. In addition, there were over 200 surveys more grandly titled 
'Inspections by District Commissioners'. 4 On many patrols there were two 
1 Manus was a District and was not further divided. 
2 Report to the General Assembly of the United Nations on the Administration of the 
Territory of New Guinea from l " July 1 942 to 30th June 1 953, [New Guinea Annual Report] 
Commonwealth Government Printer, Canberra, 1 953, gives the numbers in departments 
(p. 109) and distribution through Districts (p. 1 20). The Parliament of the Commonwealth of 
Australia, Territory of Papua, Annual Report for the period 1 st July 1 952 to 3ffh June 1 953, 
[Papua Annual Report], Commonwealth Government Printer, Canberra, 1954, p.71 and p.82. 
3 Several of the education officers in Central, Moro be and New Britain were there to teach 
the children of Australians. In Madang District there were 23 DDSNA, 1 2  Health, 5 
Agriculture, 2 Education, 5 telecommunications etc. 
4 Papua Annual Report 1952-3, p.83; New Guinea Annual Report 1952-3, p.121 .  
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DDSNA officers, sometimes just one, only five or six Papua New Guinean 
police, a Native Medical Assistant, an interpreter, and carriers, often recruited 
village to village. As there were 1 50 patrol officer and 59 cadet patrol officer 
positions in the public service compared to 40 Assistant District Commissioners 
and twenty District Commissioners, it was inevitable that most patrols were 
carried out by young patrol officers and cadets who had recently joined the 
expanding postwar service. Sometimes the patrol also included a European 
Medical Assistant, but there simply were not enough of them to travel with 
most patrols. 5 Separate Department of Health patrols made further demands on 
its few officers: it had just 1 3  European officers to cover all the highlands. 6 
There was even less likely to be an agricultural officer on patrol: five districts 
had no agricultural officers and another five had three or less.7 
The reports submitted after each patrol were numbered according to the sub­
district and reporting year, and enclosed within a cover listing all costs (stores 
carried, gifts to carriers, food bought en route and canoe hire) , the dates of the 
previous District Service and medical patrols, and each village population, 
including numbers of births and deaths, movements in and out, and the total 
numbers of both men and women who might be recruited as labourers. The 
report itself began with an initial page giving the place, dates and purpose of the 
patrol, all European and Papua New Guinean personnel, and a map reference. 
The diary of the patrol, typed from notes taken at the time, gave a daily four or 
five-line summary of movement and action. After some 'general remarks', the 
report followed headings allowing comments on 'native affairs', village housing, 
schools, roads, bridges, airstrips, agriculture and livestock, village officials, 
missions, the census, rest houses, cases arbitrated or determined in the courts 
for native affairs ('native matters' in Papua) , timber resources, labour 
recruitment, health and hygiene, and anthropology. The conclusion often 
returned to the object of the patrol. The officer in charge of the patrol included 
comments of the performance of his colleagues, the police and medical 
assistants. So Patrol Officer Jeffery Daugherty, after a patrol into the Kaugel 
and Nebilyer valleys in 1 952, wrote that Constable Hurrendua was: 
5 There were over 1 00 on the public service establishment. 
6 That includes doctors as well as European Medical Assistants. 
7 The agriculture officers were concentrated in Central, Morobe, New Britain and Eastern 
Highlands. The Aiyura experimental station near Kainantu explains the apparently high 
numbers in the Eastern Highlands. 
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A constable with exceptional personality and has a strong influence on the 
people. Is at the moment in charge of Tambil Base Camp. Uniform and 
equipment fair only.8 
And Patrol O fficer H.G. Routley wrote of Constable Dom: 
This constable is typical of the stolid, plotting policeman of fiction. He 
unquestioningly carried out all duties allotted to him to the best of his 
ability, and was not once guilty of complaining. An excellent constable, but 
unfortunately not a suitable type for promotion.9 
In their reports the government officers rarely admitted-as they did in their 
reminiscences-that the police sometimes controlled events and withheld 
information or lied when they thought it appropriate. 1 0 
The typing up of the report by the returned officer was time-consuming. Many 
reports covered over twenty foolscap pages of careful single-spaced typing 
punched through several carbons.  If the average length of a patrol report in 
1 952-1 953 was only ten pages, then they provided some 4000 pages of 
comment from all 5 1  sub-districts. 1 1  Sent to the District Commissioner who 
commented and forwarded them to the Director of DDSNA, they were 
eventually bound and stored in one of the many louvred windowed offices in 
Konedobu. 12 They were essential reading for field and headquarters officers, and 
continue to be invaluable to Papua New Guineans and others who want to 
understand the policies,  assumptions and actions of Australia's administration. 
8 Mount Hagen Patrol Report 3 of 1 951 /52. Nearly all the patrols quoted here were collected 
by Dr Norma McArthur, then at the ANU and making a study of the demographic data 
collected by field officers in Papua and New Guinea. Her files from all districts are held in the 
Division of Pacific and Asian History. The quotes are from the original patrol reports, but 
many do not have the covers or are brief excerpts and so the patrol number and the name of 
the reporting officer are not attached. 
9 Chimbu Patrol Report 6 of 1 952/3. 
10 H. Nelson, Taim Bilong Mas/a: The A ustralian Involvement with Papua New Guinea, ABC, 
Sydney, 1 982, p.48. Bill Gammage, The Sky Travellers: Journrys in New Guinea 1 938- 1 939, 
Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1 998, has investigated much more fully the 
relationships between police and government officers. If experienced officers such as Taylor 
and Black had such difficulty then the problem was immeasurably greater for new, young 
officers. 
1 1  In 1 953 there were also 35 Patrol Posts where patrols started. Some Patrol Posts were 
subsequently important ( eg Kiunga and Ialibu) while others were temporarily on the 
administrative map. 
1 2  That was where they were when I first read them in the late 1 960s. 
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While the reports often have patrols that 'departed' and 'proceeded' rather than 
'left' and 'went', and new officers were guided by the style of previous reports, 
some writers displayed an individuality in style and selection of topics. An 
officer returning to Wabag after a long patrol to Porgera wrote: 
The Lagaip is a wide spreading basin with the mountains of the horizon 
dim in the distance and many many homesteads scattered about in its hills 
and ridges. The whole floor of this valley is covered with cultivation, 
dotted with ceremonial grounds and ringed by tall casuarina pines. To 
travel in the valley systems after days in the mountains and forest is a real 
pleasure. 13 
Trying to describe the houses at Chenap upstream from Ambunti on the Sepik 
an officer said that they well constructed, conical in shape and 'Actually they 
look like a huge parachute draped over a central pole'. 1 4 Another officer on the 
eastern edge of the Eastern Highlands said that the women's houses were 
'perched like sparrows' nests on crazy sticks - one wonders how they support a 
h ' . h ' 1 5 uman s we1g t . 
In their reports officers included more than was strictly 'administration'. 
Patrolling out of Wakunai in north east Bougainville, a kiap was the target of 
duel missions. He wrote: 
At the Kusi Roman Catholic Mission school a choral programme lasting 
about 20 minutes was staged by Sironga, the native teacher, for the patrol's 
benefit. Apparently regarding this as a precedent native teachers at Pusupa 
(Methodist) and Rarie (S.D.A.) eagerly sought permission for and put on 
after dinner hymn-singing outside the rest-house, in the latter case lasting 
about an hour and a half. Vocal strength, rather than sweetness, 
highlighted these sessions, but teachers and singers were thanked in each 
case for the gesture. The National Anthem was sung at Tianana as the 
patrol entered the village. 1 6 
On the Sepik near the junctions with the April and Leonard Schultz Rivers a 
patrol officer noticed that the young men had remarkably large penises. He 
assured his superiors that he had made discreet enquiries, and discovered that 
the youths went into the bush each day and massaged their penises with nettles, 
1 3  Wabag Patrol Report 3-4 of 1 952/3. 
1 4  Ambunti Patrol Report 6 of 1 952/3. 'Chenap' later spelt Zenap. 
15 Kainantu Patrol report 9 of 1 952/3. 
16  Kieta sub-district, patrol from Wakunai, Sept 1 953. 
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resulting - not surprisingly - in 'intense irritation and swelling'. 1 7 
On most occasions the field officers were restrained in their comments on their 
fellows. As Ian Downs has pointed out, you could write a report that had 
headquarters asking 'all kinds of asinine questions' or you could imply that 
fellow officers were efficient and the district running smoothly and 'therefore 
the district officer' (and your boss) 'was doing a good job'. 1 8 Fortunately, not all 
officers were so circumspect. Patrol Officer H.G. Routley travelling through the 
islands and mud flats of Goaribari admitted that as a non-swimmer he was 
anxious and incompetent in a 'hollow log paddled by primitive and fatalistic 
tribesmen', but that his companion, Cadet Patrol Officer H.S. Pegg, was a 
disaster on land: 
If there was a weak point in a board walk, or a log that rolled when 
stepped on, he was sure to find it. On only two occasions did he miss, 
once when the board walk at Aimahe collapsed shortly after he had passed 
over it, and once when the floor of the rest house at Ubua gave way. 1 9  
Cadet Patrol Officer Pegg survived to lead the next patrol to  the Goaribari. This 
time, he said, he was able to obtain willing paddlers and fast canoes, but he still 
seems to have had some trouble on land as he timed his arrival off villages at 
low tide and had to wade several hundred yards knee-deep in oozing mud to 
make the landings. 20 
A Cadet Patrol Officer in the Eastern Highlands explained that after hearing a 
case in the court for native affairs he decided that the woman complainant was 
just trying to cause trouble between her husband and another man. He 
'castigated' her and dismissed the case. The woman went home and a few days 
later committed suicide. 21 It is a stark revelation of one village tragedy on a 
colonial frontier. Another officer returned to Aitape after a patrol into the Palei 
and Maimai areas pointed out that previous patrols had been rare and some 
villages had not been visited since the last of the prewar patrols. He could not 
restrain himself: 'An absence of four and a half years between patrols is long 
enough, surely, but an absence of twelve years, even with an intervening war, is, 
17  Ambunti Patrol Report 6 of 1 952/3. 
18 Ian Downs, The Last Mountain: A Life in Papua New Guinea, University of Queensland Press, 
Brisbane, 1 986, p. 70. 
19 Kikori Patrol Report 1 0 of 1 950/ 1 .  
20 Kikori Patrol Report 8 of 1 951 /2. 
21 Kumiava Patrol Report 1 7 of 1 952/3. No conclusions can be drawn about what caused the 
woman to commit suicide. 
22 
Hank Nelson The View from the Sub-District 
perhaps, excessive, to say the least. '22 The cautionary 'perhaps' did not blunt the 
message. 
It is a relief to the researcher to find that reports written within a hierarchical 
bureaucracy and following a prescribed structure have not been shorn of all 
reflection of the personality, side interests and prejudices of the writer; and that 
freedom increases their value as the most comprehensive statements about what 
Australians were doing and trying to do when in actual contact with the peoples 
of Papua and New Guinea. 
One basic task for all field officers was to have people lain, that is, they wanted 
all the people in a village to line up in family groups and have their names 
entered in a village book. On later 'census' patrols, the kiaps would again ask the 
people to lain, and then they could check all births, deaths and migrations; how 
many were away at school or working; they could identify those wanted as 
witnesses or suspects in cases before the courts; and they had a basic document 
helping them understand land ownership and marriages.  An accurate census was 
essential, its making and maintenance were measures of the extent of 
government control, and once established the village books were a tool of the 
administration. But making and checking a village census was often difficult. 
The first problem was that many people did not live in villages. Often, the basic 
group to be recorded in the 'village' book had to be created. The Nagovisi of 
southern Bougainville lived in scattered hamlets and to please the kiaps they had 
built villages, but they were the field officers admitted 'only lines of houses 
which the natives pretend to occupy when a patrol is in the area'.23 A Cadet 
Patrol Officer climbed across the Finisterres to reach people on the headwaters 
of the Gusap and other rivers flowing into the Markham. The villages were, he 
said deserted, and the people returning to their old ways of living in isolated 
family groups. He drew a pessimistic picture of the consequences: the village 
officials would be ignored, houses poorly built and the walking tracks 
neglected.24 In Bundi, on the highland fringe of the Madang District, the people 
were also leaving their new villages.  Made up of concentrations of up to 300 
people, the villages were, the kiap conceded, arbitrary concentrations of people 
with no desire and no kin ties to hold them together. Patrols out of Bogia and 
Saidor on the north coast noted that the 'tendency for the "independent 
hamlet" remained', and that some people who had never joined the 
concentrated villages were clearly determined to continue to live in their house 
22 Aitape Patrol Report 4 of 1 952/3. 
23 Extract from a Buin patrol in the McArthur files. 
24 Saidor Patrol Report 3 of 1 951 /2. 
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and place. 25 Further west near Vanimo the kiap said that the people should be 
encouraged to leave their 'pitiful collections of houses, with a small and ragged 
population' and form a compact village under 'one central figure of authority'. 
In the Taiora on the east of the Highlands the people had come down from 
their 'straggling collections of loosely associated hamlets perched on various 
ridges' to build their houses around a cleared square.26 But further west through 
the Highlands many people were still dispersed.27 Among the recently contacted 
Huri of the Tari Valley the kiap reported: 
They do not live in villages, and do not even have established meeting 
places, but live in small huts scattered through the gardens and bush, 
usually one family to a hut. 
Each man and his family may have land rights in as many as six different 
places, often some distance apart, and he moves between these places 
according to the seasons of the state of the gardens . In many instances a 
family is forced to move because of nearby fighting.28 
On the Hagen-Sepik patrol Jim Taylor, on arriving at Faram near Telfomin, 
noted that he had reached the first village since the Eastern Highlands-and the 
patrol had passed through thousands and thousands of people.29 
By contrast, in the Western District field officers encountered an excess 
concentration of people. In the Lake Murray area and south into the Bamu delta 
a village was one longhouse. The longhouses varied in size with the number of 
people, but one among the newly contacted Supei west of the Strickland River 
was 25 feet wide, 50 feet long and 25 feet high at its highest. All the longhouses 
were heavily barricaded.30 In the longer contacted Fly Estuary there was just one 
longhouse left, at Wapi, but there the people were said to be planning to build 
individual houses. 31 
Those writing about Papuan and New Guinea commurutles that did not 
traditionally live in villages have sometimes indicated that they dealt with 
25 Bogia Patrol Report 1 1  of 1 95 1 ;  and Saidor Patrol Report 9 of 1 952/3. 
26 Kainantu Patrol Report 5 of 1 951 /2. 
27  Eastern Highlands, Kumiava Patrol Post Report 17 of 1 952/3 regrets the 'hindrance to 
efficient administration' of  having people in small hamlets. 
28 Extract from Southern Highlands patrol report of 1 953. 
29 Bill Gammage, The 59 Travellers:Journrys in New Guinea 1938- 1939, Melbourne University 
Press, Melbourne, 1 998, p .1 38. 
30 Lake Murray Patrol Report 7-9 of 1 953. 
31 Daru Patrol Report 5 of 1 952. 
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exceptions, but patrol reports from Bougainville to Aitape show that the village 
was the exception. But for the Australian administration, the village was 
essential. A government based on patrolling had to have people concentrated at 
convenient points: its patrols could not climb every ridge, find every new garden 
and visit every family. The government agents (the village constables, luluais and 
tultuls) , and the government servants (the medical aid post orderlies and 
teachers) also needed villages. But once the government concentrated people at 
one point then problems of land ownership and old clan enmities intensified; 
many people, especially the women, faced long journeys to their gardens; and 
pigs and dogs were more likely to be a nuisance. For many people in the 'nation 
of villagers', the village is not much older than the nation. 
For convenience of administration, villages needed a name, and even that 
seemingly simple requirement could raise problems. Patrol Officer D.G. Calder 
said that when the Pare, living northwest of Lake Murray, were asked the name 
of their village they gave the name of the nearest stream, the longhouse, or the 
totem of the clan living there. 32 Similarly near Lake Kutubu a community 
sometimes gave the name of the land on which their hamlet was built, a clan 
name, or the name of the headman, and a kiap in the upper Chimbu decided 
that the name of the men's house was the best choice. The hamlet was scattered, 
but at least the men's house fixed the home of the bigman of the clan or 
subclan.33 Three years later the Assistant District Officer at Kundiawa, B. Hayes, 
was still recommending that the Chimbu sub-district be censused uniformly on 
a 'group/ clan/ sub-clan basis' and that they be named according to a consistent 
li 34 po cy. 
Among people who were in villages and accustomed to 'lining' for the 
government, a field officer could give warning of his visit and expect the people 
to gather in their family groups and be checked against the village book. In 1 954 
on the fourth postwar census patrol into the Kongara on southwest 
Bougainville the kiap was able to say that all men except one had lined, and the 
tu/tu! had been told to bring him into Kieta and report.35 That indicated a high 
degree of government control and village conformity, but even on Bougainville 
there were people beyond government control and on the margins of 
government surveillance. At Subiaia the people were still living in their dispersed 
hamlets, and the kiap from Wakunai found the people 'timid'. Although he 
waited for two nights at least seventeen people did not lain. He told the luluai to 
32 Lake Murray Patrol Report 7 of 1 952/3. 
33 Chimbu Patrol Report 1 1 / 12 of 1 950. 
34 Comment by B.Hayes on Chimbu Patrol Report 3 of  1 952/3. 
35 Kieta Patrol Report, March 1954. 
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find them and meet the patrol at another village. They did not appear.36 
F.J. Martin patrolling out of Dreikikir into the Muhiang area found that half the 
people at Moi No 1 fled into the bush, but he waited two days and they came 
back. At Ilahita he added 1 80 new names to the census, although he believed 
that through south Muhiang many people had not been seen by the patrol.37 On 
the Sepik River at Wasurian village, the kiap went around all the houses and by 
presenting the people with steel blades and fish hooks was able to induce them 
to line. At Chenap the villagers sat in their canoes just off the bank and just 
shook their heads when he asked them to line. Eventually the police 'working 
literally like a sheep dog' herded them ashore.38 South of Aiome on the Ramu 
the Maring people were pugnacious, refused to trade, and rather than line fled, 
shouting warnings to others and the relayed calls could be heard in all 
directions. 39 A patrol visited a longhouse in the Biami area of the Western 
District but 
Everybody barricaded themselves inside and no inducement whatever 
could get them to come out and meet the patrol. The only response 
obtained at all was for a hand to appear through the barricaded door and 
indicate quite obviously that the patrol should be on its way.40 
In the neighbouring Supei and Kubor areas, the villagers tried to hurry the 
patrol on its way and deliberately directed it away from other villages .  
Reactions in the Highlands varied greatly. In the N ebilyer Valley some people 
were enthusiastic about having their names recorded in village books: they 
thought it distinguished them from the 'kanakas' who were yet to make an 
alliance with the government. The census took place with a 'maximum of noise' 
and swarming mobs of people. 41 In the upper Lai the people wanted the 
government to 'sit down' on their land, and they, too, wanted their names 
recorded.42 On the first patrol for two years into the Kup area of the Chimbu 
sub-district, Routley wrote: 
The Patrol was well received at all points. Roads and pathways in the 
vicinity of Resthouses were in several places strewn with flowers and the 
36 Wakunai Patrol Report, September 1 953. 
37 Dreikikir Patrol Report 9 of 1 953/ 4. 
38 Ambunti Patrol report 6 of 1 952/3. 
39 Madang Patrol Report, June 1 953, into Gainj and Maring. 
40 Lake Murray Patrol Report, July - September 1 953. 
41 Mt Hagen Patrol Report of August-September 1 952. 
42 Wabag Patrol Report 4 of 1 952/3. 
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Resthouses themselves were liberally decorated with blossom and greenery. 
As the patrol arrived at each Resthouse it was met by the greater part of 
the population adjacent thereto, and many bands of natives travelled quite 
long distances from other Census Sub-Divisions merely to look on. The 
shouting, singing and gestures of welcome were quite overwhelming in 
their enthusiasm. Large quantities of food were piled at each Resthouse 
preparatory to our arrival, and this was purchased with Trade Goods .43 
No wonder that it was to those times and those patrols that kiaps in their 
retirement were pleased to recall.44 
By contrast, C. Terrell reported: 
In the lower Tari, conducting a census is a painful affair, but in time the 
people will realize what it is about, stop treating it as a joke, better avoided 
if possible. I am of the opinion that there are still large Nos in this area 
who remain unrecorded. 45 
On patrols through heavily populated country where the people were keen to 
line, a patrol might record over 1 0,000 names. Yet even in the Kainantu sub­
district of the Eastern Highlands only two-thirds of the estimated total 
population were recorded in the village books. 46 
When people living in scattered hamlets were sufficiently familiar with the 
government to be censused then decisions had to be made about how to define 
the group to be entered in the 'village' book. In the Upper Chimbu the people 
were lined by clan and sub-clan, but in the N ebilyer Valley the people all wanted 
to 'bung' on the same day, disputes broke out about which line should be 
censused first, people kept detaching themselves from one line and joining 
another, and refugees from clan warfare had to be fitted in somewhere although 
they might soon leave to reclaim lost lands. 47 
Once the group was defined, the people were gathered into families. But what 
constituted a family was often unclear. In the Lumi area of the Sepik a kiap 
confessed it was almost impossible to reconcile the village books with the 
43 Chimbu Patrol Report 6 of 1 952/3. 
44 H. Nelson, Taim Bilong Masta: The Australian Involvement with Papua New Guinea, ABC, 
Sydney, 1 982, p .50. 
45 Southern Highlands Patrol Report 3 of 1 953/ 4. 
46 Kainantu Patrol Report 5 of 1 951 /2. In 1 953 the Annual Report gave just over 4000 as 
'estimated'. 
47 Mt Hagen Patrol report of August-September 1 952. 
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groups in front of him: 
Children are exchanged and passed around in a most bewildering manner 
and few women appear to be able to keep a check on the number and 
disposal of their offspring from year to year. This constant adoption and 
passing back of children makes the accurate compilation of family groups a 
particularly difficult task and it is likely that every patrol officer considers 
the colleague before him a fool and an incompetent idiot.48 
Further complications arose where the people did not have a fixed name to be 
entered in the book. Patrolling on the headwaters of the Wantoat, Leron and 
other rivers between the Finisterres and the Markham, P.K. Moloney 
complained that he could not find the 'owners' of many of the names he called. 
He found that people adopted different names at different stages of their lives 
and some could not remember the name they had given at the time of the last 
patrol. Forced to make a quick decision on a new name they seized on the 
obvious so that 'Names like Katap (fire) Yanga (water) Ikwap (river) and names 
of the topography are common'. 49 Other people also chose any convenient 
noun when asked for a name. A kiap at Atiera on the east of the Eastern 
Highlands found himself reading out the names trees, birds and stones, and the 
Anga speakers in the Menyamya Sub-District had to overcome strong cultural 
aversion to giving their real names. 50 The patient officer found himself being 
given the words for 'stony ground, a pig, a dog, the leaf of a tree, hungry, and 
skin and bone'. He was also amused at apparently 'ferocious natives' putting on 
the 'bashful girl act' as they hesitated before giving a name. An apparently casual 
approach to families also prolonged the census. Children seemed to attach 
themselves to any adult and elderly women with withered breasts came forward 
with newly-born babies in string bags. When confronted with the biological 
improbability of their claim to recent motherhood, the old women calmly 
insisted that they had indeed j ust given birth. And at the end of the census a 
number of children remained unclaimed by any family. The kiap wrote: 
Liars I have met. Men would stand in front of me almost with tears in their 
eyes and tell me that their wife was dead, that he had the worry of looking 
after the family of small children when all the time he had told his wife that 
he didn't want her to have her name recorded with his.51 
48 Ai tape Patrol Report, patrol to Lumi 19 5 1 .  
49 Morobe Patrol Report 4 of 1 951 /2. 
so Kainantu Patrol Report 9 of 1 952/3; and Menyamya Patrol Report extract. 
51 Menyamya Patrol Report extract. 
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While far from complete, the census was, the kiap claimed, better than the 
previous one, and it would be 'even better next time'. 
From this survey of Department of District Services and Native Affairs patrols, 
it is apparent that as the postwar decade came to an end, much administration 
was still concerned with what was broadly concerned with 'pacification' -
extending Australian control by patrolling, setting up new patrol or police posts 
in frontier areas, stopping local warfare, providing initial health services, getting 
people accustomed to the presence of patrols, entering their names in village 
books, appointing village officials, and encouraging the people to take disputes 
to Australian field officers . Attempting to combat a cult in the Bamu area of the 
Western District Assistant District Officer, B.B.  Hayes told the people about the 
advantages that had come with Australian administration: he spoke of peace, 
and with it security of life and land and freedom to travel, medicines, and the 
introduction of axes, knives, cups, plates and calico to make life easier. 52 Cadet 
Patrol officer P. Healy was more specific about the work of the government in 
the Eastern Highlands: 
It can be said that the Government is accepted automatically as the arbiter 
in their disputes and the people are quick to take advantage of it in this 
role. And while the people identify the Administration as the power for law 
and order their conception of it stops there.53 
Even medical services, Healy said, were thought of as bi/as: very few people 
made voluntary use of them. 
The territories' basic statistics j ustified the Administration's emphasis on 
extending and consolidating government control. In 1 9  53 there were, the 
Administration thought, just over 1 ,536,000 people in Papua and New Guinea. 
Of these 290,000 were estimated. That is, just under 20% were yet to have their 
names entered in the village books. In fact, when the Administration reassessed 
its figures the next year, it found that there were many more people who were 
'estimated'. The main change was in the Southern Highlands where an estimated 
77 ,500 people in 1 9  53 had suddenly increased to 1 64 ,600 in 1 9  54. The total 
population of the Southern Highlands had grown from 82,000 to 1 70,000. The 
result was that over 25% of the population of Papua and New Guinea were then 
'estimated'. That is, they lived in areas variously classified as 'penetrated by 
patrols', under partial government influence, or under government influence, 
52 Gaima Patrol Report 4 of 1 950/1 .  
53 Kumiava Patrol Report 1 7 of 1 952/3. 
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but outside 'Administration Control'.s4 Further changes were made in the next 
few years so that the assumed total in the Western Highlands went up by over 
60,000. By the time that the first comprehensive census was taken in 1 966, the 
known and estimated total population of 1 953 of 1 .5 million was 2.2 million, 
well above the rate of natural increase. 
The fact that the administration could add 1 50,000 people to the totals of two 
districts was evidence of both the lightness of Australian control in many sub­
districts and the size of the task that the Australians faced. It was not as though 
there was a frontier of control moving west across the highlands . In 1 953 in all 
three sub-districts of the Eastern Highlands people were yet to be censused, and 
many had recently had their names recorded. Two years earlier only two-thirds 
of the Kainantu Sub-District peoples had their names in village books .ss And it 
was not simply in the Highlands that people were yet to line. There were 37,000 
'estimated' in the Gulf and Western Districts, 39,000 in the Sepik, 34,000 in 
Morobe, and 20,000 in Madang, and 1 ,900 in New Britain.s6 From Bougainville 
to Vanimo and Kiunga there were people who were beyond Australian authority 
or so nervous in the presence of field officers they could not yet be asked to 
line. The 1 953 estimate of the people yet to be censused could have been 
doubled: one third of the people were then in no more than a cautious, 
intermittent relationship with the few field representatives of the Australian 
state. 
The Australians had no doubt that they could impose peace. They had done so 
in many other parts of Papua and New Guinea; the challenge to the government 
patrols in the Orokaiva, Binandere, Nakanai, Sepik and elsewhere had been 
violent; but everywhere sustained patrolling had led to a breaking of the old 
cycles of raids and wars, and an apparent permanent acceptance of a new order. 
So in January 1 953 a kiap wrote after a patrol from Minj into the South Wahgi: 
'all is now quiet and peaceful - the warriors have turned their warlike prowess 
into more pacific channel and are working generally for the enrichment of the 
area'. s7 Another officer recorded 1 3,600 names in the Jimmi Valley and wrote: 
'These tribes have accepted the morals of the Administration'.s8 Further west, 
where the transition from stone to steel was still taking place, a kiap observed: 
'The natives of the Tari and Wage are an agreeable and happy people and the 
54 Population figures and classification of degrees of control are from Annual Reports. 
55 Kainantu Patrol Reports 5 of 1 951  /2. (Sub-district boundaries changed and the area 
beyond Lufa was not then in the Kainantu Sub-District.) 
56 Figures from the Annual reports have been rounded. 
57 Minj Patrol Report, January 1 953. 
58 Minj Patrol Report 1 of 1 953/4. 
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officers chosen to work amongst them should find them orderly and tractable'.59 
Patrol by patrol the confirming evidence accumulated: Australian control was 
being accepted and as peace was one of the great benefits of intervention there 
was no reason why it should not endure. 
The confidence of the Australians in their ability to impose peace was not 
because by the early 1 950s no Papuan or New Guinean equipped with bow and 
arrow, spear or axe would dare attack a patrol. They did so in the newly 
contacted areas of dense population in the Southern and Western Highlands; 
and in the reporting year 19 5 1 - 1 9  52 Papua New Guineans attacked patrols in 
the Sepik, Eastern Highlands, Madang and Morobe Districts.60 And late in 1 953 
two Australians (Patrol Officer Gerald Szarka and Cadet Patrol Officer 
Geoffrey Harris) and two Papua New Guinean policemen (Constables Buritori 
and Purari) were killed at Telefomin.61 The planned attack on Telefomin and the 
realization that more Papua New Guineans on the station could easily have been 
killed, reminded kiaps and more distant Australians of the dangers of enforcing 
sudden and profound change on Papua New Guinea communities. But that did 
not reduce the Australians' belief in their capacity to disrupt fighting and ensure 
a permanent peace. That is why they were surprised when Department of 
District Administration and police parties were again attacked in the Western 
Highlands-three times in 1 971  and seven times in 1 972.62 
What was not clear in the 1 950s was that the first stage of the imposition of 
Australian rule was based on false assumptions: the people of Papua and New 
Guinea lived in villages, the village site was fixed and its population stable, all 
people had one name by which they were known to all people for all their lives, 
the village population could be divided into stable families, and the government 
could appoint village leaders with authority over other villagers . Government 
officers knew that all of these in some places were fictitious, but they rarely 
acknowledged the extent to which they were untrue right across the maps of 
both territories. In the highlands, where the populations were dense, 
fragmented, mobile and turbulent and where so many were added so quickly to 
59 Wabag Patrol Report, March-April 1 952. 
60 New Guinea Annual &port, 1951 -52, pp.30-2. Of these attacks it seems like only one (on a 
patrol out of Menyamya) resulted in the return fire killing an attacker. The language used by 
officers in their reports when they or their police used rifles is worth further study-and that 
is not attempted here. 
61 R.T. Gore, who heard the cases against those accused of the Telefomin killings wrote of 
the incident in Justice versus 5 orcery, Brisbane, 1 965, pp. 1 50-65. 
62 &port of the Committee Investigating Tribal Fighting in the Highlands, P. Paney, Chairman, 
Government Printer, Port Moresby, 1 973, p.3. 
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the census, the problems of adapting the fictions to the people or the people to 
the fictions were much greater than at any other time. 
Given the need to bring government to 500,000 new people, the postwar 
Australian administration had few resources to meet the expectations of those 
who had had their names in village books for thirty or forty years. In the 1 945 
speech in which he spoke of Australia's 'debt of gratitude' and its 'bounden duty 
to further to the utmost the advancement of the natives', Eddie Ward, Minister 
for External Territories, had promised the 'natives' a 'greater participation' in 
government 'eventually'.63 During his brief time as Minister for both External 
Affairs and External Territories, Percy Spender in 1 950 said that the 'indigenous 
inhabitants . . .  will be unable, for many years to come, to play any part in the 
executive government of the country'. In a long speech, Spender gave cautious 
approval to the nomination of three Papuans and New Guineans to the 
proposed Legislative Council. And that was the only role they were offered in 
non-executive government.64 Soon after he became Minister for Territories, Paul 
Hasluck said that the native population, 'very gradually, over a number of 
generations, will take an increasing interest both in running their own 
enterprises and in taking a share in their own government'. 65 All of those 
terms-'eventually', 'many years to come', 'over a number of generations' all 
indicated that political advances would be slow, and the end point of any change 
was a 'share' in government. In its first postwar issue of 22 March 1 956, the 
Rabaul Times in its front page editorial said it would support 'any plans to end 
the trusteeship and bring New Guinea into full membership of the 
Commonwealth of Australia'. It was exceptional only in that was an explicit 
statement: most assertions about the aims of Australian policy spoke with 
appropriate vagueness about a time so distant. 
In 1 9  53 the three indigenous members of the Legislative Council were Merai 
Dickson, mission teacher of Milne Bay, Aisoli Salin, government school teacher 
of New Ireland, and Peta Simogun, ex-policeman and soldier from the Sepik. In 
the twelve months before 30 June 1 953 the Legislative Council met just twice 
for a total of three weeks . The Council gave few Papua New Guineans brief, 
nominal experience of part of the process of making Territory laws. There were 
63 Commonwealth of Australia Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol 1 83, 4 
July 1 945, p.4052. 
64 Commonwealth of Australia Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol 208, 1 
June 1 950, p.3637. 
65 South Pacific, January-February 1 952, pp.226-7. In the July 1 952 issue, p.360, Hasluck made 
another statement-again stating that political change would be slow-following social and 
educational advance. 
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then no immediate plans to change the Council's composltlon or increase its 
powers. (fhe pressure for change came from white settlers who wanted more 
elected representatives.) The one point where the Administration said it would 
'foster . . . political advancement' was at the village level where appointed 
officials were to be replaced by elected councils, and these in turn would lead to 
area, then district and 'maybe regional councils'.66 Democracy was to grow from 
below. By mid-1 953, there were six councils in New Guinea, five on the Gazelle 
Peninsula, and one, Baluan, on Manus, and in Papua there were two, Hanuabada 
in Port Moresby and Ealeba in Milne Bay. The population covered by the eight 
councils, 30,000, was 1 .5% of the total. In 1 955  there were still just 37,000 
people in the councils. The rapid growth did not begin until the late 1 9  50s, and 
even in 1 960 there were still only 265,000 people, or less than 1 5% of the 
population in the councils.67 By 1 953 town and district advisory councils had 
been formed but they had no Papuan or New Guinean representatives.  The 
Australians reported to the United Nations that the 'interests of the indigenous 
people [were] adequately protected by the policy of the Administration'.68 
In 1 953 few field officers commented on council matters: there were none in 
most sub-districts and there was still going to be none at the end of the decade. 
The comment by the kiap at Aitape was unusual. The people along the coast to 
the east, he said, were 'progressive and alert', relatively wealthy and wanted to 
'participate in public affairs '. They would, he suggested, be suitable for 'village 
il . ' 69 counc expenments . 
Australian education policy in the postwar was repeated in the Parliament and in 
annual reports: the aim was 'universal literacy, and the extension of English as 
an eventual lingua Jranca'.7° Field officers were expected to report on schools, but 
as with councils there were often none to write about. In 1 953 there were only 
4666 Papuans and New Guineans in Administration schools. Nearly all were in 
primary schools that went just to standard five. Just over 800 were in standard 
six and above, including those in technical training. 71 Hardly any were in classes 
higher than standard eight, and probably no girls. Proposals to send the first 
twenty students to Australian secondary schools were underway, and they were 
to leave Port Moresby in 1 954. Included among them was John Natera who 
66 New Guinea Annual Report, 1952-53, p.23-4. There were also some unofficial councils 
covering small areas. 
67 Papua Annual Report, 1961-62, p.30; New Guinea Annual Report, 1961-62, p.30. 
68 New Guinea Annual Report, 1 952/3, p.29. 
69 Aitape Patrol Reports, May 1 954(?) . 
70 New Guinea Annual Report, 1 952/3, p.83. 
7 1  Statistics from Annual Reports. 
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would be the first Papuan university graduate. 72 The only government school in 
the highlands was a station school at Lake Kutubu with twenty-four pupils. But 
even in some longer-contacted districts, government schools were few: just two 
primary schools in the Western District, Milne Bay and Madang, and only one 
on Bougainville. Many more students were in mission schools: a total of nearly 
1 27,000, but most were in low-level village schools. Twenty years later, in 1 973, 
there were over 220,000 Papua New Guineans in government primary school, 
and that was about half of those of school age. In 1 953, eight years after the end 
of the war, less than 2% of those of primary school age were in primary schools. 
The field officers had more to say on economic development. In the Eastern 
Highlands the people had already started planting cash crops: coffee, quinine, 
peanuts and passionfruit. Near Kainantu some New Guineans were working 
alluvial goldfields. Cadet Patrol Officer Healy wrote that the only time the 
Highlanders did not think of him as a policeman was when he talked about 
economic development. 73 On the coast many villagers had their own copra 
driers and were selling copra, and some were selling direct to the Production 
Control Board and not to missions or private traders.74 In the council areas on 
the Gazelle, each with a tax revenue of 4000 to 7000 pounds, there was more 
evidence of economic change. Cocoa fermentaries and drying sheds were being 
built, trucks bought, and the Rabaul market improved.75 But the kiaps were also 
required to report on two other aspects of economic development: the land that 
was available for economic development and the potential for labour 
recruitment. Both implied they were concerned with opportunities for white 
settlers. In 1 950 Spender had certainly signalled that there would be much more 
economic development in the hands of Australians. While he continued to talk 
about the wartime debt of gratitude and claim that Papuans and New Guineans 
would 'participate to an ever-increasing rate in the fruits of. . .  development', he 
made it clear that it was the administration's task to find and assess natural 
resources and these would be exploited by 'private enterprise'. The land laws 
were to be revised, he said, 'with a view to facilitating the taking up of land by 
people who wish to settle in the territories', and he favoured the opening of 
some areas to soldier settlers. The great 'limiting factor', Spender thought, was 
the availability of labour. The minimum contract period of one year was to be 
extended to eighteen months, and the old Department of Labour discontinued 
and most of its functions handed to the Department of District Services and 
72 J.A. Lee, 'The New Guinea Elite', The Journal of the Papua and New Guinea Society, Vol 1 No 
2, pp. 1 1 3-7. 
73 Kumiava Patrol Reports 17 of 1 952/3. 
74 Saidor Patrol Report of November 1 953 to the Rai Coast. 
75 New Guinea Annual Report, 19 5 2 / 3, p.27. 
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Native Affairs. 76 
In 1 953, the policies for the economic development of the territories were at an 
interesting point. The cooperative movement that had been important and 
successful in the postwar years was not going to be given the same significance 
by Ministers Spender and Hasluck and Administrator Cleland. The space and 
role given to the cooperatives in the annual reports both declined, and the 
number of cooperative officers within DDSNA remained small-only seven out 
of a total of 221 in New Guinea in 1 952.77 The Highlands had just been opened 
to labour recruiting in 1 950, and while almost none had gone from the Western 
and Southern Highlands, over 2000 a year were leaving the Eastern Highlands 
(then including Chimbu) . In spite of postwar inflation, the minimum wage rate 
remained at fifteen shillings a month for 'agreement workers'. The 'coffee rush' 
of settlers into the Eastern Highlands had started and in 1 953 was curbed by 
Hasluck who instructed that there should be no more release of land unless at 
the same time 'we are taking steps to ensure that the natives can and will make 
better use of the land remaining to them'.78 In 1 953, economic policy that had 
been directed towards making Papua New Guineans the beneficiaries of 
economic growth had briefly swung back to private enterprise and settlers, and 
now the talk was of 'partnership', balance and mutual benefits. 
Field officers were sometimes photographed sitting at a folding table, a 
policeman and interpreter standing to the side, the accused in front, a circle of 
respectful villagers watching, and beyond them thatched houses and rain forest. 
It was the Australian government officer bringing and dispensing law. That 
picture was both ideal and reality, but it did not happen all that often. At the end 
of a patrol from Sohano along the northeast coast a kiap wrote: 
In the legal sphere people prefer to settle matters themselves, or leave 
them unsettled if of minor importance, rather than take them before the 
Administration official - people avoid what appears a final solution.79 
76 Commonwealth ef Australia Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, Vol 208, pp.3636-
53. 
77 New Guinea Annual Report 1951/2, p. 1 28. The total turnover of the cooperatives was still 
increasing rapidly and new cooperatives being formed-but that was partly a result of earlier 
commitment to the movement. 
78 Paul Hasluck, A Time efBuilding: Australian Administration in Papua and New Guinea 1951 -
1963, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1 976, p. 1 23; and Ben Finney, Big Men and 
Business: Entrepreneurship and Economic growth in the New Guinea Highlands, Australian National 
University Press, Canberra, 1 973, pp.45-8. 
79 Sohano Patrol Report, extract, 1 954. 
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Along the coast east of Vanimo the people had 'few complaints' and they were 
confined to 'woman troubles' . 80 In the Bamu Delta, a government officer 
wrote: 'I am sure many disputes warranting hearing had been forgotten and 
others healed by time'.81 At Dreikikir F.J . Martin said that 'Very few disputes' 
were brought to his notice, and his colleague in the Burui Kunai near the Sepik 
found most disputes were minor and settled by arbitration but 'As usual a 
number of old land disputes were brought before the "new officer" in the hope 
that a new decision would be given'. 82 In the Highlands some people initially 
greeted 'courts' with the same boisterous eagerness that they met other material 
and immaterial signs of a new way of life. Acting Assistant District Officer, B. 
Hayes, in the Sinasina area of the Chimbu heard just thirty cases in a formal 
court but thought he settled 'some four to five hundred petty disputes' by 
informal discussion.83 Routley, also patrolling in the Chimbu, decided six cases 
in court and many out of court because the 'people appear to be under the 
impression that an Administration officer's one delight is to hear "court", and 
matters of the most trivial nature were dragged up, and sometimes from the 
remote past'.84 
The total number o f  Papuans and New Guineans convicted in the courts for 
Native Affairs and Native Matters in 1 952-53 was 9576.85 To that number may 
be added those cases referred to higher courts, but there also needs to be some 
discounting for the convictions in the Courts for Native Matters and Native 
Affairs that were against laws introduced by the Australians. For example, over 
1 OOO convictions were for gambling, 250 for drinking intoxicating liquor and 
many others were for violating the laws that controlled labourers or those living 
in towns: they were absent from their quarters during prohibited hours or they 
were found on the employers' premises without permission But as the 
government officers recognised, on their patrols-even in long contacted 
areas-they were hearing few of the cases that were important in those 
communities. Although the patrols were often welcomed because they brought 
peace and the kiap J- court was a convenient way to settle or sidetrack some 
disputes, the Australian administration did not bring a new and comprehensive 
system of justice. In 1 953 two systems of dispute resolution and crime control 
were operating, and except in the most serious cases that could not escape 
80 V aimoa Patrol Report, extract, May 1 9  54. 
81 Bamu Patrol Report, December 1 953. 
82 Dreikikir Patrol Report 9 of 1 9  53 / 4; and Ambunti Patrol Report extract. 
83 Chimbu Patrol Report 5 of 1 952/3. 
84 Chimbu Patrol Report 6 of 1 952/3. 
85 The numbers of cases heard before the courts were published in appendices to the Annual 
Reports. 
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notice, the village system was connected to the formal system only by an 
intermittent choice exercised by the villagers. 
In the immediate postwar, the Department of Health was confident that it could 
do good. Its confidence and energy came partly from its Director, John 
Gunther, and from what had recently been achieved by the new drugs and what 
had been demonstrated in wartime by using increased resources to maintaining 
health in the tropics. Where the prewar administration officials had accepted 
malaria as an inevitable part of their lot, the Australian army had become so 
convinced of the effectiveness of its drugs, sprays and preventive actions that it 
thought a high incidence of malaria was evidence of lax discipline.86 Because of 
the appointment of European refugee doctors to Papua and New Guinea from 
1 950 and the early and extensive training of European Medical Assistants , and 
Native Medical Assistants and Orderlies, the Department of Health had the 
trained personnel to patrol and establish hospitals and aid posts . And the first 
Papuans and New Guineans had gone to the Central Medical School in Suva. 
From its analysis of its own data, the Department seemed to have clear targets: 
malaria, yaws and tropical ulcers were the most common diseases, and malaria, 
pneumonia, tuberculosis and dysentery were the main causes of death. The 
Department believed that it could do something to alleviate their symptoms or 
cure or prevent all them. In 1 953, the aid posts in Papua claimed to have given 
281 ,276 treatments . 87 Even given multiple treatments to many, that was an 
exceptional reach of services. The Department of Health looked most likely to 
help Australia pay the 'debt of gratitude' and carry out its 'bounden duty to 
further to the utmost the advancement of the natives' .88 
Patrol Officer R. Jeffrey after a long 64-day patrol to the Upper Kaugel and 
N ebilyer Valleys of the Western Highlands wrote: 'The blue ensign was flown 
and compliments were paid to it at sunset by the Europeans and native 
members of the patrol. The significance of the flag was constantly pointed out 
to the natives'. 89 Just what the significance of  the flag was, and how this was 
interpreted and received by the patrol that added over 5000 new names to the 
86 Allan S.Walker, The Island Campaigns, Australian War Memorial, Canberra, 1 957, Chapter 1 5  
'Aitape-Wewak'. 
87 Papuan Annual Report, 19 52 / 3, p.54. 
88 Commonwealth ef Australia Parliamentary Debates, House if Representatives, Vol 1 83, 1 945, p.4052. 
89 Mt Hagen Patrol Report 3 of 1 951  /2. That wording about the flag being flown, respects 
paid, and the significance explained recurs in other patrols reports, eg, A. Keogh, Chimbu 
Patrol report, 8 of 1 952/3: 'The Blue Ensign was flown during the stay of the patrol at each 
rest house. Officials were invited to participate in the lowering of the flag each day, and the 
significance of the ceremony was explained to them'. 
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census, is uncertain. But that was one of the field officers' few references to the 
fact that they were engaged in the great enterprise of preparing two million to 
enter the international community in some as yet uncertain constitutional form. 
In the early 1 9  50s the task for the field officers was overwhelmingly one of 
meeting and guiding people-who variously welcomed and resisted change­
through those first years of contact. From the perspective of most sub-districts, 
the perspective presented with such detail in over 400 patrol reports each year, 
the policies of the central government, whether they were concerned with the 
broad political aims or the attempts to set up councils were irrelevant. The field 
officers, spread so thinly across the territories, were trying to make some 
compromise between the assumptions about people who lived in families and 
villages under headmen and the apparent fragmented physical and institutional 
reality that confronted them. They had their priorities right and they had 
become efficient in their tasks, but it was the next step that was difficult and at 
risk. That was how to connect the scattered and fragmented hamlets and 
communities into a centralised system, and how to get the centralised system 
into the villages and hamlets. In 1 953 in law, education and political and 
economic development this was happening only in exceptional places. The 
Health Department alone seemed to be reaching a significant number of people, 
training Papua New Guineans at high and basic levels, and connecting the 
centre with village institutions. The technical and institutional weaknesses that 
were later to emerge in the Department of Health were a long way away. Even if 
the Australians had known in 1 953 that they had just twenty years and not 
several generations, and that they were making an independent nation and not 
preparing Papua and New Guinea for some form of constitutional union with 
Australia, it is doubtful that they could have done much better. We still do not 
know how to make nations from the fragmented Melanesian populations. 
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Taim Bilong Kiap:  
Looking back at  Government by Patrol 
in Papua New Guinea 
William C. Clarke 
By the mid 1960s there was a House of Assemb/y meeting in 
Port Moresry and Local Government Councils operating 
through much of the Tem"tory; but most villagers still thought of 
government as the kiap. 'Government' was one Australian 
field officer. 
- Hank Nelson, Taim Bilong Masta, 1 982, 33. 
Government by Patrol, 1965 
During 1 964 and 1 965 I spent 1 3  months carrying out geographical and 
ethnobotanical research in the Jimi and Simbai valleys in the highland fringe to 
the north of Mt Hagen (Map 1 ) .  This is an area where the heavily populated 
broad open basins of the highlands give way to rougher, often forested 
mountainous country, where population density is low, and where Australian 
administrative influence came late. Because of this, I was able to see at firsthand 
the operations of 'government by patrol'-the term used by Lucy Mair in her 
1 948 book to describe the establishment of government control in Papua and 
New Guinea. 
It was in April 1 965 that I was allowed by the then Australian administration to 
accompany a patrol officer and a cadet officer on a 'patrol of contact' into the 
lower Jimi Valley. I later published a long account of that journey, describing in 
some detail the secondary vegetation, house types, garden and tree crops, and 
landscapes seen along the way (Clarke 1 977) .  But I also took note of how 
government influence was extended into a recently contacted area, an area 
where it was believed there were still a few small groups who were said to have 
'not yet shown themselves to the kiap ', that is, who had not yet been officially 
contacted by the administration. In this paper, I look mainly at the ways in 
which patrols extended government influence, affected public health, and 
helped establish educational facilities. Then I examine the implications of the 
decline of government by patrol in the decade following 1 965. The paper ends 
with a consideration of the relationship between government by patrol and the 
discipline of anthropology. 
To set the broader scene before focusing in detail on this single patrol, I will 
turn to the comments made by anthropologist Buck Schieffelin and geographer 
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William C. Clarke Taim Bilong Kiap 
Robert Crittenden at the beginning of their book Like People You See in a Dream: 
First Contact in Six Papuan Societies, which describes the ill-fated Strickland-Purari 
patrol of 1 935  and how it was perceived by the people along its route. Although 
they are writing of pre-war Papua, not post-war New Guinea, and the political 
history of the two territories is different, what they say applies well to the New 
Guinean situation I will describe (Schieffelin and Crittenden 1 99 1 ,  1 3) :  
Patrols, consisting o f  one o r  two white officers, a number of 
armed Papuan police, and a line of carriers, walking from village to 
village along an established route, were the chief means by which 
the native peoples of Papua were governed between 1 885 and the 
early 1 970's. For most Papuans, experience with patrols was the 
only basis they had for understanding anything about the ways, let 
alone the institutions, of their colonial masters. Government 
officers were responsible both for maintaining peace and order in 
their districts and for exploring their unknown regions, contacting 
newly encountered tribal peoples, and bringing them under 
administration influence. 
Those motives remained after the war and were joined in the 1 950s and 60s by 
instructions to the people that they should work toward achieving something 
called development, and then by the late 1 960s and into the 70s that they should 
prepare themselves to experience, first, something called self-government and, 
then, something called independence. 
The patrol I will describe was not one of initial exploration and was on a far 
smaller scale in time and distance travelled than the Hagen-Sepik patrol led by 
Jim Taylor and John Black in 1 938 and 1 939-the patrol so thoroughly 
described and analysed by Bill Gammage (1998) in The S� Travellers. But in a 
modest way the 1 965 patrol in the J imi Valley contained the basic essentials of 
the whole system of government by patrol. 
The patrol was led by the kiap (fok Pisin term for patrol officer) of the Jimi 
River Patrol Post, one of the many isolated outstations of the then Australian 
Administration (Map 2) . The Jimi River Post was established in the late 1 950s 
following preliminary sallies by patrols from previously established stations in 
the Highlands to the south. In the mid-1 950s one of these patrols had been 
attacked by some 200 warriors, ten of whom were killed by the patrol, lending 
urgency to the establishment of a pacifying presence in the region. 
As was true of most government outstations in New Guinea at that time, the 
dominant feature of the Jimi Post was the airstrip, which was grass covered and 
slightly less than 500 m long. Trailing up the ridge above the strip were a small 
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trade store, a government school, a chapel, warehouses, sleeping quarters for 
labourers, prisoners, New Guinean police, and other people connected with the 
Post. There were also food gardens, a medical aid post, and near the top of the 
ridge, set among attractive lawns and decorative plants, the government office 
and the Patrol Officer's house. From this headquarters, the Jimi River kiap 
administered many hundreds of square km and about 26,000 people. Thanks to 
the efforts of several successive kiaps, all the area within two or three days' walk 
of the Patrol Post was by 1 965 under effective government control and was 
linked to the Patrol Post by narrow earthen vehicular roads or good walking 
tracks . The only part of the area within the jurisdiction of the Jimi River kiap 
that was still to some extent uncontrolled was the westernmost end of his 
territory, several days' walk down the Jimi River valley. (Map 2) . Not far to the 
northwest of this area is the territory of the famous Hagahai "lost tribe" of the 
Schrader Mountains, supposedly first contacted in 1 983-a claim gainsaid by 
Mangi (1 985) and Boyd (1 996) ,  who report the passage of various patrols in 
earlier years. But it was the case that in 1 965 the area had not yet received 
permanent administrative attention. 
The patrol began early in the morning on 8 April 1 965 with great excitement as 
local men sent their yodelling cries sounding through the valleys around the 
patrol post. By this characteristic means of distance communication, they were 
calling for men to assemble to carry the patrol's supplies on the first leg of the 
journey. Amid the raucous noise, the bags and metal patrol boxes were laid 
out, and two-man loads were tied to carrying poles . The initial patrol included 
about 80 men: sixty locals serving as temporary carriers and twenty permanent 
members of the patrol, the latter group including three white men (the kiap, the 
Cadet Patrol Officer, and me), together with six native policemen (chosen from 
the eighteen who made up the police force at Jimi River Post) ,  a native Medical 
Assistant, and several cooks, interpreters, and miscellaneous auxiliaries. 
After leaving the Patrol Post-with the carriers yodelling in unison and 
stamping their feet in excitement-the patrol walked toward Kwibun on a 
earthen road suitable for four-wheel drive vehicles. This stretch of road, which 
was only a few km long, was of necessity deeply cut into the steep slopes that 
lead down to the Jimi River and took over a year to build. The entire 
construction was done with hand tools by drafts of native labourers, who at first 
worked with reluctance but then came to anticipate the potential uses of the 
road, which, it was said by the kiap, would eventually lead southward over the 
Wahgi-Sepik divide and vastly expand the Jimi Valley's connections, which in 
1 965 were almost entirely by air. 
Along the road to Kwibun among the productive local subsistence gardens and 
43 
William C. Clarke Taim Bilong Kiap 
orchards, were some small shaded plots of coffee, grown from seedlings 
provided by the Department of Agriculture and earlier distributed to the local 
gardeners by the kiap or the agricultural extension officers who sometimes also 
went on patrol. By the mid-1 960s such high-quality mountain coffee had 
become the major crop of the Central Highlands and often spread quickly into 
newly contacted areas, partly because of promotion by the Administration but 
also because it fitted easily into the patterns of local agriculture, where trees 
were often planted in old subsistence gardens. 
When I look back over nearly forty years to those roads and walking tracks, I 
remember how pleasant they were, often lined with flowers and brightened by 
the green, yellow, and reddish leaves of decorative shrubs. Best was how much 
easier to walk on they were compared with the steep, narrow, muddy local trails 
they replaced. Now, everyone I ask about the current condition of the kiap­
built tracks and the later roads built in the Jimi and Simbai valleys (and 
elsewhere in the country) assures me that in recent years they have all 
deteriorated. Even by 1 977, when I returned to the Simbai Valley for the last 
time, what had been well-graded walking tracks were not being maintained. The 
seeds of their deterioration began with their construction, which was decreed by 
the kiaps and enforced by the native police, who would live in local communities 
while the roads were being built. Having accepted the message that the roads 
meant progress and would bring European goods and coffee buyers to their 
isolated valleys, the local people came to have inflated expectations about the 
benefits of roads. When the expected benefits only trickled in if they came at all 
and when coffee prices recurrently slumped, as they do, people's enthusiasm for 
road maintenance fell. Further, the enforcement mechanisms inherent in 
frequent patrols had begun to break down by the early 1 970s as independence 
approached. 
Not far along the track from the Jimi Patrol Post, we came upon the neat 
grounds and corrugated metal buildings of a Nazarene mission. A few 
kilometres farther along, across the Jimi River, was the Anglican mission at 
Koenambi. To its east up the valley was a Catholic mission. Each religion had 
staked out its own spiritual claims, thus creating a patchwork of 'parishes' of 
different religions. This curious division of the larger landscape happened widely 
in the 1 950s and 1 960s with the founding of new patrol posts following the 
pacification that preceded the lifting of the 'restricted territory' classification. 
Missionisation was an accepted part of Administration policy, as set out in a 
statement of Australia's tasks and policies in New Guinea by Paul Hasluck, 
Minister for Territories in the Australian Parliament. As Hasluck put it in 1 958, 
one of the objectives of the Government's policy was the voluntary acceptance 
of Christianity by the native peoples, this in the absence of any indigenous body 
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of religious faith, founded on native teaching or ritual (Hasluck 1 958, 98) .  
Hasluck also argued ( 19  58 ,  89) that the Christian religion and the English 
language could become two of the great unifying forces bringing together the 
disparate peoples of New Guinea. The reality was that doctrinal schisms were 
inherent between the different but contiguous faiths, and were sometimes over­
emphasised by semi-literate indigenous evangelists. Different religions also at 
times competed for converts, a struggle that increased with the later entry of 
aggressively pentecostal sects. 
In his discussion of the impact of the Christian missions in his book The New 
Guinea Villager (1 965) ,  Charles Rowley points out that rapid (sometimes mass) 
conversions could be interpreted as a 'package deal' whereby local people 
accepted the white man's beliefs and ideals of behaviour in the expectation of 
getting the white man's rewards- material as well as spiritual. Further, the 
New Guineans, who believed in the efficacy of magic spells, could reasonably 
have assumed that Christian rituals and ceremonies were the way to open the 
road into the newly revealed European world and its wealth of goods, which 
were somehow accessible to the kiaps, missionaries, and other outsiders. 
Continuing on our journey, the patrol reached Kwibun haus kiap (the name for 
the rest houses built at the kiap 's orders in each community) , where we were met 
by a fresh contingent of carriers, who would take us on the next leg of the 
patrol. The vehicular road ended at K wibun, and we descended the steep inner 
valley of the Jimi River on a government walking track, crossed the roaring river 
on a traditional suspension bridge of quivering thin poles and swinging ragged 
vines, and climbed up slope to Koenambi, the site of a new Anglican Mission 
and a 400 m airstrip under construction. As with road-building, all the 
excavation and filling necessary to make an airstrip were carried out by hand 
tools, and the excavated earth was removed by four men carrying it in mounds 
piled on stretchers of hessian. Such airstrips may take as much as two years to 
build but were considered absolutely essential for the operation of missions and 
patrol posts in rugged, roadless country-essential to the extent that the Jimi 
River kiap had assigned a policeman to help the mission staff recruit and 
supervise the local labourers. 
Such government aid to the mission at Koenambi represented a general pattern 
of cooperation between Administration and missions. Aside from facilitating 
the spread of Christianity, the missions performed more mundane services for 
the Administration, particularly the running of clinics and schools. Lacking staff 
and funding to carry out such work themselves on the required scale, local 
administrators as well as Paul Hasluck, the Minister for Territories in Australia, 
valued the contribution of the missions highly. 
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Hasluck was quite open about his dissatisfaction with his accomplishments in 
education. In his account of his time as Minister for Territories in a chapter 
entitled 'Not Enough Schools', Hasluck observes that the years from 1 945 to 
1 955  were years of poor achievement, but he also notes that they would have 
been worse without the mission schools. A report he distributed at the end of 
1 955 showed an increase in the enrolment of native children in mission schools 
since 1 950 from 1 05,000 to 1 53,000 and in Administration schools from 2,690 
to 6,000 (Hasluck 1 976, 99) .  Of course, some of the mission schools were poor 
educationally, but they had the great advantage of being there, out in the local 
communities, and some religious organisations, especially the Roman Catholics, 
Lutherans, Methodists, and Anglicans, ran some good schools. Hasluck made 
an ad hoe decision to support the mission schools financially, with the support 
being subject to conditions about standards of teaching. Hasluck particularly 
favoured the wide dispersion of local primary schools, which only the mission 
base could provide. His stated goal was ' . . .  to bring a sound elementary 
education in English to every child in controlled areas' (Hasluck 1 958, 98) .  
Hasluck's views faced opposition from others in  the Administration who 
pushed for directing more funding to regional secondary schools and national 
tertiary institutions intended to produce an educated elite. Debates of this sort 
over education were nothing new; nor was Administration support of mission 
schools, which in Papua dates back to 1 920 when Lieutenant-Governor Murray 
announced a scheme to subsidize mission schools and admitted that the colonial 
government had done very little for the people's education (Haihuie 2003, 222) . 
After overnighting at Koenambi, the next day's route for the patrol lay along the 
government walking track that connected a series of haus kiap sited on ridges 
along the south face of the Bismarck Range. On reaching the first of these haus 
kiap, at a place called Y embugema, the patrol was met by an animated crowd of 
local people. Speaking in Tok Pisin, the kiap announced that he would soon 
return to take the annual census and to hear any court cases that the people or 
the tu/ tuls and luluais cared to present. Tul tuls and luluais were officials 
appointed by the kiap in each community. Lacking much authority, their 
function was to act as intermediaries between the people and the government 
and to encourage obedience to the kiap 's orders concerning such matters as road 
building and maintenance, constructing haus kiap, or behaving in new ways such 
as practising burial of the dead instead of laying bodies out on platforms to 
decay, as was the custom in this area. Once the people became more familiar 
with European ways and imperatives, a local government council of elected 
members was instituted. This body had more autonomous authority than the 
luluais and tu/ tuls and was considered a step toward self-government and 
eventual independence. 
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After the kiap 's speech in Tok Pisin had been translated into the local language, 
the patrol's cargo was transferred to Y embugema men, who carried it to the 
boundary with the community censused at Bokopai, people who were 
traditional enemies of the Y embugema. Six years ago, when there was a carrier 
exchange here during one of the first patrols to enter this region, the police had 
to carry the cargo across the boundary because neither group of men would 
venture into the territory of an enemy clan or clan-cluster for fear of retaliation 
by sorcery if not by arrows and spears-retribution for as yet unavenged killings 
in the past. But today the transfer of the cargo to Bokapai carriers was done 
easily amid the usual yodelling and shouting. I think I am right in saying that 
local men viewed the Administration's ban on warfare with mixed feelings. 
Certainly, there was an element of pleasure in the antagonistic relations between 
enemies, and men boasted of exploits in pre-contact wars with excitement and 
glee. But they also frequently asserted that life was better since the kiap came 
because now people could walk about without fear. As a mark of this feeling 
people had erected near this boundary, a 'shrine' of cordyline and other ritual 
plants to mark the spot where a kiap on one of the initial patrols (probably in 
1 956) had announced the government's intention to prohibit wars . 
Bokapai offered a good example of further outreach by both missions and the 
government. The Koenambi Anglicans had a school at Bokapai, staffed by 
coastal Papuans, who taught about 70 children and also provided religious 
instruction. Nearby was a government medical aid post staffed by a native Aid 
Post Orderly. After receiving training, such orderlies were assigned to more 
remote communities .  Often their supplies were meagre, and their salaries low, 
but the 'doktaboi' improved health conditions: yaws was all but eliminated, skin 
and respiratory infections had been treated, anti-malarial medicine distributed, 
and people had learned new habits of sanitation from the orderly. Having spent 
at least two years at a training centre in a town, the orderly also served as a link 
to educate local people about the nature of the outside world. 
As the patrol reached each haus kiap along its route, a large crowd always waited 
in response to the messages sent ahead calling on the people to assemble. All 
listened with some degree of attention to the kiap 's talk. On reaching Waim, 
four haus kiap beyond Bokapai, about 1 20 men were gathered, some from Waim 
and nearby communities and some from communities down slope near the Jimi 
River. From this assembly, the kiap selected 60 permanent carriers because 
beyond the next haus kiap (f sarap ), the patrol would enter uncertainly controlled 
territory, where it might be impossible to obtain a new set of carriers for each 
day's journey. Unlike the temporary carriers used so far, the permanent carriers 
would be paid, each man receiving every day one Australian shilling, food, and a 
stick of tobacco. 
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In 1 965 Tsarap haus kiap was the last of the chain of official haus kiap along this 
part of the south face of the Bismarck Mountains. Beyond to the west there 
were no registered tu! tuls or luluais and there had been no contact between the 
local people and the administration or the missions aside from short and 
sporadic patrols. Along the route so far, local people had, as requested, 
supplied food to the patrol: mostly sweet potatoes, pumpkins, and the edible 
leaves of Hibiscus manihot, which is a widely planted garden shrub and an 
important source of plant protein in the local diet.. The food supplied to the 
patrol was paid for with salt, face paint, beads, and other trade goods. From 
Meren on, the kiap did not expect the local people to supply enough food to 
feed the patrol, so the carriers would eat the rice and tinned meat included in 
the patrol's cargo. Three hours' walk beyond Tsarap, the good government 
walking track that the patrol had used for the last four days came to an end, to 
be replaced by a rough local trail cleared more by occasional use than by design. 
In the forest it consisted of tree roots and mud, and at times tunnelled through 
secondary thickets of sprawling ferns. 
While still at Tsarap, the kiap had sent a message ahead for the people at Meren 
to assemble for a census and medical treatment. 1 1 6 people showed up, 
compared with the kiap :r previous visit eight months before when only 64 
appeared, the rest remaining hidden in the forest. During these early stages of 
contact, people are always urged to appear to be censused, to have their names 
recorded in the village book, but there is no penalty for absence. Later on, 
apprehended absentees might receive a short jail sentence. On the patrol's 
arrival at Meren, many local people, especially the women, sat in clusters with 
their backs to the men of the patrol as though they were not there, but gradually 
the women warmed and began to show interest as the police and carriers set up 
camp, the Australian flag was raised, and the census book and medical 
equipment laid out. This initial response of seeming to ignore the newcomers 
was not uncommon, but it is impossible to know its exact basis beyond 
assuming that at least in part it was a mixture of fear and puzzlement. 
Schieffelin and Crittenden (1 991 ,  5) suggest that, whereas the patrol members 
have a category of 'native' or 'buskanaka' (hillbilly) in which to place the newly 
contacted people and have the upper hand in strength, the local people have no 
easy category in which to place the newcomers, who appear immensely powerful 
and who might be supernatural. Faced with this quandary, they turn their backs 
on the dangerous and the difficult-to-explain. 
Since the kiap 's last visit to Meren, the people had built a bamboo and grass haus 
kiap and had cleared and fenced the area around it, showing that the tu! tu!, who 
had been provisionally appointed on the earlier visit, had powers of persuasion 
over the people. So the kiap asked the tu! tu! if he would accompany the patrol 
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back to the Jimi River station, whence with other new appointees he would be 
flown to the highlands town of Mt Hagen to be registered as a tu/ tu/ in the 
district office. Then, when he came back to the Jimi Valley, a policeman trained 
to lay out roads would escort him home, where the new tu/ tu/ would be 
expected to lead his people in extending the government tracks, using the 
shovels that he would carry from the Jimi Patrol Post. Making this journey is 
also intended to lend him authority at home as well increase his knowledge of 
the outside world. 
For the next eight days, while the patrol moved through the area not yet fully 
controlled, the kiap would tell each assembled group about the Administration's 
goals and describe the benefits to the people of accepting the government and 
welcoming the missions. A census would be conducted if enough local people 
appeared, and all the people present would receive an anti-yaws injection of 
penicillin. Any food brought to the camp would be purchased in exchange for 
bush knives, steel axe blades, salt, matches, beads, face paint, and mirrors. At 
Meren, as elsewhere, once the first census was complete, a record, or 'Village 
Register', was left in the charge of the tu/ tu/, who was instructed to guard the 
'book' until the kiap 's next visit. During the interval, the registers stay wrapped 
in leaves tucked under a smoke-darkened roof support. Rarely lost, these books 
that mysteriously hold people's names so that they can be spoken when the kiap 
comes again is yet another indication to the people of the Administration's 
power. 
Once the kiap 's tasks for the day were done, he ordered the flag lowered, and 
while he and the husky native police stood at attention, the people watched in 
silence-not knowing the meaning of the ritual but seeming to be respectful. 
Many patrol officers and others have remarked on the tractability of the local 
people whereby one kiap who lived several days travel away can end traditional 
wars, introduce other new ways, induce people to build haus kiap and roads, and 
to give deference to the Administration. Among the several explanations for 
this tractability is that the natives, being practical people, quickly realized the 
superiority of rifles over bows and arrows. Another explanation has to do with 
the often asserted materialism of Papua New Guineans who decided that the 
road to the desired goods was going to be more easily opened by cooperation 
than by hostility. Still another explanation was that the traditional antagonism 
between neighbouring populations made impossible the formation of any sort 
of united resistance to European penetration. Finally, the people's docility may 
in part have been illusory: in the 1 9  50s and 1 960s they may not have felt as 
'controlled' as the Administration and the kiaps liked to think. Most New 
Guinean groups were used to being temporarily subdued by a stronger 
neighbouring force but, as anthropologist Ronald Berndt (1 957, 41 3) suggested, 
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being temporarily defeated did not mean that they could envisage being 
permanently under the control of an external power. Certainly, the collapse of 
the kiaps' prohibition against wars between neighbouring groups bears out this 
argument (Gordon 1 983) . 
On the rough trail between Meren and Benjem we heard the call of a bird-of­
paradise and saw a flash of yellow in the treetops. Quickly the kiap cautioned 
the patrol members not to try to shoot the bird for its valued feathers because 
to do so might offend local people who would feel that their hunting rights had 
been violated. 
At Benjem, the Taun clan was assembled, again in higher numbers than on the 
previous visit. The Taun told the kiap of two groups who had not yet appeared 
before him. One of these groups lived near the Jimi River, far down the slope 
from the route of the patrol. Because they were said to be few in number and 
had not recently attacked any of their neighbours, the kiap decided not to seek 
them out on this patrol, hoping that when they heard of the medical treatment 
and trade goods the Taun had received, they would show up when the patrol 
next returned. The other group lived along our route at the confluence of 
Kinent Creek and the Kaironk River. A Taun messenger was sent to tell them 
that we would meet them in their home territory the next day. 
When local people travelled from Benjem to Kinent Creek, they descended a 
small steep stream down to Kinent Creek, but the streambed turned out to be 
too boulder-strewn for the heavily burdened carriers to manage so it was 
necessary to cut a new track through old secondary forest. After an hour or so 
of slow movement, still cutting our way, word passed along the line of the patrol 
that the guides ahead had met a boy of the uncontacted group. He said the 
other members of his family were coming toward the patrol. Soon we heard a 
baby crying, and down the slope came two women, a boy of about seven, two 
younger children, and the baby in a string net bag on the back of one of the 
women. They all acted withdrawn but sat down on the forest floor where the 
kiap indicated. To talk with them two interpreters were needed, one from the 
Patrol Post who translated the kiap 's Tok Pisin into the Taun's language, and a 
Taun man who could speak the language of the uncontacted group. The kiap 
queried the woman about their husbands (thry were huntiniJ, did any other people 
live nearby (no), had they ever before seen outsiders like those on the patrol (no) , 
where had they lived before marrying (thry had alWC!JS lived here) . After a few more 
questions, the kiap gave them a bush knife, told them about the good intentions 
of the government, and urged them to come with their husbands to Benjem the 
next time a kiap came. Then the little group departed among the trees, and the 
patrol continued westward. Most probably, members of the newly contacted 
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group did show up for the next patrol, 'their friendship having been won', or at 
least their acquiescence gained, or curiosity aroused. Such calculated gift-giving 
features in similar encounters at least back to the fifteenth century when 
Christopher Columbus gave red caps and beads to the newly contacted native 
Americans 'in order to win their friendship', and later James Cook threw nails 
and beads ashore to newly met Pacific Islanders (cited in Neumann 1 994) . 
At each camp the kiap conducted a census, gave penicillin anti-yaws injections, 
spoke to people about the government's intentions, and appointed provisional 
tu/ tuls. At Auremp Camp three interpreters were required to communicate­
dubiously-with people who appeared, again, to be impassive or indifferent but 
who became more animated and laughed and talked when trade goods were 
exchanged for the food they had brought. It was near Auremp camp that the 
only overtly hostile act of the entire patrol took place, this when a man with an 
arrow held to his drawn bow leapt from the bush onto the trail in front of some 
carriers, who dropped their burdens and ran away. When they looked back, the 
menacing figure had disappeared and was not seen again. 
On reaching Tsengapi, the patrol spent two days so as to give the police and the 
carriers time to build a permanent haus kiap there. This was done to ensure 
Tsengapi's future as a place selected to be the site of a medical aid post, a 
Nazarene mission, and an airstrip, all of which I have been told now exist. After 
leaving Tsengapi, the patrol's work was done because after crossing the high 
pass into the Kaironk valley the patrol entered the jurisdiction of the Simbai 
Patrol Post, which was part of the Madang District, as it then was. 
Aftermath, 1965 to 1977 
During 1 964 and 1 965-aside from going on the patrol j ust described and 
carrying out ethnobotanical surveys in several Maring-speaking communities in 
the Jimi and the Simbai valleys-I spent most of my time among the people 
who lived in the easternmost settlement in the Simbai Valley (marked by B /A 
on Map 2) . Consequently, I was able to see what government by patrol was like 
over time at one place as well as seeing it on the patrol during one time in many 
places. The people I lived among were a clan cluster known as the Bomagai­
Angoiang, whose agriculture and landscape are described in my book Place and 
People: An Ecology of a New Guinean Communiry (Clarke 1 971 ) .  
When I went to their territory in  1 964, the Bomagai-Angoiang had been 
contacted only six years before by a patrol from the Jimi River. The events of 
that first contact are described in New Guinea: The Last Unknown, a book by 
Gavin Souter (1 963, 235-236) , who accompanied Barry Griffin, the kiap on that 
patrol in 1 958 .  As Souter describes the meeting, Griffin spoke to the assembled 
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group of men through an interpreter, calling the people the Gants, a mistaken 
name for the Bomagai-Angoiang and a neighbouring clan cluster. Griffin said: 
'I am the Kiap. I am the Government.' I have built my house at 
Tabibuga (that is, the Jimi Patrol Post) and I look after all the 
people that live there. . . . Now I have come here to your place . . .  
.I want to tell you something very worth while. This talk of mine 
must go right inside your head, and it must stay with you, and you 
must give it much thought. 
Souter continues: 'When Griffin had finished telling the Gants that they must 
no longer kill or steal, and that they must help the Government build patrol 
roads, the sun had almost set. But there was still time to lower the Australian 
flag, which had been hoisted beside our tents earlier in the afternoon. As the 
flag slid down its bamboo pole Griffin came to attention and saluted; his police 
slapped the butts of their bayoneted .303s, and the poor bewildered Gants stood 
gaping.' 
Two years later, in 1 960, another patrol came, this time from the newly 
established Simbai Patrol Post. Since then, the region has been administered 
from the Simbai Post, but because the region is thinly populated and on the 
outer limit of his jurisdiction, the Simbai kiap only visited once a year during the 
1 960s, spending a day or two to hold court and take the annual census. But the 
people did receive other early western visitors, including labour recruiters, 
geologists, anthropologists, geographers, entomologists, missionaries, didimen 
(agricultural extension officers) , missionary medical patrols, and medical 
researchers. 
When I arrived in 1 964 the principal physical manifestation of the 
administration was a haus kiap on a hilltop. By 1 970, when I returned for a 
second visit, a medical aid post with a doktaboi had been established, and, more 
impressively, a Papua New Guinean Luthern pastor had come there from the 
Jimi Valley and persuaded the Bomagai-Angoiang to build a grass-roofed 
church, the largest building in their territory. The people congregated there daily 
and especially on Sunday to hear the pastor evangelise. 
By 1 977, on my final visit, commerce had replaced the gospel. Now the first 
building to be seen on entering Bomagai-Angoiang territory was a typical trade 
store, a local materials shed big enough for one man to stand in and sell goods 
through an opening in the wall. The store was closed during my visit because it 
was too hard to tote the goods all the way from the Simbai airstrip, especially 
since the road and walking track had deteriorated. Nonetheless, the store 
remained a focal point in the community's life, perhaps being symbolic of 
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money and modernity even though its few flimsy shelves were empty. A 
disintegrating haus kiap did remain but the church and the aid post were gone, 
with a patch of tobacco growing on the ash-rich soil where the church had been. 
Men were growing coffee now but were reluctant to haul it on the shoulders for 
hours to a road head when the prices were low. The nearest aid post was now a 
day's walk up the Simbai Valley. The Anglican mission school, which had been 
located only a few hours away up the Simbai Valley in 1 965 and 1 970, was also 
closed. A few boys crossed the Bismarck Range to go to a school in the J imi 
Valley, where the Bomagai-Angoiang had traditional affiliations. 
Most symbolic of the dwindling outreach was that during the first three 
elections (1 964, 1 968, and 1 972) special patrols came and set up polling stations 
at the haus kiap in Bomagai-Angoiang territory. But during the 1 977 election, 
two years after PNG's independence, those Bomagai-Angoiang who wanted to 
vote had to cross a rugged river gorge and walk four hours to a polling place. I 
was told that only four men had done so. To the Bomagai-Angoiang, whose 
only experience throughout the 1 960s and into the early 1 970s had been of the 
government (and the missions) coming to them, the withdrawal of services and 
visits was confounding. One Bomagai-Angoiang man told me in 1 977 that his 
people were angry at the kiap. 'The kiap has abandoned us,' he said, 'and now 
we're going to abandon the kiap.' 
This decline in contact between agencies of the government and the Bomagai­
Angoiang is described in more detail in my paper entitled 'At the Tail of the 
Snake' (Clarke 1 980) ,  a phrase that would fit the experiences of many other 
people in rural areas across much of the country. Writ large, this loss of 
attention to its people could be seen as part of the evolution of Papua New 
Guinea towards becoming a 'failed state'. If  that is going too far, it could at 
least be said that people 'abandoning the kiap ' shows that the concept of being 
citizens of a nation had not been built into the minds of Papua New Guinea's 
disparate people and, for various reasons, the government became less and less 
capable of maintaining services while 'government by patrol' was diminishing. 
Looking back, one can only agree with August Kituai (1 998, 41)  when he says 
that the kiaps, along with their loyal police, were once the backbone of the 
Administration. 
Gordon and Meggitt (1 985) in their account and analysis of 'the decline of the 
kiaps' among the Enga people of the highlands of Papua New Guinea comment 
that it was unfortunate that the decline in extensive patrolling should coincide 
with the increasing localization of kiaps because this resulted in the invidious 
inference, made by the Enga themselves and by some academics, that kiaps 
became ineffective simply because they were nationals. Rather, Gordon and 
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Meggitt argue, it was the experience of being on long patrols that was the 
making of both the kiaps, the police, the interpreters, and even the carriers, and 
this experience led to a bonding among the patrol's participants. Freed from 
overcentralised decision-making, the kiaps in little-known or unknown regions 
of necessity assumed power, authority, and effectiveness on their own part. 
Gordon and Meggitt (1 985, 67) comment further: 
In reading accounts of early patrols of the kiap and his small 
contingent of police and large train of carriers labouriously walking 
to and from distant destinations, one is struck by the similarity 
between patrols and religious pilgrimages. Like the shrines that the 
pilgrim visit, the rest houses and the census points to which the 
patrols went were on the periphery of the circle of power and 
authority. . . . Kiap work - especially patrolling, which was often 
defined by the participants as adventurous - bred a remarkable 
self-confidence in young officers, as the pilgrimage may among its 
participants 
Anthropology and Administration in Papua New Guinea 
In accelerating numbers from the late nineteenth century onwards, 
anthropologists have explored Papua New Guinean ways of life. In these 
ventures, it might be conjectured that the anthropologists'  activities or ideas 
would rouse antagonism on the part of officers of the region's colonial 
administration, given that the goals of the officers were different from those of 
the anthropologists. The officers sought, first, to control local people and then 
to impart 'new and better' ways to them as part of their path to becoming 
efficient workers and good citizens in due course. Although before World War 
II, many anthropologists believed in the practical value of ethnography with 
regard to the administration of 'backward peoples', others sought only to 
understand ways of life (particularly 'traditional' or pre-contact ways) and to 
explicate people's beliefs and behaviour (Gray 2003; Campbell 1 998) .  After 
World War II, as support for colonialism waned, anthropologists began to 
doubt the propriety of being closely associated with government. But where 
antagonism may have existed between kiaps and anthropologists, it was generally 
muted. For instance, to the best of my firsthand knowledge in the Simbai and 
Jimi valleys during the 1 960s, when at least nine anthropologists or researchers 
with ethnographic interests lived in the area, relations with the kiaps were 
seldom strained, and the kiaps willingly expedited mail and supplies and were 
ready to discuss the anthropologists' work and ideas. There could of course be 
conflicts, such as one in another part of New Guinea in 1 968-although this 
had more to do with indiscretion on the part of a journalist than with 
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impropriety on the part of the anthropologists (Errington and Gewertz 1 995) .  
Or see McAuley for  discussion in  1 953 of a ' . . .  certain amount of tension, or 
mutual dissatisfaction' between anthropologists and administrators (McAuley 
1 953; cited in Westermark 2001 , 52) . And James Sinclair, a longtime kiap, 
describes how in 1 948 as a young cadet patrol officer taking the preparatory 
'short course' at the Australian School of Pacific Administration (ASOPA) in 
Sydney prior to his first posting in Papua New Guinea he encountered conflict 
between an anthropologist instructor and an officer with long familiarity with 
Papua New Guinea (Sinclair 1 978, 1 5) .  
That the anthropologists and their discipline were accepted to the extent that 
they were, even supported, rested in large part on the institutionalisation of 
anthropology into the administrations of both Papua and New Guinea (before 
the two were united) and the requirement that patrol officers study 
anthropology academically and include ethnographic material in their patrol 
reports . This support began with J .H.P. Murray, Lieutenant-Governor of 
Papua, who became interested in the usefulness of anthropology and 
anthropologists when in 1 904 he met C.G. Seligman, who had carried out an 
ethnographic survey in British New Guinea in that year and in 1 9 1 0  published 
The Melanesians of British New Guinea. By 1 91 9  the Papuan colonial 
administration under Murray had come to require, where staff numbers 
permitted, training in anthropology for both cadet officers and senior staff. To 
that end and to raise the discipline's status in Australia, Murray was instrumental 
in the establishment in 1 926 of the first chair of Anthropology in Australia, with 
the appointment of A.R. Radcliffe-Brown as Professor of Anthropology at the 
University of Sydney. As Campbell (1 998, 70) comments in his article on 
'Anthropology and the Professionalisation of Colonial Administration in Papua 
and New Guinea', the establishment of anthropology in Australia would almost 
certainly not have happened until after the Second World War without Murray's 
realisation that ' . . .  a prerequisite for successful government of any people was 
knowledge of its customs, languages and habits of thought, especially if one 
wanted to draw them by gentle means to a new order of living.' Murray's 
support of anthropological knowledge and concern for the welfare of Papuan 
people is remarkable given the prevalence of racism and policies of labour 
exploitation among the most aggressive white settlers in Papua throughout his 
years as Lieutenant-Governor (1 908-1 940) (Griffin, Nelson, and Firth 1 979, 
23-33) . 
Not only did Murray advocate that patrol officers study anthropology 
academically and include ethnographic material in their patrol reports, in 1 922 
he appointed F.E. Williams to act as government anthropologist in Papua, a 
position Williams fully occupied from 1 928 almost to his death in Papua New 
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Guinea in 1 943. The most accomplished of the government anthropologists 
appointed to Papua or the Mandated Territory of New Guinea, Williams was an 
Australian Rhodes scholar who had studied anthropology and psychology at 
Oxford under R.R. Marett. Although Williams accepted Murray's belief that 
anthropology in the service of administration was not to be doctrinaire or 
theoretical, but practical and at all times subservient to the administration's 
requirements, Williams also strove to use his meticulous fieldwork, his 
photography, and his publications to establish the intrinsic significance and 
merit of Papuan cultures.  In an address to the Adelaide Anthropological Society 
in 1 930, he said: 'The great value of anthropology for administrators of native 
races is that it teaches them that their culture is not the only one of value; it 
broadens the mind, roots out prejudice and the evil of national arrogance' 
(Young and Clark 2001 , 9, 1 6) .  
To an extent, Williams did take up theory but in  a way that accorded with 
Murray's dictum that the needs of good administration must take precedence 
over anthropological principles or theory, functionalism in this case. The 
functionalist paradigm was dominant in British social anthropology in the 1 920s 
and 1 930s and brought the potential for tension between the anthropologists 
and government officials charged with administration. Anthropologists holding 
strict functionalist beliefs were concerned that change was harmful because 
functionalist orthodoxy stresses interdependence of patterns of culture and the 
institutions of a society and their interaction in maintaining cultural and social 
coherence-taking a piece out of the system will break the unity and cause the 
whole to fall apart or stop working like a watch with a gear taken out. Since the 
job of the kiaps was precisely that-take some pieces out and put new ones 
in-dedicated functionalist anthropologists worried about the integrity and 
survival of local cultures. In reality, Papua New Guineans proved far more 
resilient to even very rapid change than functionalism posited, and the 
anthropologists could see, no matter what their intellectual beliefs, that rapid 
change was inevitable and a 'preservationist' policy not practical. Although by 
training and early inclination Williams supported functionalism, in his work he 
was also charged with the expurgation of 'bad' customs such as head hunting, 
sorcery, insanitary burial rites, and prolonged seclusion of widows. In his 
attempts to apply the values of the administration, he tangled with functionalist 
doctrine and found it wanting. Rather, he put forward the possibility of the 
blending of cultures, wherein replacing some old ways with new ones would not 
bring the destruction of the whole (Young and Clark 2001 , 25; Williams 1 929) . 
Later, Williams went one step further in his criticism of functionalism in his 
paper 'Creed of a Government Anthropologist', wherein he announced the 
functionalist heresy of 'cultural rubbish'. Arguing that functionalist doctrine as 
it applied culturally and to human societies had been overstated, Williams wrote 
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(1 939 / 1 976, 404) ' . . .  the degree of integration revealed by any organism is 
wholly beyond that achieved by any culture. '  Deliberately provocative, Williams 
went on to compare culture to a heap of rubbish in the back garden. It is true 
that adding to or removing something from the heap of rubbish may disturb the 
whole but that does not mean that the pile (or the culture) is a fully integrated 
whole (Young and Clark 2001 , 5 1-53) .  But in this venture into anthropological 
dispute, Williams maintained both his respect for Papuan cultures and his 
practical approach to change, noting that while he believed it justifiable to 
eliminate ' . . some things from primitive cultures that lie, so to speak, at our 
mercy, I would not dream of suggesting that we do so merely because they 
"outraged civilised notions of propriety'". But, he added, there may be good 
reasons of other kinds (Williams 1 939 / 1 976, 41 1) . 
Mention should also be made of the appointment in 1 924 of E.W.P. Chinnery 
as Government Anthropologist for the Mandated Territory of New Guinea, an 
appointment that was supported by Murray from the Papuan side (Campbell 
1 998) .  For much of his time in New Guinea (which he left in 1 938) ,  Chinnery 
served as an administrator as well as government anthropologist and published 
several anthropological reports (e.g. 1 925; 1 926) .  As an administrator, he 
promoted anthropological training for colonial field staff and also acted as 
'gatekeeper to the field' by his supervision of the entry into New Guinea of 
many eminent academic anthropologists, including Gregory Bateson, Beatrice 
Blackwood, Reo Fortune, Margaret Mead, Camilla Wedgwood, and Ian Hogbin 
(Gray 2003) . 
The support given by Williams and Chinnery to an anthropologically informed 
colonial policy and practice became a legacy that lasted after World War II 
through the 1 950s and well into the 1 960s in the ethnographic information that 
found its way into patrol reports. During the 1 945-1 965 period, most reports 
followed a similar format, as Westermark (2001 ,  53) describes: 
A diary of the day-to-day movements of the patrol was followed 
by accounts of such topics as the "Native Situation," "Health and 
Hygiene," "Roads and Bridges," and "Village Officials." These 
reports indicate the multitude of interests to which the kiaps were 
expected to attend, and which, of course, placed significant limits 
on their ability to collect much anthropological material. Generally 
speaking, such data were gathered through pidgin interpreters, and 
this, too, shaped the nature of the material. Nevertheless, the 
earliest reports from the postwar era begin to refer to "Native 
Customs," though the preferred label soon shifts to 
"Anthropology" or "Anthropological Information." 
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Westermark's (2001 )  analysis of 330 patrol reports from the Eastern Highlands 
between 1 945 and 1 973 shows that anthropological information was clearly an 
expected part of patrol reports and an obligation that was given serious 
attention by many kiaps. Of itself, the necessity to pay attention to local ways of 
life must have had a worthwhile influence on the way kiaps would have related 
to and understood local people. But it would be wrong to think that the 
requirement for anthropological reporting necessarily brought a rapprochement 
between the kiaps and the communities they oversaw. I know from my own 
experience among the Bomagai-Angoiang that when census patrols arrived and 
people were required to 'line' at the haus kiap (that is, be present and respond to 
the calling out of their names) , some people always stayed away in remote 
hamlets or in their gardens. After the patrol was gone they told me that they 
had hidden because they did not like the kiap or, as Errington and Gewertz 
(1 995, 27) put it for another part of New Guinea, they did not like the 
experience of being 'ordered' (in both senses of the word) by beings more 
powerful than they were-especially since the rationale for the ordering 
remained at least somewhat mysterious . 
As Errington and Gewertz express it in their description of the Karavaran 
people in the Duke of York Islands, the patrols and reports constituted a system 
of surveillance and control. The presence of the village book, which was left in 
each village and was consulted and augmented by each visiting patrol officer, 
provided for a dialogue between kiaps and asserted the continuity of colonial 
control. The village books examined by Errington and Gewertz (1 99 5, 25-27) 
also showed a continuity of frustration on the part of the kiaps, if not at times 
outright contempt. 
Patrol officers concerned themselves on patrols and in their reports 
with all aspects of life. Backward locals had to be taught the 
fundamentals of proper living and were j udged and represented 
according to their willingness and capacity to conform to European 
standards (Errington and Gewertz 1 995, 30) . 
In response to kiaps' enjoinders, some of which the Karavaran people found 
demeaning, misinformed, or foolish, the people sought to trick the kiap or 
otherwise aggravate inexperienced patrol officers. For instance, they responded 
to the Administration's preoccupation with latrine construction by following the 
letter of the requirement but not the spirit: they built the latrines but didn't use 
them. After all, they told the anthropologist, how truly embarrassing it would 
be if their affines saw them entering or leaving the outhouses (Errington and 
Gewertz 1 995, 30) . 
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On the other hand, since the patrol reports passed up through the chain of 
administrative command all the way to headquarters in Port Moresby, 
anthropological understanding would have reached into all levels of the 
administrative structure to at least some extent and would have served, again to 
some extent, to mediate between the administration's goals and the measures 
taken to achieve them. As Westermark (2001 ,  58) says, it is difficult to ascertain 
from the reports how the collection of anthropological information may have 
affected administrative policy but there is evidence that the information was 
taken into consideration as, for instance, in the extremely significant matter of 
land tenure. It is not surprising that the collection of anthropological data built 
up only slowly during the post-war recovery of the latter 1 940s, reached its peak 
during the 1 950s as administrative control was widely extended and then began 
to lessen during the latter 1 960s as the emphasis of administration shifted 
towards the political education necessary for the development of self­
government and independence, and for the first time Papua New Guineans 
themselves began to take on the work of the kiaps. 
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Tom Kabu and the 'outside men ' :  Paternalism and Prestige in the 
Purari Delta, 1945-1960 
Anthony Yeates 
Tom Kabu was a Papuan leader who was influential in the Purari Delta, in the 
Gulf of Papua, following the Second World War. A man of great enthusiasm 
and drive, his mission was to develop the region of his birth to a level 
approximating that of Australia as he had experienced it during the war. His 
primary focus was on cooperative economic activity and he encouraged local 
people to grow cash crops (especially vegetables) and market sago in Port 
Moresby. The transformations he envisioned were not, however, all economic. 
Kabu was also interested in changing the mores of the Purari people and sought 
to introduce Christianity and European-style dwellings and communities to the 
Delta. While some of his aims were shared by Australia's post-war 
administration in the territories, with its 'new deal' for native people promising 
them the opportunity to participate in their own development, his methods were 
often antithetical to theirs. In the early years of his cooperative movement 
(referred to variously in patrol reports as the Kompani and the Ina, or Ena, 
Company), which was at its peak from 1 946 to 1 954, Kabu rejected the 
interference of the government in his schemes and discouraged his followers 
from working for Europeans. 1 Kabu's followers in the villages of the Purari 
called him 'our taubada', our boss, and 'King Tommy'.2 
Many people living in the Purari villages, especially the young men returned 
from the labour lines, were hungry for change after the war. The old ceremonies 
had lost much of their significance, following the suppression of cannibalism 
and inter-tribal warfare and no suitable substitute had been found to fill this 
ontological void. Despite the lofty promises of Australia's Labor Government, 
the Australian administration was slow in providing services, and even slower in 
providing capital, toward satisfying the people's desire for change and 
opportunity. The developmental goals of the Australian administration in Papua 
and New Guinea during the period under review seem to have been mostly 
concerned with implementing a civilising project through a moral tutelage that 
was based on assumptions of European cultural superiority. The people in the 
villages consequently had little say about the direction that cultural exchange and 
1 He was not, however, anti-European and clearly distinguished between the Australians in 
New Guinea and his friends in Australia. 
2 Sam Tua Kaima, 'King Tommy's ideal dream is shattered', Times ef Papua New Guinea, 5- 1 2  
September, 1 986. 
62 
Anthony Y eatcs Tom Kabu and the 'outside men' 
village development might take. 3 Furthermore, the assistance and guidance 
promised by the Patrol Officers working for the Department of District 
Services and Native Affairs (DDSNA) was not backed up by vital infrastructure, 
such as transport and marketing opportunities. 
The Government and the people in the villages also clashed over the rate of 
development and change. For the Government change was to be gradual and 
controlled by the authorities and this cautious approach often suppressed and 
discouraged native incentive and enthusiasm. This was certainly the case with 
the Tom Kabu cooperative movement. In the villages of the Purari, many 
people became impatient with the pace of change dictated by the Government. 
This eventually subdued the enthusiasm of many people in the villages of the 
Gulf of Papua, even those that had experienced some success with cash 
cropping and cooperative associations. What followed was a period of 
increasing disillusionment and disappointment. 
Most disturbing for the government's representatives in the district, the Patrol 
Officers, was Kabu's influence in the villages and the anti-government 
sentiment that this was believed to engender. The Patrol Officer was responsible 
for maintaining order in the villages and any sign of rebellion against the 
colonial administration was viewed as a serious matter and as a sign of the 
Patrol Officers' failure to perform their duties. While the senior levels of 
government retarded native development, albeit not by design, through over­
regulation, neglect (usually a result of staffing shortages) , and administrative 
inflexibility, the Patrol Officers in the field did so through local squabbles over 
power and prestige. The more Kabu's prestige grew the more the Patrol 
Officer's standing seemed to diminish. A local power struggle ensued as the 
field staff tried to undermine Kabu and his activities so that the Government 
might claim absolute authority in the Delta. These were indeed the formative 
years, an era of hope and, unfortunately, missed opportunity. By not supporting 
strong indigenous leaders, such as Tom Kabu, the Administration missed a 
valuable opportunity to encourage and guide the energy of village life in post­
war Papua New Guinea, creating a sound foundation for future development 
and economic independence. 
Situated in the Western Coastal region of the Gulf of Papua, the Purari Delta is 
a maze of creeks and swamps where the most pervasive elements are mud and 
3 Development is an ambiguous term and I use it here to signify the colonial regime's idea of 
development as progress, growth, and advancement according to a culturally arrogant 
civilising project. 
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water.4 Most of the land is barely a metre above sea level. For the local people 
the land provided for most of their needs: there were vast sago swamps and the 
creeks were alive with fish and crabs. Some Patrol Officers attributed the so­
called laziness of local people to the fact that food was so plentiful and relatively 
easy to procure in the region. Life in the Purari, however, was not always easy. 
Crocodiles are common and the people of the region once had a well-deserved 
reputation as cannibals. The area was also famous for its huge men's houses, the 
ravi or eravo. These long cavernous structures were once the spiritual centre of 
the village, but they lost much of their significance after the colonisers 
suppressed cannibalism and warfare. The imunu, the life spirit, had passed.5 The 
people of the Purari were left depressed and empty. Conditions were thus ripe 
for a visionary leader. The young men following Kabu said that they belonged 
to a new generation. They called themselves the 'New Men'. For them, the time 
before Kabu's Company was muru pani, a time of darkness.6 
Tom Kabu was born Koiva Aua sometime around 1 922 in the Purari Delta. He 
left the village as a young man, as many did, and in 1 937 was recruited as a 
native police constable in eastern Papua where he was stationed at Samarai. 
Early in 1 942, he accompanied some Australian army officers on a small vessel 
from Samarai in eastern Papua to Cairns in northern Queensland. The 
Australians called him Tommy (which he later changed to the more dignified 
diminutive, Tom) . He spent the following four years either in Australia or at sea 
serving with the Royal Australian Navy.7 In Cairns Tom Kabu was employed as 
an orderly by a senior officer with the Royal Australian Navy, Lieutenant­
Commander Norman S. Pixley.8 He served for twelve months at sea and was by 
all accounts popular with the Australians. He made a name for himself as a clean 
4 In 1 887 Captain J .M. Hennessy described a journey in the upper Vailala River country as 
one 'ample for the most greedy globe-trotter. Mud, mud, mud; nothing but soft, slimy mud 
covered mostly all the way, with about 6 inches of water.' J.M. Hennessy, 'Report of a Trip to 
the Western Part of the South Coast of British New Guinea', Proceedings and Transactions of the 
Queensland Branch of the Rnyal Geographical Sociery of Australia, 3 (2), 1 887-1 888, p.65. 
5 Maher writes that what remained of the old Purari culture was 'a fac;ade without substance.' 
Robert F. Maher, 'The Purari River Delta Societies, Papua New Guinea, After the Tom Kabu 
Movement', Ethnology, 23 (3), 1 984, p.220. 
6 L.W. Allen, 'The Purari Kompani: a brief report on the main aspects of the happenings of 
1 946-8 in the Purari Delta of Papua' in The Purari Delta: Background and Progress of Communiry 
Development, South Pacific Commission Technical Paper 35, Noumea, 1 952, p . 10. 
7 Nigel D. Oram, 'Rabia Camp and the Tommy Kabu Movement' in Nancy E. Hitchcock and 
Nigel D. Oram, Rabia Camp: A Port Moresl!J Migrant Settlement, New Guinea Research Bulletin 
1 4, New Guinea Research Unit, Canberra, 1 967, p.8. 
8 Oram, 'Rabia Camp and the Tommy Kabu Movement', p.8. 
64 
Anthony Yeates Tom Kabu and the 'outside men' 
living and dignified man who spent long hours reading the Bible.9 On his return 
to the Purari in 1 946 he adopted the name Kabu, 'the man who owns things' . 1 0 
During his time in Australia, a period of approximately two and a half years, 
Kabu accompanied Norman Pixley's family on holiday to Surfer's Paradise and 
he lived for some time in Brisbane. He also stayed with the family of an 
Australian friend in Adelaide. 1 1  This is significant as it meant that, unlike most 
Papuans, he personally saw the European world and gained some idea of its 
wealth and the source of this wealth. More importantly, he witnessed first-hand 
the social dimensions of European economic activity: the clean roomy houses, 
the power of cooperation, and the dignity that material wealth seemed to bring. 
These experiences fuelled his aspiration for a Papuan world based on the 
Australian model. 
Kabu's Australian experience apparently took a nasty turn in 1 945, following the 
Japanese surrender, when Norman Pixley, with some regret, left Kabu at a 
repatriation camp for New Guineans and Pacific Islanders in Queensland. 1 2  It 
was in the repatriation camp that Kabu was given a 'refresher course' in colonial 
relations. The officer in charge of the camp, an ex-New Guinea planter, was a 
subscriber to the old orthodoxy of white prestige and it has been reported that 
this officer beat Kabu for being 'cheeky'. This really meant that Kabu had had 
the audacity to step outside the boundaries of race and to speak plainly and on 
familiar terms with the white authority figure. 13 This reminder of colonial 
relations probably reinforced Kabu's desire to achieve independence from 
European domination and to resist government interference in his schemes. 
Kabu saw money as a necessary prerequisite if the living standards of the Purari 
people were to approximate that of the Australians. He wrote in 1 956 that 
money was the 'most important and powerful thing in the world'. 1 4 Indigenous 
economic development, however, was not a great priority for the Australian 
administration at the time. Development, at least as far as indigenous people 
were concerned, was concentrated on moral education as part of an ill-defined 
civilising project, which in turn was based on the assumption of European 
cultural superiority. The Administration favoured indigenous productivity 
9 Norman S. Pixley, 'Tommy Kabu of Papua', journal if the Rqyal Histo1fral Society of Queensland, 
1 1  (3), 1 981 -82, p.6. 
10 Robert F. Maher, 'Tommy Kabu Movement of the Purari Delta', Oceania, 29 (2), December 
1 958, p.76. 
1 1  Pixley, 'Tommy Kabu of Papua', p.3. 
1 2 Pixley, 'Tommy Kabu of Papua', pp.6-7. 
1 3 Kaima, 'King Tommy's ideal dream is shattered'. 
14 Maher, 'Tommy Kabu Movement of the Purari Delta', p.220. 
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mainly as a way of regulating, settling, and pacifying native people so that they 
might be more receptive to the government's doctrine of self-help, 'cultural 
blending', and assimilation. Catherine Snowden, historian of cooperatives and 
rural progress societies in Papua New Guinea, writes that 'any entrepreneurial 
behaviour was viewed [by the Administration] with suspicion.' 15 There was, 
consequently, a good deal of conflict between Kabu and the local Patrol 
Officers, the 'outside men' as they were known prior to the war. 
The Patrol Officer was effectively the government in the Purari and as such he 
expected to be obeyed and respected, both as a figure of authority and, at least 
covertly, as a racial superior. 16 Any trouble, or even dissent within the 
subdistrict, reflected badly on him, personally in terms of his standing with the 
expatriate community, and professionally as an officer of the government. 17 
Kabu's popularity undermined the standing of the Patrol Officer in the village 
and challenged the covert but persistent idea of white prestige by antagonising 
local expatriates. Consequently, on a number of occasions, the field staff 
purposefully sought to frustrate his activities . This was done by withholding 
funds held in trust, declaring one strategic village a 'Forbidden Settlement', by 
favouring pro-government leaders in competition with Kabu, and by promising 
government help, through state supervised cooperative societies, to compliant 
villagers. 
In the 1 920s the population of the Delta was estimated to be between 1 0,000 
and 1 5 ,000 people, with some of the larger communities made up of 2,000 or 
more people. 1 8 By 1 947 there were roughly 9,000 people living in the area. 19 
Between 1 948 and 19 5 1 ,  approximately a third of Purari villagers had migrated 
from the region, either temporarily for work or education, as was mostly the 
case, or permanently to live in Port Moresby.20 Some villages lost up to eight per 
15 Catherine Snowden, 'Copra Cooperatives' in Donald Denoon and Catherine Snowden 
(eds) , A Time to Plant and a Time to Uproot, Institute of Papua New Guinea Studies, Port 
Moresby, 1 98 1 ,  p.20 1 .  
1 6 In 1 951 ,  for example, Patrol Officer Herbert Clark spoke of the 'Beara Government - or 
myself.' Patrol Officer H.E. Clark, Beara Patrol Report 1 1 951  / 1 952, Gulf Province Patrol 
Reports 1 9 1 2-1 974, National Archives and Public Records Service of Papua New Guinea, 
A9844, 1 989. 
1 7  Maher, 'The Purari River Delta Societies', p.21 8. 
1 8 R. Thomson, 'Community Development in the Purari Delta' in The Purari Delta: Background 
and Progress of Communiry Development, p. 1 5. 
19 Allen, 'The Purari Kompani', p. 1 .  
20 Allen, 'The Purari Kompani', 9. This figure is confirmed by the annual census conducted by 
the Patrol Officers. 
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cent of their inhabitants .21 One of Kabu's aims was to encourage the Papuan 
people to work for themselves, rather than for Europeans, and one of the 
benefits of this would be to provide an incentive for people to remain in or 
return to the village. The Purari villagers had a long history of trading with the 
Motuan people of eastern Papua. For hundreds of years, during the lean dry 
season, the Motu sailed their lakatoi to the Delta, to trade clay pots for sago and 
timber. It was Kabu's intention to reinvent this trading relationship, the hin·, in a 
new form, by transporting sago to Port Moresby, not in exchange for pots, but 
for money.22 Aided by his immediate supporters, sometimes referred to as his 
lieutenants, satellites, or less favourably as 'henchmen',23 Kabu set up the Purari 
Sago Company in early 1 946.24 
In 1 947 Patrol Officer Francis Robb, an officer who for the most part seems to 
have supported Kabu's ventures, reported that the activities of the Company 
were doomed to fail, not because the people were not productive, but because 
shipping was not available.25 The larger shipping firms were not willing to make 
space available for native produce. 26 They claimed that the wet sago would 
damage the decks. The situation had not improved three years later when Patrol 
Officer Herbert Clark wrote that economic ventures in the region would not 
21 Cadet Patrol Officer L.G. Bridges, Beara 2 1 954/1 955, Gulf Province Patrol Reports 1 9 1 2-
1 974, p .2. In 1 970, Patrol Officer J.W. Boyes visited villages west of the Vailala during the 
Christmas period and found it remarkable how much livelier they were with the presence of 
the children and visiting relatives. By the time he finished his patrol the New Year had passed 
and 'the usual atmosphere of depression and apathy re-asserted itself.' Patrol Officer J.W. 
Boyes, Ihu 10 1 969/70, Gulf Province Patrol Reports 1 91 2- 1974. 
22 Oram, 'Rabia Camp and the Tommy Kabu Movement', p.8. 
23 Clark, Beara 4 1 951 /52, Gulf Province Patrol Reports 1 9 12- 1974, p.7. 
24 Sago was shipped to Port Moresby until the Company folded in 1 949. Oram, 'Rabia Camp 
and the Tommy Kabu Movement', 1 1 .  It is interesting to note that in 1 952 there was a great 
demand for Motuan pots in the Purari and that the Airavi and Evara people expressed the 
desire for the Motu people to continue to trade pots in return for sago and canoe timber. 
Clark, Beara 5 1 95 1/52, Gulf Province Patrol Reports 1 91 2-1 974. 
25 Patrol Officer Francis Robb suggested that the Government could counter Kabu's 
influence in the Purari by raising the prestige of the Patrol Officer. This, he proposed, could 
be achieved by making regular, 'extensive, and sustained', patrols in a launch. Apart from the 
time that would be saved, Robb did not think that 'the power, or prestige, of the government, 
is at present enhanced in this area by the use of a canoe, and such prestige was never at a 
lower ebb.' He found, on a recent patrol, that many villagers refused to obey orders and pay 
due deference to his office. He writes that there were numerous cases demonstrating the 
'degree of respect, and obedience accorded to the Government and to the orders which I 
issued. ' Patrol Officer Francis Robb, Kikori 2 1 947 / 48, Gulf Province Patrol Reports 1 91 2-
1 974, p. 1 2. 
26 Thomson, 'Community Development in the Purari Delta', p. 1 8. 
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succeed unless shipping and marketing could be assured. This was obvious to 
Kabu who set about collecting money to purchase a boat for the Company. 
With Kabu's leadership qualities engendering a sense of optimism and 
confidence, contributors for his boat-buying scheme were not hard to find. 27 
According to the London Missionary Society's Reverend L.W. Allen, thousands 
of people contributed to Kabu's scheme, raising over £2,500. The Patrol 
Officers and Allen sought to dissuade them, advising the people to concentrate 
on smaller schemes within their own tribal communities. 28 
The Company purchased a 47 year-old schooner, the Ena, from the Royal 
Australian Navy for £3,000 in April 1 946. Less than a month later, while docked 
in Port Moresby, it was burnt beyond repair when a crewmember used gasoline 
instead of kerosene to make a lamp. 29 The Administration ruled that the 
purchase of the Ena had infringed the Transactions with Natives Ordinance and it 
was agreed that the purchase price should be refunded to the Company's 
subscribers. 30 Exactly how this money was to be refunded would be an ongoing 
problem for the Administration, especially officers in the DDSNA, which was 
responsible for the refund operation.3 1 When Patrol Officer G.P. Hardy spoke 
to the Purari people in 1 948, he suggested that the refund of subscriptions 
should be paid to individual subscribers. For the most part the people disagreed, 
saying that the money should instead be handed over in full for Tom Kabu to 
use to buy a boat. The Crown Law Officer refused to do this, and vouchers 
showing the amount to be repaid to each subscriber were drawn up. In many of 
the villages loyal to Kabu, the people simply refused to accept the money and 
for the Patrol Officer this was a source of frustration and humiliation.32 
27 Peter Fitzpatrick, Law and State in Papua New Guinea, Academic Press, London, 1 980, p . 128. 
28 Allen, 'The Purari Kompani', p.2. 
29 Maher, 'Tommy Kabu Movement of the Purari Delta', pp.82-83. 
30 Oram, 'Rabia Camp and the Tommy Kabu Movement', p. 1 9. 
31 When the Company's truck broke down in 1 95 1 ,  Kabu applied to have his own 
contribution to the Ena collection, which was the equivalent of $600, refunded in order to 
carry out repairs. Oram, 'Rabia Camp and the Tommy Kabu Movement', pp. 1 4-45. The 
Administration refused to refund the money, either through malice, or because reliable 
records of the scheme had not been kept. Possibly the latter was used to justify the former. 
The Ena money was finally recovered in 1 966 when a meeting of the Baimuru Local 
Government Council, attended by Kabu, decided that the money should be placed at the 
disposal of the Council so that they could purchase a boat. Seven years later a boat was built 
at Baimuru and delivered to the Council at a cost of around $6,000. It would be used to start 
a fishing industry with the intention of supplying the domestic market. Maher, 'The Purari 
River Delta Societies', p.22 1 .  
32 J.H. Jones, 1 June 1 949, i n  Patrol Officer RT. Galloway, Beara Patrol Report 3 1 947 /48, 
Gulf Province Patrol Reports 1 9 1 2- 197 4. 
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In 1 9  50, more than three years after the Ena was destroyed, a patrol set out to 
return contributions to the individual subscribers, but it was largely 
unsuccessful. Patrol Officer E.O. Graham again found that most people wanted 
the refund to go back to the Company. He wrote that the refund exercise 
demonstrated the 'more unwholesome aspect' of Kabu's influence, which was a 
general resistance to the government. Offering money to 'natives', and having it 
refused, was an undignified position for a government officer to find himself in 
and Graham related that he found it personally embarrassing to be in such a 
situation.33 A few months later, Graham wrote that, in his opinion, Kabu not 
only ruled the Purari people but 'robbed them as well.'34 It could, however, be 
argued that it was the Administration that was robbing the people of the right to 
choose how their money could be used. The withholding of funds and the lack 
of assistance in procuring a replacement vessel would prove to be terminal 
impediments to Kabu's Company. 
Many of the Patrol Officers, and their immediate superiors, were convinced that 
Kabu was a shyster intent on taking advantage of gullible local people. This was 
an intolerable situation for the Patrol Officer, whose job it was to protect them. 
In 1 949, the Acting District Officer, C.T. Healey, wrote that the Purari people 
had received no payment for producing the sago while Tom Kabu and 'his 
satellites wax fat on expenses.' 35 The Acting District Commissioner, L.J . 
O'Malley, concurred in 1 95 1 ,  saying that in his opinion the collection of shares 
was a hoax and that the proceeds were being used by Kabu to enrich his camp 
in Port Moresby. O'Malley assured his superiors that Kabu's activities were 
being carefully monitored.36 
The local field staff were constantly reminded of the prestige and respect 
accorded to Kabu in relation to themselves .  In 1 948 Patrol Officer Ron 
Galloway reported that houses built for Kabu in the Purari villages were much 
better than the Rest Houses built for Patrol Officers. He also related that, when 
Kabu last visited the area, his houses were 'piled with food', whereas in only one 
village was food brought to the Patrol Officer and offered for sale. 
Furthermore, when Kabu entered the village everyone gathered to greet him, 
whereas only the Village Constable and Village Councillors greeted the Patrol 
Officer. Galloway writes that these were all 'little things' that indicated a swing 
33 Patrol Officer E.O. Graham, Beara 3 1 949 /SO, Gulf Province Patrol Reports 1 9 1 2-1 974. 
34 Graham, Beara 2 1 950/5, Gulf Province Patrol Reports 1 912-1 974, p . 1 . 
35 C.T. Healey to Jones, in Robb, Beara 6 1 948/ 49, 4 May 1 949, Gulf Province Patrol Reports 
1 9 12-1 974. 
36 L.J. O'Malley, 10 October 1951 ,  in Clark, Beara 2 1951 /52, Gulf Province Patrol Reports 
1 9 1 2- 1974. 
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away from the Government, 'as far as guidance is concerned', to Kabu.37 
In 1 94 7, the Senior Social Welfare Officer with the Department of Education in 
Papua, R. Thomson, questioned one of Kabu's followers about the movement's 
origins and aims. According to his informant, the villagers had originally 
approached Tom Kabu saying that they wanted to get rid of 'all their New 
Guinea things . . . and have things and utensils just like Australians.' Kabu 
agreed to help. He told them to gather together all the ceremonial objects and, 
after a Bible reading and prayers,38 they were destroyed.39 There were rumours 
that a native police force was being drilled and that gaols were being built in 
those villages under Kabu's influence. 40 This, along with the burning of 
ceremonial objects in the villages, was too much for the Government, which 
suspected that Kabu's activities might revive the inter-war cult described by the 
Australian anthropologist Francis Edgar Williams as the 'Vailala Madness'. 41 
Kabu was subsequently brought in to K.ikori, the administrative centre in the 
Gulf District at the time, for questioning. According to some accounts of the 
incident he was merely taken in for consultation, while others argue that he was 
arrested 'with a considerable degree of force'.42 
The more militant aspects of Kabu's movement were easily brought under 
control and after 1 947 it operated, at least overtly, within the Administration's 
37 Galloway, Beara 3 1 947 /48, Gulf Province Patrol Reports 1 91 2-1 974. The Patrol Officers 
could on occasion be quite petty about the situation in the Purari. For example, when in 1 947 
some Kinipo villagers, disillusioned with Kabu's scheme, asked Patrol Officer Collins for 
help, he reminded them that only two months ago they had the opportunity to receive help 
but had declined the Administration's assistance in favour of Kabu. Patrol Officer G.D. 
Collins, Beara 1 1 948/49, Gulf Province Patrol Reports 1 9 1 2- 1 974. 
38 Allen writes that Kabu also read from Communist tracts. Allen, 'The Purari Kompani', p.5. 
39 Thomson, 'Community Development in the Purari Delta', p . 17. 
40 These rumours were largely unfounded. There were guards parading with wooden rifles, 
but these were purely symbolic and used to ward off 'evil spirits'. Thomson, 'Community 
Development in the Purari Delta', p. 1 8. The anthropologist Peter Worsley referred to this 
force as a 'paramilitary organization.' Peter Worsley, The Trumpet Shall Sound· A Stucfy of 'Cargo' 
Cults in Melanesia, Second Edition, Schocken Books, New York, 1 968, p. 1 93. 
41 Like Kabu, the cult 'bosses' had also discouraged members from working for Europeans 
and had displayed insolent behaviour. The cult activity, according to Peter Worsley, was a 
reaction to the new order being imposed upon the Purari people by the Europeans. It was an 
act of rebellion against the indigenous peoples' subordinate position within this new 
hierarchy. Worsley, The Trumpet Shall Sound, p.89. 
42 Oram, 'Rabia Camp and the Tommy Kabu Movement', p. 1 8. Catherine Snowden writes 
that another reason for the raid was Kabu's 'lieutenant' Aua Akia's punishment of recalcitrant 
villagers. Snowden, 'Copra Cooperatives', p .1 86. 
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framework.43 In 1 948 and 1 949, for example, Kabu invited the Administration's 
assistance in training the Company's clerks in book keeping. The Patrol 
Officers, however, never really forgave him for refusing their help and Kabu 
continued to be viewed as a threat by some officials in the Administration. In 
1 948 the Acting Director of DDSNA, John Herbert Jones, a man known to 
have been antagonistic to Jack Keith Murray's 'new deal' Administration, 
expressed concern that Kabu's authority in the area appeared to be adversely 
affecting administrative control. 44 The Patrol Officers sought to reverse this 
trend by attempting to break up the Company and discredit Kabu. 
One of Kabu's many projects was to move Purari villages to more harmonious 
and advantageous environments. In 1 95 1  Clark described the old Iari villages, 
where Kabu grew up, as a 'quagmire of slush, filth, coconut husks and general 
food refuse', with 'disgusting blue blow-flies' making conditions 'most 
unpleasant' .45 The ubiquitous pig excrement further added insult to the village 
ambience.46 In contrast, Francis Robb described Kabu's new Sago Camp village 
as 'very clean' with flowerbeds and watermelon patches planted throughout.47 
Another of Kabu's new villages was Hevesea, which was situated opposite the 
Port Romilly Sawmill on the banks of the Warne River. Hevesea was the 
Company's storage and shipping centre.48 The idea of situating Hevesea near the 
sawmill was to take advantage of the wharf facilities .  While this was 
pragmatically a valid decision, the proximity of the European owned mill would 
prove a big problem for Hevesea and Kabu's Company. 
When Francis Robb visited Hevesea in August 1 947, there were several 
43 Maher, 'Tommy Kabu Movement of the Purari Delta', p.78. 
44 Jones 2 June 1 948, in Galloway, Beara 3 1 94 7 / 48, Gulf Province Patrol Reports 1 9 1 2- 197 4. 
Brian Jinks writes that Jones had been part of the pre-war Administration and had little 
involvement with the post-war 'new deal', for which he had little sympathy. Brian Jinks, 
'Bibliographical Guide' in Policy, Planning and Administration in Papua New Guinea, 1 942-
1 952, with special reference to the role of Colonel J .K Murray, PhD Thesis, Department of 
Government, University of Sydney, 1 97 5, p .1 8. 
45 Clark, Beara 2 19 51 /52, Gulf Province Patrol Reports 1 9 1 2- 197 4, p. 7. 
46 Clark, Beara 7 19 51 /52, Gulf Province Patrol Reports 1 9 12- 197 4. The situation in the Old 
Iari villages changed little over the following decade, with Patrol Officer J.P. Fowke reporting 
in 1 961  that the housing remained 'extremely poor' and that 'extremely malodorous sago pith' 
dotted the landscape in rotting piles. Patrol Officer J.P. Fowke, Beara 1 1 960/6 1 ,  Gulf 
Province Patrol Reports 1 9 12-1 974. 
47 Patrol Officer Francis Robb, Kikori 2 1 947 / 48, Gulf Province Patrol Reports 1 91 2- 197 4, 
p. 1 8. 
48 The Kikori land owners, living in nearby Evara, had given permission for Kabu and his 
followers to set up storage and transport facilities for the Company. Robb, Kikori 2 1 94 7 / 48, 
Gulf Province Patrol Reports 1 9 1 2-1 974, p .1 3. 
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thousand coconuts, a great deal of fruit and vegetables, including corn, and 1 40 
bundles of sago ready for shipment to Port Moresby. Since the next boat due to 
visit the sawmill would not arrive for at least two weeks, Robb expected most of 
this produce to rot before i t  could be delivered. The attitude of the saw millers 
toward Hevesea was, according to Robb, 'most hostile'. He writes that, 'they will 
endeavour to prevent any of the companys [sic] produce being shipped', by 
refusing the use of the wharf and by filling each boat with timber so that there 
was no room left for the Company's produce. 49 
According to the Reverend Allen, the manager of the sawmill had been 'very 
tolerant' until Kabu's activities 'retarded the efficient handling of timber and 
cargo. '  Kabu had told his followers not to work for the Europeans after he had 
heard from labourers employed by the sawmill that they were being treated 
unfairly.so Ever the scribe of rumour, Allen writes that Kabu declared he would 
take over the Port Romilly Sawmill and banish the Europeans.s1 The Company 
was subsequently banned from the sawmill. Robb wrote that the 'virtual 
blockade is having the effect of strangling the Ena Company's activities. '  He was 
sure that if 'nothing constructive' could be done then the Company should be 
'closed down, and the people returned to their villages. 's2 
It is no surprise then that, with the Australians united against them, Hevesea 
was declared a 'Forbidden Settlement' in 1 950. This was quite unusual as mostly 
it was only derelict villages and kombati, isolated sago camps, which were 
gazetted as 'Forbidden Settlements'. The reason given was that conflict between 
the people of nearby Evara and Hevesea would eventually cause trouble, despite 
the fact that the people of Evara were supporters of Kabu and had given 
permission to use the land. The real reason for the declaration seems to have 
been the conflict between the sawmill's manager and Kabu and Hevesea's non­
cooperation with the Government. It had, after all, been one of the villages to 
unanimously decline the refund of the Ena money. The easiest way to resolve 
these conflicts, from the Government's point of view, was to close the 
settlement down in the hope that Kabu's movement would fold. Many of 
Kabu's followers subsequently moved from Hevesea to Maipenairu, not far 
from Allen's London Missionary Society headquarters on Urika Island. s3 The 
49 Robb, Kikori 2 1 947 / 48, Gulf Province Patrol Reports 1 91 2- 1 974, pp. 1 3- 14. 
so Allen, 'The Purari Kompani', p.8. 
si Allen, 'The Purari Kompani', p.5. 
s2 Robb, Kikori 2 1 947 /48, Gulf Province Patrol Reports 1 9 1 2- 1 974. 
s3 Graham, Beara 3 1 949/50, Gulf Province Patrol Reports 1 91 2-1 974. Apparently not all of 
the villagers willingly moved from the upriver villages to Maipenaru. Clark was told that a 
man named 'Auwa Ariki' had issued the order for one small village, Ravikivau, to move to 
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antagonism of the Patrol Officers toward Kabu continued unabated after 
Hevesea's closure as the field staff discouraged the movement's schemes at the 
new location. 
Another method employed by the Patrol Officers to thwart Kabu's actlvttles 
was to support more compliant leaders in the region willing to oppose Ka bu. s4 
One of  these was the Village Constable at Maipua, east of Urika, Kiri Morea. In 
1 948, Patrol Officer G.D. Collins reported that Kiri Morea had built a new 
copra shed and planned to 'work on his own account' with the assistance of 
twenty supporters. The Patrol Officer felt justified in supporting Kabu's rival as 
suspicion of the Administration, reported Collins, was only evident when Kabu 
himself was in the district.ss It was reasoned that if Kabu could be kept out of 
the area then this suspicion would disappear. Francis Robb wrote that the 
Government should encourage Kiri Morea's 'rebel group', which was a small 
'core of opposition' to Kabu's Company, by providing copra bags and arranging 
transport through the Beara Police Camp, which was near the Port Romilly saw 
mill. Robb felt that Kabu's activities could be 'much reduced' by supporting his 
competitors.s6 Acting District Officer Healey wrote that, if Kiri Morea's copra 
production was a success, then it might 'go far to break down faith' in Kabu's 
Company.s7 The Director of DDSNA, Jones, wrote to Healey asking why the 
Ena Company should be retarded. 'Is it an unlawful situation?' he inquired of 
the Acting District Officer.s8 Healey replied that he did not know whether it was 
lawful or not, what he did know was that 'on its present basis it is not good for 
the Purari people. 's9 
Patrol Officer Robb was impressed by the considerable extent of Kabu's power 
over the people and suggested that, if the government had a similar hold, the 
region would develop rapidly. He pondered whether some sort of company or 
cooperative could be built upon the foundations of Kabu's Company and under 
Government control. In Robb's opinion, a Cooperative Society would redirect 
Maipenairu. The people were told that they would go to gaol if they did not obey. They then 
found upon arrival that they had no food, and no materials to make new houses. There were 
thirty-one people in the group and according to Clark none of them wanted to return to 
Urika. Clark, Beara 2 1951 /52, Gulf Province Patrol Reports 1 91 2- 197 4. 
54 Snowden, 'Copra Cooperatives', p .1 86. 
55 Patrol Officer G.D. Collins, Beara 4 1 947 / 48, Gulf Province Patrol Reports 1 9 1 2-1 974. 
56 Robb, Beara 6 1 948/49, Gulf Province Patrol Reports 1 9 12- 1974, p.6. 
57 Healey to Director of Department of District Services and Native Affairs, Jones, 9 
September 1 948, in Collins, Beara 2 1 948/49, Gulf Province Patrol Reports 1 9 1 2-1 974. 
58 Jones, 22 April 1 949, in Robb, Beara 6 1 948/49, Gulf Province Patrol Reports 1 9 12-1 974. 
s9 Healey, 4 May 1 949, in Robb, Beara 6 1 948/49, Gulf Province Patrol Reports 1 9 12-1 974. 
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the people's enthusiasm away from Kabu and toward the Government.60 What 
he failed to consider was that the Government would face many of the same 
problems as Kabu's Company, notably the paucity of shipping, and that without 
positive results the enthusiasm of the people in the villages would be difficult to 
maintain. There was a shortage of staff available to oversee the formation and 
running of Cooperative Societies and this retarded the development of 
indigenous economic ventures in the region. In 1 948 there were only six field 
officers with the Cooperative Section and in 1 953 there were 28.61 Despite this 
increase, serious understaffing meant that the promises made by Patrol Officers, 
perhaps hastily made to sway Kabu's followers, were not always backed up by 
action. 
In 1 952 Patrol Officer Clark wrote that a Cooperative Section Officer was 
sorely needed in the Purari, as the people were 'anxious to commence some 
venture as an outlet for their energies and emotions. '62 Clark was a dedicated 
officer, he had a reputation for conducting thorough patrols, and having 
persuaded the local people to trust the government he was aware how fragile 
that trust could be.63 He wrote to his superiors asking what was the possibility 
that a Cooperative Section Officer might visit the district to advise and authorise 
proposed endeavours, such as the setting up of Trade Stores and the marketing 
of agricultural commodities. 64 Clark was told by his superiors not to make 
promises to the native people, as it would invariably lead to disappointment, 
disillusionment, and distrust. 65 Clark recognised that to ignore the villagers ' 
enthusiasm would be to make them 'discontented and frustrated' and that this 
could lead to trouble. 
Catherine Snowden argues that the · cooperative societies were used to 'guide 
potential forces of resistance into proper channels'. John Millar, who headed the 
Cooperative Section during the period, played up the control function of the 
Cooperative Societies, saying they were the best antidote to cargo cult activities 
and anti-government dissent in less developed regions like the Purari.66 There 
were fifty-three cooperative societies in the Gulf by 1 9  5 1 ,  though an officer 
60 Robb, Kikori 2 1 947 /48, Gulf Province Patrol Reports 1 9 1 2- 1974, pp. 1 5- 16. 
61 Snowden, 'Copra Cooperatives', p. 1 88. 
62 Clark, Beara 4 1 9  5 1/52, Gulf Province Patrol Reports 1 9 1 2- 197 4. 
63 James Sinclair, Kiap: Australia 's Patrol Officers in Papua New Guinea, Pacific Publications, 
Sydney, 1 981 ,  p.39. 
64 Clark, Beara 5 1951/52, Gulf Province Patrol Reports 1 9 1 2- 1 974. 
65 Jones, 1 9  May 1 952, in Clark, Beara 6 1 951  /52, Gulf Province Patrol Reports 19 12-1 974, 
p.6. 
66 Snowden, 'Copra Cooperatives', pp. 1 88-89. 
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from the Cooperative Section was not posted to the region until 1 9  55 .  Many 
projects were suspended until an officer was available to supervise operations 
and this dampened the enthusiasm of many local people. In 1 959, the Director 
of Native Affairs, A.A. Roberts, admitted that the staff position in the 
Cooperative Section was getting worse and it was unlikely that any support 
would be given in the Delta in the 'foreseeable future. '67 This meant that the 
Patrol Officer's promise to replace Kabu with a government scheme was not 
backed up by action. The result was that local people lost faith in the 
government and so the cooperative movement was in many ways counter 
productive. By 1 959 Kabu had lost much of his influence in the region, as the 
Patrol Officers had hoped he would, and so with no strong indigenous leaders, 
and with an apathetic Administration, conditions in the Purari villages continued 
to deteriorate. 
In 1 9  54 Kabu returned from Port Moresby and settled down in Ako ma on 
U rika Island. 68 In 1 9  55 he attempted to revitalise a rubber plantation he had 
started five years earlier. He was told by the field staff that this was not a good 
idea since the trees would not produce for another eight years. 69 This 
contradicted Acting District Commissioner O'Malley's suggestion in 1 952 that 
the people should be encouraged to consider the long-term benefits of cash 
cropping. 'If the people are not prepared to expend their energy at the moment 
in regard to long range enterprises', wrote O'Malley, 'they will never get 
anywhere, it is a risk they all must take.'70 As was often the case, there was little 
in the way of a unified development policy in the territories, especially in terms 
of economic development. 
Ever industrious, Kabu also planted rice on Crown Land behind the Beara 
Patrol Post. In 1 956 Cadet Patrol Officer Wiltshire, who was stationed at Beara, 
wrote that if Kabu succeeded in growing rice then all the other villages would 
plant it, 'as the man still retains a certain amount of power over local people.'71 
Kabu was also employed by the London Missionary Society on Urika Island to 
oversee a small copra-making venture. 72 In 1 958 Patrol Officer P.J .  Foldi 
67 A.A. Roberts, Director Native Affairs, 6 February 1959, in Patrol Officer P.J .  Foldi, Beara 1 
1 958/59, Gulf Province Patrol Reports 1 9 12-1 974. 
68 Cadet Patrol Officer L.G. Bridges, Beara 1 1 954/55, Gulf Province Patrol Reports 1 9 1 2-
1 974. 
69 Cadet Patrol Officer JA. Wiltshire, Beara 1 1 955/56, Gulf Province Patrol Reports 1 9 1 2-
1 974. 
70 O'Malley, 3 June 1 952, in Clark Beara 9 1 951 /52, Gulf Province Patrol Reports 1 91 2-1 974. 
7 1  Wiltshire, Beara 1 1 955/56, Gulf Province Patrol Reports 1 9 1 2-1974. 
72 The London Missionary Society's Reverend G. Bents and his wife had by this time replaced 
Allen on Urika Island. Bridges, Beara 1 54 / 55, Gulf Province Patrol Reports 1 9 1 2- 197 4. 
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described Kabu as the 'leading "business man"' in the area, although his 'past 
ventures have led to failure and the people now give him little support.' Foldi 
attributed these failures to Kabu's contempt for the advice proffered by 
previous Patrol Officers. It could, however, be argued that it was the Patrol 
Officer's contempt for Kabu that contributed to the failure of many of his 
schemes. In 1 958 Kabu was still living at Akoma on Urika Island where he was 
building a hot air copra dryer. Healey, his attitude toward Kabu perhaps 
softened by familiarity, advised the Patrol Officer to give Kabu any advice that 
he could to facilitate this venture.73 
In her book, Left in the Village, Louise Morauta writes that economic change in 
the Gulf District was not stimulated by copra production, it was instead 
encouraged by a demand for consumer goods, initially the desire for trade 
tobacco.74 If Kabu failed to bring the modern world and material wealth to the 
Papuan villages the Administration fared little better. In 1 959, for example, a 
Cadet Patrol Officer visiting the Koriki area reported that the people were 
incapable of working beyond a subsistence level and that the cash economy had 
still not had a significant impact in villages of the Gulf. The Koriki producers 
still sold their coconuts to a European-owned Trade Store from which they 
received one stick of tobacco for every nine coconuts. The Cadet Patrol Officer 
inspected the Trade Store at Kinipo and found only four cans of dripping. 75 
There was, even by 1 960, obviously little incentive to raise money. 
The American anthropologist Robert F. Maher, who conducted field research in 
the Purari Delta during the mid-1 950s, writes that, while the Kabu movement's 
general principles were well founded, the basic skills required for their 
realisation were lacking. According to Maher the movement was destined to 
fail.76 Nigel Oram, historian of Port Moresby and the hin· trade, in contact with 
Kabu in the early 1 960s, challenged Maher's assumption that failure was 
73 Foldi, Beara 1 ,  1 958/59, Gulf Province Patrol Reports 1 91 2-1 974. Kabu made frequent 
excursions into the swamplands and continued to draw inland people to the coast, bringing 
fourteen families from old Iari to Akoma in 1 957 and 1 958. In 1 963 he sent a messenger to 
persuade the Pawaia people to move to the Purari River. The Administration, ever vigilant to 
Kabu's schemes, intercepted the Pawaia and persuaded them to return. Maher, 'The Purari 
River Delta Societies', pp.220-21 .  
7 4  Louise Morauta, Left Behind in the Village: Economic and 5 octal Conditions in an Area ef High Out 
Migration, Institute of Applied Science and Economic Research Monograph 25, Boroko, 1984, 
p.22. 
75 Cadet Patrol Officer M.G. Atyeo, Beara 2 1 959 / 1 960, Gulf Province Patrol Reports 19 12-
1 974. 
76 Maher, 'Tommy Kabu Movement of the Purari Delta', 82. This view was shared by a 
Cooperative Officer in 1 952. Thomson, 'Community Development in the Purari Delta', p. 1 9. 
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inevitable. Oram wrote that the 'unco-ordinated policies of different 
government departments toward the movement' impeded Kabu's activities . He 
also noted that the over-cautious attitude of  the paternalistic Patrol Officers, 
and their suspicion of Kabu, stifled the initiative of local producers.77 Maher 
concurs, writing that the Administration failed to follow its criticisms of the 
movement with 'effective action of a positive kind.'78 
There was a marked change in attitudes to patrols from the early 1 960s when 
Patrol Officers were encouraged to spend at least one night in each village, not 
away in the Government Rest House. In 1 966  the Director of Native Affairs, 
J .K. McCarthy, wrote that 'from now on Administration officers generally 
should listen to what is being said by the local people rather than "talking at" 
them.n9 This would suggest that, prior to 1 966, it had been otherwise. This 
certainly seems to have been the case in the relationship between the Patrol 
Officers and Tom Kabu, where the quest to maintain prestige was privileged 
over the desire to facilitate indigenous economic development. 
Perhaps a valuable opportunity was missed when the momentum of indigenous 
desire for development, so overwhelming after the war, was lost, frustrated, and 
worn down by the unfulfilled promises of the Administration and its officers in 
the field. State paternalism meant that local people were protected and not given 
the chance to learn through experience, and so economic activity tended to be 
inhibited, not facilitated by, state intervention. There was a chance, in the first 
few years after the war, to foster grass roots development and to strengthen 
local markets. This would have required a flexible Administration with a 
mandate to encourage local economies, perhaps within a pre-existing indigenous 
framework, and to acknowledge local leaders, even if they sought a path 
independent of the colonial government. The Australians, however, were not 
ideologically prepared to meet such a challenge. The so-called failure of Tom 
Kabu's cooperative movement was perhaps not so much a failure on the part of 
local people to adapt to European models of economic and social behaviour so 
much as it was a failure on the part of the administering officers to adapt to 
local conditions and indigenous relationships.  
While Kabu's regime failed to effect long-term economic prospects for the 
region, there is little doubt that he was an energetic and enthusiastic champion 
of Papuan autonomy and indigenous development. He achieved a great deal, 
77 Oram, 'Rabia Camp and the Tommy Kabu Movement', p .20. 
78 Maher, 'Tommy Kabu Movement of the Purari Delta', p.87. 
79 J.K. McCarthy, 29 July 1 966, in Patrol Officer L. Gari, lhu 7 1 965/66, Gulf Province Patrol 
Reports 1 9 1 2-1 974. 
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especially in terms of bringing villagers together to live and work cooperatively. 
He was, for many of the Purari people in the late 1 940s, the equal of the 
European, whom some hoped he would soon displace. Only toward the end of 
his life did Kabu run for public office. Albert Maori Kiki ran against 'the once 
famous' Kabu when the latter ran as a candidate for the People's Progress Party 
candidate in the 1 968 House of Assembly elections. Kabu was by then confined 
to hospital and the days left to him were few. Kiki said that in his heyday he 
would easily have won a seat.80 His popularity, like his health, had by this time 
faded. 
80 Albert Maori Kiki, Kiki: Ten Thousand Years in a Lifetime, F.W. Cheshire, Melbourne, 1968, 
pp. 1 7 1 ,  1 79. 
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' For the welfare of the native peoples' :  
Samoa and New Zealand i n  the 1940s1 
Donovan Storey 
The 1 940s represent somewhat of a blind spot in New Zealand/Samoan history, 
despite the critical events which took place. 2 Davidson, for example, has 
referred to the decade prior to 1 948 as 'marking time' until political reforms 
moved Samoa closer to independence, while other historians have also given the 
period limited attention3• Yet the years between the Mau protest of the 1 920s 
and 1 930s and independence in 1 962 were formative, transitional and critical for 
Samoa and for New Zealand's South Pacific policies in terms of searching for, 
and articulating, a relationship that would survive impending change. Through 
the 1 940s New Zealand was to develop and formalise policies of international 
trusteeship and postcolonial development that were to serve as the basis of its 
relationship to its Pacific territories and beyond. Far from being peripheral to 
such events Samoa was firmly at the centre of evolving policy. In particular, the 
administration of Prime Minister Peter Fraser (1 940-49) was significant in 
Samoa being held up, despite considerable reservations, as the 'shining example' 
of New Zealand trusteeship at the United Nations and later the South Pacific 
Commission (SPC) . 
Prior to the 1 940s New Zealand had gained little respect in either Samoa or 
domestically for its administration of Samoa. As a mandate of New Zealand 
under the League of Nations since 1 91 9, Samoa remained almost invisible in 
terms of public debate, but was a troublesome and at times politically anarchic 
project for administrators. New Zealand officials had struggled to develop an 
administrative policy which was acceptable to Samoans, expatriate residents of 
Samoa, and increasingly to New Zealanders themselves . Indeed, in the 1 930s 
policy and administration appeared to be unravelling. Though Ian Campbell has 
1 This research was completed with support from the New Zealand Ministry of  Foreign 
Affairs. I wish to express my appreciation for the Historical Research Grant which funded 
access to the archival materials used in this chapter. 
2 J .W. Davidson focuses mainly on constitutional issues; Malama Meleisea, The Making of Modern 
Samoa (1987) does not mention Prime Minister Fraser's visit to Samoa in 1 944 (see below) at 
all, and biographers of Fraser and Walter Nash only pay passing attention to their respective 
roles in Samoa. As Ian Campbell has recently noted: 'In the history of Samoa in the twentieth 
century, two events dominate: the Mau protest and the early granting of independence-the 
first in the Pacific-in 1 962'. 'New Zealand and the Mau in Samoa'. Campbell, New Zealand 
Journal of History, 33:1 (1 999) , p.92. This research attempts to 'fill-in' the intervening years. 
3 J.W. Davidson, 'Political Development in Western Samoa', Pacific Affairs 21 :2 (1 948), p . 140. 
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argued that resistance arose primarily because of New Zealand's liberal and calm 
approach to Samoan politics which opened the door to not Samoan, but planter 
and capitalist-led hostility who felt that 'pro-Samoan' polices were frustrating 
their commercial and political interests in the colony4, there remained a lack of 
clear purpose, problems of inadequate administrative capabilities, and increasing 
social dislocation. Indeed, Samoan complaints over a lack of say on 
administration and resentment and dissatisfaction over the quality of staff in 
posts continued to be sore points raised at every possible opportunity with 
resident and visiting officials. 
While great significance is often attributed to the election of the first New 
Zealand Labour government in 1 935, as it had often been critical of 
administration in Samoa in the past and many Samoans felt it would be 'pro­
Samoa', relations remained cool initially and 'no substantive changes of policy or 
procedure took place'5• This absence of a committed and consistent approach to 
Samoa was exemplified in the attempted visit to New Zealand by a Samoan 
delegation in June 1 936, which was delayed until late 1 937. Despite the earlier 
'Goodwill Mission' of two parliamentarians to Samoa and pleas from Secretary 
for Native Affairs Cyril McKay that 'beyond any doubt . . .  no obstacle should 
be put in the way of the proposed Samoan delegation to New Zealand'6 Prime 
Minister Joseph Savage refused to meet with the visitors. The delegation was 
finally received in Wellington, but not by the Prime Minister and only after they 
had paid for most of their own accommodation. 
The ascendancy of Peter Fraser to Prime Minister upon the death of Savage in 
1 940 signified a more consistent and personal focus to Samoan affairs . It was 
clear that policy in Samoa had only led to 'disillusion and disappointment7 7 •  
Something new needed to b e  thought out. The inspiration fo r  such a shift came 
from both within the region but also beyond. The 1 940s witnessed an energising 
of New Zealand-Samoan affairs during which the relationship underwent 
substantial and irrevocable change. It was a period of unprecedented personal 
contact between the two nations. Indeed, Fraser and his administration were 
more active in terms of contact with Samoan representatives than any previous 
administration and this allowed the opportunity to develop new ideas, witness 
4 Campbell, pp.96, 1 04. 
5 Ibid, p. 92. 
6 Memo to The Acting Administrator, 7 /6/37. Visits to NZ by Samoan Delegations, Island 
Territories (IT) files, National Archives, Wellington. IT1 EX 88/3/2. 
7 T.R. Smith, 'International Co-operation for Aid to Underdeveloped Pacific Territories' in 
B.M. Brown (ed), New Zealand in the Pacific (Wellington: New Zealand Institute of Public 
Adminstration, 1 970), p.70. 
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social and economic circumstances, and listen to grievances. No less than three 
visits by the Governor General took place between June 1 942 and June 1 944. 
The Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR) visited Samoa to 
report on 'scientific matters' in 1 946, and this visit was followed by a Public 
Services Commission (PSC) delegation examining labour and employment 
issues in 1 947. Fraser himself spent Christmas in Samoa in 1 944, meeting with 
the Fono of Faipufe for several days, and played host to a Samoan delegation 
which extensively toured New Zealand in October 1 945. 
During this period Samoa was undergoing profound and rapid change as a result 
of the Second World War. American military bases in the Pacific had resulted in 
a significant expansion of capitalism and opportunity in Samoa, but had also 
resulted in concerns over the implications of this on 'traditional' life. One 
theme, which consistently emerged from visiting reports, was the significant 
impact resulting from the war and the increased role of capitalism in village life.  
The Governor General's visit in 1 943, for example, noted that US troops were 
having a marked effect on Samoans: 
The normal life and economy of the Islands have been completely 
upset by the big money which can be gained from employment with 
the Americans, and when this has ceased to be available there may 
well be a recrudescence of former political trouble . . . .  There is no 
doubt the Americans are covetous of Western Samoa . . .  endeavours 
should be made to ensure that American influence does not become 
too attractive.8 
Additionally the joint committee of the PSC reported emerging post-war 
economic pressures , notably a boom in post-war prices for Samoan products, 
especially copra and cocoa. This had led to a sharp increase in the price of basic 
foodstuffs and pressures from aiga (family) on salary earners in town. The PSC 
noted that the estimated cost of living for those 'living in the European fashion' 
had risen by over 60 percent since 1 939, and forewarned that 'the pressure from 
the outlying village on the salary and wage earner in Apia must not be 
encouraged so that the incentive to village food production is seriously 
diminished'9 • To maintain this precarious balance, Samoans should ideally be 
kept on the land. Policy was to encourage some degree of change in Samoa, to 
meet rising expectations and needs , but just as importantly to ensure stability 
through conserving the past, especially in the form of rural-based development. 
8 Visit of Governor-General to Islands, September-November 1 943, IT1 EX 1 /23/23. 
9 Report of the Joint Committee Appointed by the PSC to visit Samoa, 1 947. IT1 EX 
89/ 1 /32. 
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External Affairs staff in Wellington were also aware of the pressures of change. 
Hence Alister Mcintosh, who served as both Permanent Head of the Prime 
Minster's Department and Secretary of External Affairs from 1 943-1 966, 
counselled the DSIR prior to its visit that 'industrial development is practically 
nil and in the present state of social organisation, development should be linked 
as closely as possible with agriculture'10• 
Nevertheless, coupled with a litany of complaints emerging from the PSC visit 
in 1 944 1 1 ,  it was evident that Samoa was undergoing profound social and 
economic change and that it was no longer the isolated rural, village country that 
it once was. Coupled with persistent petitions for greater autonomy New 
Zealand's policy toward Samoa was clearly under stress. In particular there was a 
need to more effectively balance a number of pressures emerging from 
development while preserving fa 'a Samoa (the Samoan way) as well as forging a 
new relationship away from colonial administration to meet the continuing 
demands for self-government-or even independence-while maintaining New 
Zealand's strategic and commercial interests in the islands. 
Arguably the most pivotal moment in New Zealand's evolving policy in Samoa 
was the visit of Prime Minster Peter Fraser to the islands in 1 944. As Minister of 
Island Territories, Fraser's visit in December was to gauge the legacy of New 
Zealand's role in Samoa but also to provide him with a first-hand experience of 
the mandate in preparation for assuming the role of chair of the proposed 
trusteeship committee in San Francisco in 1 94512• Fraser, the first New Zealand 
Prime Minter to visit Samoa, was evidently 'appalled by what he saw'. As a result 
of the 'long-standing lack of interest in Wellington toward the territories' it was 
clear that New Zealand had not formulated either 'a cohesive policy for their 
development nor any reasonable response to their needs' 13 • Fraser openly 
regretted past mistakes, which he blamed on misunderstandings, and during the 
visit effectively apologised for the damage this had caused the relationship. 
10 Memo from Alister Mcintosh to the Secretary of DSIR, 27 / 1 0/44. IT EX 69/1 55 .  
1 1  A long list of issues were put forward to the Commissioner by the Samoan representation, 
complaining about the lack of opportunities for Samoans to get well-paid and high positions 
in the administration; poor and expensive housing; low salaries; the lack of development in 
the country after 30 years of New Zealand rule; putting curbs on contracts for NZ staff (to 3 
years) ; sending back unpopular administrators; a lack of opportunity for Samoan opinions to 
be heard; and better educational opportunities in New Zealand for Samoan youth. Memo for 
the Right Hon. the Prime Minister, from the Commissioner of the PSC J.M. Boyes, 
1 6/ 1 1 /44. IT1 EX 89/ 1 /32. 
1 2  M. Bassett and M. King, Tomorrow Comes the Song: A Llfe of Peter Fraser (Auckland: Penguin, 2000), p.281 . 
13 G. Laking in Templeton, M., An Eye, An Ear and a Voice: 50 years in New Zealand's external relations 1943-199J 
(Wellington: New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1 993) ,  p.49. 
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I regret that in the years that have gone serious mistakes were made 
and enormities were raised and the people divided through lack of 
understanding or appreciation of the difficulties peculiar to the 
country. 14 
The very nature of such a historic v1s1t, coupled with the fluidity of the 
international system of the war and immediate post-war period potentially gave 
Fraser a significant opportunity to radically redefine New Zealand's policy 
toward Samoa. Nevertheless, while Fraser was clearly more stimulated than his 
contemporaries by international events he maintained a careful and often 
conservative stance on almost any issue, however trivial1 5• This was, in the end, 
Fraser's enduring legacy on Samoan policy. While engaged in establishing a 
more informed perspective on Samoan issues and policy Fraser both promoted 
considerable change but also clung to pragmatic continuity. On the one hand he 
was fiercely pro-British, explaining to the legislative council of Samoa on 
December 22 1 944 that 
the British Commonwealth method, the NZ method, is to meet 
people, hold out a hand of fellowship, help them along, deliberate 
with them, consult them and advance together shoulder to shoulder 
in an unbroken line of progress. That is our ideal, that is the British 
way and this is New Zealand's conception of what progress ought to 
be16. 
In this sense Ashby has described Fraser as a 'structuralist, in that he believed an 
oppressive or inadequate structure should be replaced, not destroyed'11• On the 
other hand he was pushed into action beyond indefinite tutelage based on his 
own Fabian beliefs, by advisors such as Frank Corner18 who argued that the 
control of Samoan demands for self-government was no longer avoidable, and 
also through his dealings with Australian Minister of External Affairs Herbert 
14 P. Fraser to the Fono of Faipule 20/1 2/44-26/1 2/44. IT 1 EX 1 /67 / 1 .  
1 5  A .  Mcintosh, 'Working with Peter Fraser in Wartime', New Zealand Journal of History, 1 0:1  
(1 976) . 
1 6 Prime Minister Fraser to the Fono of Faipule, 22/1 2/44. IT1 EX 1 /67 /1  
1 7  M .  Ashby, 'Under Southern Skies: Sources o f  New Zealand Foreign Policy 1 943-57'. PhD Dissertation, 
Victoria University of Wellington, 1 989, p.367. Likewise, Mcintosh has noted that Fraser was chosen to Chair 
the 'Special Committee II/ 4: The Trusteeship Committee' drafting trusteeship provisions because he was 
conservative enough for the British yet liberal enough for the US. Mcintosh, 1 977, p .16. 
1 8 Frank Comer was an External Affairs diplomat who later served as First Secretary at the 
New Zealand embassy in Washington D.C. 
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Evatt, particularly at the San Francisco conference of 1 945 19• 
These issues were not, of course, limited to Samoa, and clearly took place in a 
changing regional and global environment. Indeed, New Zealand's evolving 
policy on Samoa both shaped and was shaped by its emergent steps onto the 
international stage. This included New Zealand's delegation to, and more 
particularly Fraser's personal role in, the founding of the United Nations at San 
Francisco, and particularly his role in the Trusteeship CounciF°. In this sense 
New Zealand's post-war Samoan policy was reflective of both the need to 
contend with the aspirations of newly emerging nations, but also the desire for 
industrialised states to control this process .  Increasingly, this centred on 
negotiating the access of nations to emerging regional and global institutions of 
'expertise' in return for technical, social and military assistance to aid in their 
'independence' and 'development'. 
In particular, post-war policy debates were increasingly being informed by the 
emergence of ideas which argued that 'development', and more specifically 
development aid, could effectively replace formal empire as a means through 
which to order international relations. Hence policy initiatives increasingly 
moved from justifying empire and toward encouraging (or at least not 
indefinitely impeding) the creation of new States linked to patrons through 
technical expertise and aid, thus providing 'a means by which imperial powers 
could reconcile themselves to their loss [or lack] of power, while maintaining a 
connection with their ex-colonies and a continued sense of their mission in 
shaping their future'.21 In New Zealand's case, it additionally provided a moral 
rationale of withdrawal for an increasingly reluctant colonial authority. 
Significantly, it also provided a podium for Samoan demands for greater self­
government. 
The challenge of marrying the expectation of progress with the desire to 
preserve Samoa's economic and social structure was one which Fraser, himself, 
was acutely aware of. In addressing the Legislative Council on 22 December 
1 944 Fraser summed up his appreciation of the shifting landscape and New 
Zealand's response: 
I appreciate the great danger of people coming to the conclusion that 
19 It is widely acknowledged that Corner infused Fraser with ideas of Trusteeship, 'about 
which he previously had only vague and general ideas'. Ashby, 1 989, p. 87. 
20 See Mcintosh, ibid. 
21 F. Cooper and R. Packard, International Development and the Social Sciences, (Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 1 997), p.7. 
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because things have always been so that they must always remain as 
they are and that things that have endured for many years are static 
and immovable; that is equally wrong. In Samoa as in every other 
country, in varying degrees, the problem is how to conserve all that is 
good in the past in the people's form of life and government, of their 
associations, councils, economic system, food, and all that their life in 
the past has meant and at the same time get all the benefits of the 
discoveries, research and progress of the world at large . . . . . The 
guiding principle of New Zealand's policy . . . is the good, the 
advancement, the progress and the benefit . . . and the happiness of 
the people of Samoa as  a whole. 22 
Promises made through trusteeship and development however could also be 
turned into demands for greater autonomy. For example during Fraser's visit the 
Hon. Ulupoao, in accepting New Zealand's interest in Samoan affairs put the 
onus back on Fraser: 'Your remarks reflect upon me two important points­
firstly, the advancement and progress of the country and secondly, the 
cooperation and working together in good-will of the people to reach a required 
destination. I therefore wish to speak for the anxiety in my mind to see that the 
welfare of Samoa is vastly increased and the progress of the people is to be 
advanced'23• 
The doctrine of intentional development thus emerged as a key post-war 
'Samoan Doctrine'.24 It was both a conservative and radical policy-one which 
sought to re-establish New Zealand's administration as a progressive force and 
antidote, both to traditional law (and Samoan authorities) and laissez:faire 
capitalism (or, immanent development) . The justification was no longer 
colonialism, but 'partnership' towards a common goal, relevant to Samoa's 
capacity and expectations. New Zealand's post-war policy in Samoa thus 
became that of 'organised social change' and 'organising or motivating societies 
to change', directed by governments and mandated institutions. 25 
Establishing post-colonial machinery 
Such an approach required a concerted effort of both the Samoan elite and New 
Zealand authorities (or 'experts') in order to share in 'the intellectual universe 
22 Fraser, in a speech to the meeting of the Fono of Faipule, Apia, 22/12/44. IT1 EX 1 /67 /1 . 
23 Hon. Ulupoao to Fraser, Dec. 1 944, IT 1 /67 / 1 .  
24 Indeed, 'for the welfare o f  native peoples' became the mantra o f  Fraser, and was reiterated 
at every conceivable speech (it seems) throughout the 1 940s. 
25 P. McMichael, Development and Social Change, (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 2000), pp. 1 0, 1 5 . 
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and in the moral community'26 of development. But ideological unity was not 
necessarily enough: new organisations and international aid would also be called 
upon to promote economic growth, alleviate poverty and foster beneficial 
change.27 Once the principle of trusteeship, which would guide colonial powers 
in the administration of their dependent territories (and therefore be of 
universal application) was promulgated, it then became a matter to create the 
machinery. Two key institutions in this regard were the Trusteeship Council of 
the United Nations, and the South Seas Commission (later the South Pacific 
Commission), both of which offered a pathway to Samoa from ward to eventual 
independence, while concurrently creating mechanisms by which the region's 
industrialised states could continue to shape and discipline the future28• 
The origins of New Zealand's interest in technical assistance and aid institutions 
lay in initiatives taken in the early 1 940s .  In particular, point five of the Atlantic 
Charter (1 941) ,  in which President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston 
Churchill outlined a post-war world where the allies would 'bring about the 
fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field with the objective 
of securing, for all, improved labor standards, economic advancement and social 
security'29 gave impetus to a post-war structure of guided development through 
institutions, rather than colonial possessions . 
The Atlantic Charter was a direct impetus to New Zealand and Australia seeking 
to establish their own post-war policy in the Pacific, particularly with regards to 
their mandates. This view was more clearly established by the Canberra Pact of 
1 94430• While much of what was discussed in order to develop closer trans­
Tasman relations was soon forgotten or dismissed31 the legacy for development 
policy was clearly significant. Indeed, the Canberra Pact 'pioneered . . .  the policy 
of international technical assistance to backward peoples'32 with the enduring 
26 Cooper and Packard, p. 1 .  
27 Ibid. 
28 A third key plank was the establishment of a New Zealand aid programme, though this was 
not to appear in any significant form until the 1 950s as a result of the Colombo Plan. 
29 http:/ /www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wwii/atlantic.htm. The Atlantic Charter was also 
discussed between Fraser and the Fono of Faipule in Samoa, 1 944. 
30 R. Kay (ed.), Documents on New Zealand External R.elations Volume 1 The Australian-New 
Zealand Agreement 1 944 (Wellington: Historical Publications Branch, 1 972). 
31 In a letter to Carl Berendsen dated 29 / 5 / 50, Mcintosh exclaimed that 'I never did like the 
Canberra Pact, and I have always felt sincerely and deeply ashamed of my own part in it. It 
never was in our interests, and I doubt it will ever be, to work in double harness with the 
Australians'. Cited in I. McGibbon (ed.), Undiplomatic Dialogue: Letters between Carl Berendsen and 
Alister Mcintosh 194 3-52 (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1 994), p .230. 
32 J. Thorn, Peter Fraser (London: Oldhams, 19 52), p.221 .  
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mantra being 'the welfare of the native peoples and their social, economic and 
political development'.33 The Canberra Pact also gave impetus to the South Seas 
Commission (later the South Pacific Commission) and acted to promote 'native 
welfare and the social and economic development of the inhabitants of the 
territories concerned' especially with regard to 'health services and education, 
the maintenance and improvement of standards of Native welfare, research in 
economic, social and anthropological fields, and in regard to material 
development, as, for example, expansion of production, communications, and 
marketing'34• But while the South Seas Commission was established 'to secure a 
common policy on social, economic, and political development directed towards 
the advancement and well-being of the native peoples themselves' 35 , the 
Commission, in practice, 'was planned far the peoples of the South Pacific but 
not f?y those peoples'36 • 
Technical development assistance was increasingly seen as a precursor to, and 
even a precondition of, political development and ultimately independence 'on 
the conviction that healthy political development is possible only as the 
inhabitants of the territories can be assisted to solve the problems which press 
most heavily and immediately upon them'.37 In time, the SPC came to fulfil its 
two critical objectives: it 'produced for territories a forum for discussion and [it 
became] a clean·ng house far international aid'.38 
The second significant constituent in advancing New Zealand-Samoan relations 
in the 1 940s was the United Nations Trusteeship Council. As a result of its 
mandate status in the League of Nations, coupled with Fraser's commitment to 
the United Nations system and more particularly the Trusteeship Council in 
which he played a lead role as chair39, Samoa became the first territory in the 
world to be granted trusteeship status (on December 1 3, 1 946) , While the 
Trusteeship Council was arguably less successful and enduring than the SPC, it 
nevertheless played a key role in guiding Samoa towards self-government and 
33 R. Kay. 
34 R. Kay. 
35 Smith, p.69. For the Commission's origins see also G. Fry 'The South Pacific 
"Experiment": Reflections on the origins of regional identity', The Journal of Pacific History, 32, 
p.2, and T.R. Smith, South Pacific Commission: An ana!Jsis efter twenryjiveyears (Wellington: Price 
Milburn, 1 972). 
36 Smith, p.76. 
37 Report of the NZ Delegation on the Conference held at Canberra, 28/1 -6/2 1 947, for the 
purpose of establishing an advisory commission for the South Pacific. Department of 
External Affairs, Wellington 1 94 7. Publication number 26. 
38 Ratu Mara, quoted in T.R. Smith, p.80. 
39 E.P. Chase, 'Peter Fraser at San Fransisco', Political Science, II (1 959) p. 1 .  
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ultimately full independence in 1 962. On the one hand the Trusteeship 
Council's mandate acted to preserve the stability of colonial order through the 
United Nations . For example, its provisions required that 'the tutelage of such 
peoples should be made, or should remain, the responsibility of advanced 
nations, who are best fitted to undertake this responsibility and who are willing 
to accept it; and this tutelage should be exercised by them on behalf of the 
United Nations'4(1• However, New Zealand more clearly saw that the Trusteeship 
Council could provide a transparent and progressive passage for the eventual 
independence of Samoa in line with international norms. 
Certainly this process was hastened by Samoans themselves when, on hearing 
that they had been placed under the trusteeship of New Zealand, they almost 
immediately replied with a petition to the United Nations protesting their non­
approval and calling for a more rapid passage toward self-government. New 
Zealand's response, in order to appease Samoan protest but also to ensure it was 
seen as taking the lead in events, was to hasten a series of political reforms 
beginning with the shift toward Samoan self-government through the Samoan 
Amendment Act of 1 947, the appointment of J .W. Davidson as Constitutional 
Advisor for Samoa, and the appointment of Guy Powles as High Commissioner 
in 1 949 armed with the personal mandate of Fraser to prepare Samoa's political 
and constitutional preparation for eventual independence. These latter two 
actors became central to the constitutional transition of Samoa from colony to 
independent State through the 1 950s.41 
There was evidence nonetheless that New Zealand officials at the United 
Nations were less supportive themselves of the potential role of the Trusteeship 
Council in providing a framework for New Zealand/Samoan affairs . Over time, 
correspondence indicates that there was growing disillusionment regarding the 
role and effectiveness of the Trusteeship Council and it became less favourably 
viewed over time. Its reports became more onerous in terms of the data 
required42 and inevitably it became bogged down in cold-war politics, as well as 
40 Files from Committee 4 on the Trusteeship Council, chaired by Fraser in May-June 1 945. 
In Fraser, P., Official Administrative Papers, Vol. 1 Series 3, Papers of the United Nations, 
National Archives. 
41 On this period see Justin Fepulea'i, 'From Self-Government to Independence: The 
development of New Zealand's policy towards Western Samoa during the trusteeship period, 
1 946-62', MA Thesis, University of Auckland, 1 994. See also D. Munro, 'J.W. Davidson and 
Western Samoa', The Journal of Pacijic History 35:2 (2000), pp. 1 95-21 1 .  
42 And 'development' itself could now b e  measured (thus spawning an industry o f  indicators) . 
In one Trusteeship Council meeting the Australian delegate stated that 'progress' could be 
measured and 'stressed the importance of statistical information as a measure of the progress 
of the inhabitants of dependent territories'. June 1 9  Summary of the 1 5rh Meeting of 
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conflict surrounding self-determination between newly independent Third 
World states and administering powers. In a memorandum to Fraser, John S .  
Reid (the alternate New Zealand representative on the Trusteeship Council) 
noted that the 'character of the Trusteeship Council changed markedly' by 1 948 
and that 'administering authorities must in future be prepared, not merely for 
criticism but also for attacks'.43 Others were blunter in their assessment. Robin 
Miller, who worked for the Trusteeship Division and examined New Zealand's 
submissions on Samoa and the Cook Islands had this to say: 
I can mention these things to you without damaging my modesty; for 
the blunt fact is that so much of the work being done here is so 
shoddy that no great amount of effort or experience is needed to arise 
above it. On the way here I had had some qualms that my own rather 
formless background might show up badly in the brilliant company of 
the experts, but this has not been the case. 
He then went on to advise that for future reports: 
The first thing is to accept, as a fundamental condition, that your 
potential critics on the Council know next to nothing about the 
territory, modern methods of administration, and above all about the 
people and the way they live and are governed and educated and 
cared for as human beings. By giving them all the info[rmation] , 
unlike Britain, Aust[ralia] and Belgium, you will disarm them. Let 
them see clearly and simply how a sick Samoan is cared for in a 
hospital, what his child learns at school, how his land rights are 
protected; translate your annual report into the lives and needs of 
individual human beings, and you will surely find the going smoother 
when they come to matters of policy. 
Conclusions and legacies 
According to a number of commentators, the onset of Labour rule resulted in 
Committee II/ 4, Trusteeship Council IT1 EX 1 1 /4 / 43. The provisional questionnaire, as 
approved by the TC at the 25th meeting of its first session, 25 April 1 947 contained no less 
than 247 questions and the need for more than 50 statistical tables! Questions were asked on 
social conditions and advancement, eduction, research, law and order, political advancement, 
international and regional relations and economic advancement. Fraser, P. Official 
Administrative Papers, National Archives. 
43 United Nations Trusteeship Council, 1 947-49, IT1 EX 25/ 1 /28. 
89 
Donovan Storey Samoa and New Zealand in the 1 940s 
'next to nothing [happening] ' in regard to New Zealand's policy on Samoa44• But 
the period was 'radical' and critical in several respects. Samoa, in the 1 940s, was 
an example of 'an experiment in maintaining empire against moves in world 
opinion, and a way of setting in motion ideas that would help to bring empire to 
an end'.45 •  In the case of New Zealand's evolving policy on Samoa 'it was 
Fraser's intention, not only to help produce a sound basis for a realistic system 
of colonial advance and eventual self-determination, but also to produce a lead 
in the form of an enlightened administration of its own trust territory' 46 • 
However, the goal was more than a rapid track to self-government. Policy was 
to focus substantially on utilising emerging development concepts of 
trusteeship,47 which sought to balance the present, future and past. This evolved 
in order that New Zealand could counter potentially destructive change but also 
to establish a post-colonial relationship in which New Zealand, through 
development aid, could continue to play a role in Samoan affairs . Accordingly, 
'the idea of development-and the relationship it implied between 
industrialised, affluent nations and poor, emerging nations-became the key to 
a new conceptual framework' and also the basis of New Zealand policy in the 
Pacific. 48 Samoan policy in the 1 940s then both reflected and shaped emerging 
discourses and policies which sought to create order, through the 'development 
project', 49 in a potentially chaotic post-war environment. Or, as McKay once 
noted: 
If one could consider the welfare of Western Samoa in an abstract 
way, one could claim truthfully that it would be better for the present 
form of administration to continue until a nucleus of Samoans, 
educated and trained for administrative responsibility, is created, by 
scholarships or by any other means. But we are in a realistic world. 
Current history shows that brown peoples are insisting that they be 
kept subordinate no longer. It may be better to show leadership than 
to be precipitated by force of circumstances. 50 
The 1 940s should therefore be considered the opening act of a new era for New 
44 M. Field, Mau (Wellington: Reed, 1984), p.222. 
45 G. Fry, 'The South Pacific Experiment', Journal of Pacific History, 32 (1 997), p . 1 97. 
46 D.J. Kelly, Peter Fraser (Wellington: Reed, 1 968) ,  p.24. 
47 The process by which 'those who [take] themselves to be developed [can] act to determine 
the process of development for those who [are] deemed to be less developed'. M. Cowen and 
R. W. Shenton, Doctrines of Development (London: Routledge, 1 996) ,  p.4. 
48 Cooper and Packard, p.1 .  
49 P. McMichael. 
50 Memo, C. McKay to Osborne. Papers concerning Samoan movement to self-government 
1 944-49. IT EX 4/ 4. 
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Zealand/Samoan relations. It did not necessarily involve great change in terms 
of people's welfare51 or even radical political change but it did significantly alter 
the perception of what was to be done and create the institutions through which 
policy could be put into practice. Replacing the hierarchical colonial system of 
colonizer/ colonized, was the more 'progressive' relationship between states at 
different levels of development: Samoa and New Zealand were now equal in 
principle, if not in practice. 
The 1 940s thus represent a significant, and in many ways successful, shift in 
New Zealand's relationship with Samoa. To borrow from Cooper and Packard,52 
development became the 'framing device through which colonial regimes tried 
to respond to challenges and reassert control and legitimacy'. In the case of 
Samoa in the 1 940s this meant the attempt to blend the preservation of 
traditional modes of life, with 'useful features of modern civilisation'53-or, the 
reconciliation of progress and order.54 However this was not the end point, as 
colonial and post-colonial authorities in Wellington, Samoa and the SPC may 
have wished, for the promise of development opened up a field of dialogue and 
contestation about both the 'objectives and strategies' as well as the ethical 
dilemmas of intervention, change, autonomy and ultimately development itself. 
These issues remain as unresolved today as they were in the 1 940s. 
5 1 Frank Corner (former Secretary of External Affairs) has lamented the unfulfilled nature of 
New Zealand's commitment to Samoa as 'an uneasy dualism between liberalism and 
imperialism'. F.H. Corner, 'New Zealand and the South Pacific', in T.C. Larkin (ed.), New 
Zealand's External Relations (Wellington: NZ Institute of Public Administration, 1 962), p. 1 39.  
52 Cooper and Packard, 1 997, p. 1 8. 
53 Notes for Hon. W. Nash on Pacific Confederation, MS-Papers-6759-020 (Alexander 
Turnbull Library, Wellington) , 1 943. 
54 Cowen and Shenton, Doctrines efDevelopment, 1 996, pp.28-29. 
91  
The Beginnings of Elected Government in Palau, 
1947-63 
Donald R. Shuster 
The Pacific War was a frightening event for the Palauan people. Thirty years of 
Japanese colonial rule ended in a cataclysm of bloody battles on Peleliu and 
Angaur islands and the bombing of the main islands of Koror and Babeldaob in 
1 944-45. The United States' military, however, did not move onto the main 
islands until November and December 1 945 and this gave the Japanese military 
on Babeldaob time to exhume bodies of at least six civilians and probably 
another six to ten American prisoners of war and to destroy evidence of their 
murders. When the US army did finally arrive, it had to round-up some 35,000 
Japanese soldiers, who were eventually repatriated, and to feed, clothe, and 
provide medical assistance to the Palauans. Munitions and mines had to be 
disarmed and removed. American soldiers were everywhere in Palau; their blue 
eyes, cocked hats, and the unimaginable amounts of food they gave out made a 
lasting and positive impression on the Palauans. Food is valued highly in island 
societies and, after a year of near famine, some Palauans believed they had 
arrived at a heaven on earth. 
But the United States' design for the Marshall, Mariana and Caroline islands 
(Micronesia) was determined totally by strategic considerations. 1 Civilian and 
military authorities at the highest levels of the US government agreed that the 
islands should be held as a United Nations' trust, a strategic trust under US 
administration. The Trusteeship Agreement (TA), Article 5, gave the US authority 
to establish military bases , to station armed forces, to make use of volunteer 
forces, and to close any part of the territory for security reasons (Article 1 3) .  
Therefore, the defining years in Micronesia were dominated by U S  strategic 
needs: 65 nuclear bomb tests on Bikini and Enewetak atolls, and the closing of 
Saipan and Tinian from 1 953-62 so that the Central Intelligence Agency under 
the guise of a Navy Technical Training Unit could secretly train Nationalist 
Chinese as guerrilla fighters for infiltration of Mainland China. It appears that 
military advisers for Vietnam were also trained at this facility. 
1 Spanish colonial rule over Palau began nominally in 1 885. In decline, Spain sold most of her 
Pacific holdings to Germany in 1 899. The Japanese Navy expelled German authorities at the 
beginning of World War I and, in turn, lost their vast Micronesian holdings to the American 
military during the Pacific War, 1 941--45. The Trusteeship Agreement came into effect on 1 8  July 
1 947. Freely Associated State (FAS) status began in 1 986 and 1 994. 
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The dominance of the US military in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands 
(ITPI) was balanced by the United States' obligation to promote political, 
economic, educational, and social development (f A Article 6) . However, during 
the defining years, such development received far fewer resources than military 
activities .  Be that as it may, significant political developments took place in 
Palau during this period and it is to these initiatives that I now turn. 
Beginnings 
With the arrival of the Americans, elected government was introduced and 
evolved from a purely advisory Palau Congress (1 947-55) to a large and 
cumbersome Olbiil Era Kelulau Era Be/au (1 955-63) . Both legislatures were the 
political arenas where Palau's first generation of elected leaders cut their political 
teeth. These bodies were followed by the Palau Legislature (1 963-80) and the 
Palau National Congress (1 981 to present) . Over the years, these assemblies 
became powerful forces on the local scene and winning election to a congress 
seat carried great prestige, status, and opportunity. 
Nearly all of Palau's post-war political leaders were legislators. The table below 
outlines Palau's three early legislative bodies, their structure, membership, and 
political authority. It was there that Palau's first generation of postwar leaders 
practised the western way of government. 
Table 1: Palau's First Three Legislative Bodies 
Membership Palau Olbiil Palau 
Congress, Era Legislature, 




Palau Paramount No Yes Yes 
Chiefs, I be du! and 
Reklai 
Fourteen highest No Yes Yes 
ranking village 
chiefs 
Sixteen elected Yes Yes No 
magistrates 
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Elected members Yes - 31  Yes - 37 Yes - 28 
(Chadal 
Olbiil) 
Advisory-liason Palau Tebechel No 
group Administrative Olbiil of 
Council 1 4-20 
including the advisers 
2 high chiefs 
and 8 other 
chiefs 
Legal Authority Purely Power of Same as 
advisory to resolution; OEKEB 
the Civil power to and: power 
Administrator receive to write bills; 
and power to 
administer override veto 
property; of Distad to 
power to Hi Com; 




Traditional Government and Change 
One of Palau's most important but nearly forgotten legends explains that 
Palauan political theory and structure came from the snake god, Mesaod NgereL 
Known as the 'Mouth that Explains', Mesaod Ngerel travelled throughout Palau 
during antiquity teaching kelulau, the nature of politics, and kebliil, the nature of 
clan.2 
Accordingly, the autonomous villages and village-complexes of Palau were ruled 
by a village council, or klobak, that was generally composed of eight to ten male 
clan leaders. These clans were ranked hierarchically based on an affinity to the 
founding clans and persons of ancient days. The leading elder of the highest-
2 Robert K. McKnight, The Mouth that Explains: Mesaod Ngerel-an allegory in Palauan Political 
!JJre (Koror, Palau: Palau Museum Publication No. 2, 1 961  ) .  
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ranking clan served as village chief. He ruled through persuasion and consensus, 
rather than by force and command because there were numerous checks on his 
authority, the two most important being the second-ranking chief with his 
faction of supporters, and the village religious leaders. In their attempts to 
manipulate the chiefs, these priests of the local gods were especially 
troublesome to both German and Japanese administrators. 3 Although overt 
political leadership was men's business, Palauan women exerted great behind­
the-scenes influence on decisions that affected land, title, custom and Palauan 
money-and now, American money as well. 
Since both the Spanish (1 891-99) and German (1 899-1 9 1 4) colonial periods 
were relatively short and characterized by few colonists and little development, 
traditional political structures were not extensively modified by culture contact. 
However, during Japanese rule (1 9 1 4-44) the indigenous political system was 
respected to the extent that its leaders did not oppose Japanese efforts. Such 
efforts were usually carried out with the aid of a collaborationist Palauan faction 
to suit  the ambitious political and economic goals of the Japanese. Even today, 
older Palauans joke in a half-satirical way about the periodic 'yes-conferences' 
held for top-ranking chiefs to rubber-stamp various Japanese programmes of 
social and economic change. Nevertheless, the traditional chiefs remained 
important functionaries, so much so that 'the Japanese administration was 
keenly interested in who was who and who did what among the hereditary 
leaders . '4 
Although Japanese political authority (in contrast to force) broke down during 
the fifteen months of war between Japanese and American forces in Palau, an 
alliance between hereditary chiefs and Modekngei religious leaders resulted in 
social and psychological stability. Anthropolgist Arthur Vidich claimed that local 
control in the various villages and refuges was commonplace and that Modekngei 
leaders assumed a central role in directing Palau through the war crisis. 5 This is a 
clear example of the resurgence of indigenous religo-political authority during a 
confusing time, influenced as it was by the dominance of the Modeknegi religious 
leadership . 
3 Arthur Vidich, Political Factionalism in Palau: Its Rise and Development (Washington, D.C.: 
Pacific Science Board, National Research Council, 1 949), p.60. 
4 Robert K. McKnight, 'Rigid Models and Ridiculous Boundaries: Political Development and 
Practice in Palau, circa. 1 955-1 965', in Hughes, Daniel T. and Sherwood G. Lingenfelter (eds), 
Political Development in Micronesia (Columbus, Ohio: Ohio State University Press, 1 974), p.43. 
5 Vidich, Political Factionalism in Palau, p.92. 
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US Navy Plans 
Toward the end of the Pacific War, US naval authorities prepared five 
comprehensive plans for the civil administration of several groups of Pacific 
islands taken in conquest. On 1 7  September 1 945, a month after Japan's 1 5  
August surrender, a 'Proposed Plan for Civil Government by the Navy of 
Certain Pacific Islands Areas under United Status Control' was drafted.6 Given 
consideration of military security, the plan called for: 
1 .  The adaptation of introduced government to the life and needs of the 
islanders. 
2. The incorporation and maximum use of indigenous institutions into 
introduced government. 
3. The preparation of islanders for self-government by filling governmental 
positions with islanders whenever possible. 
4. The execution of government on a cooperative and consultative basis at all 
times. 
5. The eventual granting of United States citizenship should be considered when 
these peoples are capable of assuming such responsibilities.7 
The fifth of these political objectives was an especially significant statement 
because it assumed that the island peoples wanted, or would in the future want, 
US citizenship. As conceived by naval authorities, the other objectives defined a 
policy for the evolution of self-government within a framework of native 
institutions. This policy was more fully elaborated in Admiral Spruance's 
directive of 1 2  December 1 945. Known as the 'Pacific Charter', this statement 
assumed a period of direct military government during which the islanders 
would 'be granted the highest degree of self-government that they are capable of 
assimilating'8 and that 'local governments . . .  should be patterned on the politico­
social institutions which the inhabitants have evolved for themselves. '9 
In response to these political notions and unaware of  cross-cultural 
complexities, US Naval authorities in Palau turned to the traditional chiefs for 
leadership and legitimizing authority. This move rejuvenated indigenous 
6 Dorothy Richard, United States Naval Administration of the Trust Territory o/ the Pacific Islands, vol. 
2 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Office of Naval Operations, 1 957) , p.74. 
7 Richard, United States Naval Administration, vol. 2, p.74. 
8 Ibid., p.307. 
9 Ibid. 
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authorities that had had little power or influence during Japanese rule. This 
change temporarily undercut the political base of the former collaborationist 
group which had successfully mediated between the indigenous Palauan and 
Japanese systems. This change also stimulated the emergence of a very small 
group of radicals led by Ronald Sakuma, who had studied at a Seventh-Day 
Adventist college in Japan from 1 939-1 946, earning the equivalent of both B.A. 
and M.A. degrees .10  He was joined by Takeo Yano, who had also attended a 
Japanese middle-school and worked for the Japanese civilian government on 
both Palau and Saipan before the war. Sakuma's ideas, with which Yano 
generally sympathized, envisioned Palau rebuilding its pre-war commercial 
economy, relying on an elite trained during the Japanese administration. Further, 
as Sakuma understood things, ascribed status would be replaced by achieved 
status and, finally, modifications would be made to Palau's social system to 
eliminate the numerous exchange customs that were regarded as inhibiting 
development of a robust commercial economy. 1 1 All this would open new 
avenues to greater power, prestige, and wealth for these young agents of social 
change and, in turn, threaten chiefly prerogatives. 
This ambitious program devised by Sakuma and Y ano matched neither the 
plans of the US military government nor those of the traditional chiefs. The 
chiefs, in fact, regarded Sakuma's Japanese-style modernising programme as a 
serious threat to their newly-regained political status and therefore rej ected it. 
The US had no plans for reviving the vigorous pre-war Japanese development 
programme and had neither the talent nor the resources for such an effort. In 
fact, nearly all the infrastructure built by the Japanese in Koror was destroyed 
during wartime bombing or dynamited and bulldozed afterwards. Sakuma's 
ambitious economic plan was ignored. 
The Palau Municipality 
Even before Sakuma had pushed his modernization plans very far, the US Navy 
had started to implement programmes in infrastructure reconstruction, health, 
self-government, economic development, and schooling according to the 
guidelines of Spruance's 'Pacific Charter'. Commander Anderson, Palau's 
Military Governor at the time, called upon the Palauans to establish a Palau 
government. The same two energetic men who had drafted the economic plan, 
Sakuma and Yano, were assigned this task by the older Palauan leaders. Sakuma 
and Y ano had acquired some Japanese books on governmental theory and 
10 Vidich, Political Factionalism in Palau, p.1 09. 
1 1  Ibid., pp. 1 1 1 -1 2. 
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structure and began making a plan. 1 2  The two men recognised that the ad hoe 
Palau Administrative Office previously established by the military had no source 
of revenue and therefore would have very little authority. The Sakuma-Yano 
plan called for a representative form of government with legislative, executive, 
and judicial functions. The legislative function would be carried out by a 
congress composed of elected representatives with tax-levying powers. The 
executive function would be carried out jointly by the naval authorities and the 
Palauans with the latter administering and staffing the departments of education, 
finance, industry, general affairs, the judiciary, and the police. This plan did not 
include a role for the hereditary chiefs who then had the ear of the military 
governor. 1 3 
The hereditary leaders rejected most of the Sakuma-Yano plan, but allowed the 
section on the establishment of an executive to be submitted to Commander 
Anderson. Anderson accepted this section with the proviso that the six heads of 
department be elected by those Palauans already employed by the military to 
carry out civilian functions. Even though the six heads of department already 
had been appointed, Anderson ordered that an election be held to certify the 
positions. Thus, Palau's very first election under American rule took place in 
October 1 946. Forty-six people then employed by the naval authority voted. 
They elected Joseph Tellei as head of General Affairs; Indalecio Rudimch, 
assisted by Sakuma, as head of education; Lomisang for Industry; Ngoriakl as 
head of the police; Takeo Yano as head of finance; and Pablo Ringang as head 
of the judiciary. All of these men had experience during the Japanese 
administration in the departments they had been newly elected to head up, 
though under military rule their authority was rather limited in scope. Joseph 
Tellei, in particular, was a man of great knowledge, ability, and experience and 
the others deferred to him as the key leader. 
In April and May 1 947, two incompatible directives concerning governmental 
structure were issued by the top military brass. 'The Joint Chief of Staff Interim 
Directive for Military Government', issued in April 1 947, called for: the training 
and employment of qualified islanders to fill administrative posts; the creation 
of local legislative, administrative and judicial institutions conducive to the 
growth of democratic self-government; popular elections; and the protection of 
12 Takeo Yano, Personal interview, Koror, Palau, 10 Feb. 1 981 . 
13 Reflecting on this plan in July 1981 ,  Takeo Yano said, 'At that time I didn't fully realize the 
role and power of the chiefs even though my grandfather was the reigning lbedul.' Personal 
interview, Koror, Palau, 6 July, 1 981 . 
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the rights and fundamental freedoms of all elements in the population. 14 
The May directive which, according to military historian Richard, astounded 
military government personnel, was a precise plan for the establishment of local 
municipal government 'to provide for a system of taxation to make 
municipalities self-supporting'. 15 This, it seems, was in anticipation of sharp 
budgetary reductions that would accompany departure of military forces and 
establishment of the area as a United Nations Trust Territory administered by 
the US Navy in conjunction with civilian personnel. The directive stipulated that 
local municipal (or village) governments be headed by an elected magistrate 
assisted by an elected or appointed treasurer. Besides the collection and 
expenditure of tax revenues, the municipal government, as an arm of the 
American administrator, would be responsible for the local enforcement of his 
orders, particularly as regards police affairs, sanitation, and education. Terms of 
office and affairs of the municipal government were subject to approval, 
termination, or change by the military government authority.1 6 This was hardly 
the makings of the greatest degree of democratic self-government so often 
proclaimed in earlier military statements. 
With President Truman's approval of the Trusteeship Agreeement on 1 8  July 1 947, 
the title 'military governor' was changed to 'civil administrator'. Commander 
Ball, Palau's first civil administrator, took action on the April directive, which 
resulted in the rejuvenation of the Sakuma-Yano plan for a government 
structure. The revised version of this plan proposed a Palau Congress and a 
Palau Court as Palau's central government. Unlike the earlier plan that the 
hereditary leaders had rejected, the revised plan recognized chiefly power by 
including the two high chiefs and several other chiefs as part of the fourteen­
member Palau Administrative Council (fable 1 ) .  
The military authorities accepted this plan. It seems in  hindsight that the new 
government structure was, in many ways, Palauan conceived and administered, 
sensitive to indigenous institutions, and democratic in a way understood by 
Palauan leadership. As noted earlier, Admiral Spruance's 'Pacific Charter' 
maintained that island peoples be granted the highest degree of self-government 
possible, that they assume the management and conduct of their own 
government, and that 'local governments be patterned on the politico-social 
14 Richard, United States Nava/Administration, vol. 2, p.3 1 1 .  
1 5  Ibid. , p.31 2. 
1 6 Ibid. 
99 
Donald R. Shuster The Beginnings of Elected Government in Palau 
institutions which the inhabitants had evolved for themselves '. 1 7  The Palauan 
plan for a centralized municipal government met the general conditions of both 
the 'Pacific Charter' and the April directive and thus merited full 
implementation. 
The membership of the Palau Congress, as conceived by Sakuma and Yano, 
involved a concession by the chiefs in that the congress was to be composed of 
elected leaders only. The historical record is not clear on this issue, but the 
military governor's report of 1 July 1 947 indicates that Commander Ball had 
little confidence in the administrative abilities of the chiefs: 
Most of the chiefs have had little or no experience in administration 
under the Japanese . . .  The anachronistic practice of previous Military 
Government officers in installing the hereditary offices, instead of 
electing or appointing trained Palauan administrators has caused 
reverses to the democratic ideal and created new stresses within the 
native society. The Palauans who have attended school disrespect the 
chiefs, and there is much complaint that the youngers do not hear the 
voice of the chief. 1 8 
Clearly, the military administration at this time favoured elected leaders over 
hereditary ones. 
Furthermore, before the Palau Congress was formed, the military governor sent 
Joseph Tellei and Charlie Gibbons, two older and highly respected leaders (but 
not traditional chiefs) , to Guam for a legislative workshop. After returning to 
Palau, Tellei and Gibbons persuaded two high chiefs, Ibedul Mariur and Reklai 
Brel, that a congress of representatives could be a unifying force, that it should 
include elected members to please the American overlords, and that the chiefs 
would have the leading role on the Palau Administrative Council. The Council 
was the main link to the foreign administration because the congress would 
meet for only a few days each year. 19 In this act of political persuasion, Tellei and 
Gibbons instructed the chiefs concerning the newly introduced form of 
government. On Guam, Tellei and Gibbons had learned what a legislature was 
and, having served in important positions during the Japanese administration, 
17 Admiral R.A. Spruance, Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Ocean Area, Serial 52855, 1 2  
December 1 945. Quoted i n  Richard, United States Nava/Administration, vol. 2 ,  p.307 and 
pp.516- 19. 
1 8 US Navy, 'Military Government Unit Report', Palau, 1 July 1 947, Summary, Section C-3, 
Hamilton Library, University of Hawaii at Manoa. 
19 Joseph Tellei, personal interview, Koror, Palau, 21 Dec., 1 980. 
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they recognized the importance of accepting foreign innovations. The two men 
became advocates of elected government. 
A congressional convention was held in May 1 94 7 and the first Palau Congress 
assembled on 4 July 1 947. Palau's second election (the first was held in October 
1 946) under American rule was held during June 1 94 7 and thirty-one 
congressmen were elected. They sat together with sixteen hereditary chiefs, who 
by charter had no role in the Congress but by virtue of their high social rank and 
title, knowledge, and prestige, wielded great influence during deliberations. The 
Congress itself functioned in a purely advisory capacity vis-a-vis the US civil 
administrator, who replaced the naval military governor in 1 947. So that the 
Palauans might not misinterpret their new roles as congressmen, the Deputy 
High Commissioner reminded them that the Palau Congress was an advisory 
body and that 'their government was in no sense an independent nation, but 
part of the government of the Trust Territory'.20 
Sixteen Municipalities from One 
Under the more flexible military directive of April 1 947, Indigenous leaders 
carried out the development of a Palau Municipality then made up of sixteen 
districts (villages) . The US Navy noted in a 1 948 report that the Palau 
Municipality in its brief period of operation had worked well. 'The considerable 
revival of the power of the hereditary chiefs, which is involved in its operation, 
is tempered by the elective system relating to congressmen and district 
officials. '21 
With the changeover in mid-1 947 from military government to civil 
administration, and complete demobilisation, there was a significant reduction in 
funding for the Pacific Trust Territory. During the transition to trusteeship 
status , the High Commissioner's Office exerted pressure in late 1 947 and early 
1 948 to have implemented the more specific directive of May 1 94 7. This 
directive called for the establishment of numerous self-supporting local 
municipal governments headed by elected magistrates for the purpose of 
carrying out executive orders. This abrupt change in direction set up tensions 
between the Palauan-created central system and the military-supported 
decentralised system. In May 1 948, the Deputy High Commissioner, Rear 
Admiral Carlton Wright, informed the Civil Administrator in Palau, Commander 
20 Richard, United States Naval Administration, vol. 3, pp.398-399. 
21 Stanford University, School of Naval Administration, Handbook on the Trust Territory ef the 
Pacific Islands (Washington, D.C.: Navy Department, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, 
1 948), p .1 04. 
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C.M. Hardison, that the Palauan-created centralized system 'interfered with the 
development of self-government on a community level.' 22 Hardison's third 
quarterly report (covering April, May, June 1 948) clearly indicated that the 
centralized system was being disbanded in favor of a decentralised system of 
sixteen municipalities. Hardison and his staff met with the Palauan leaders who, 
he said, 'profess to understand what they had to do at the meeting but there 
have been constant rumblings from them since . . .  as to how and why.'23 
Despite 'constant rumblings', the Palauan leadership adjusted to the Deputy 
High Commissioner's request. A year after the June 1 947 congressional election, 
fourteen of Palau's sixteen municipalities elected magistrates for one-year 
terms. 24 These elections were held under the auspices of the civil administration 
during field trip inspections to rural villages on Babeldaob, Kayangel, Peleliu, 
and Angaur. These elections were an introduction to the western method of 
choosing leaders by one person one vote. 
The second round of elections for magistrate was held during July 1 949 when 
two parties of administrative officials led by lieutenants H.L. Stille and C.L. 
Frink toured the municipalities . 25 As might be expected, voter turnout in the 
municipalities varied, ranging from 50 to 90 percent, depending on the social 
rank of the favorite candidates. The position of magistrate did not provide 
much of a pay cheque. The monthly salary, which was paid from municipal 
taxes, of the first group of magistrates ranged from a low of $US3 to a high of 
$50. In essence the position was that of a messenger for the foreign 
administration. Since the position carried little in the way of pay, prestige or 
authority, elections for magistrates were generally dull affairs from their 
beginning in 1 948 to the mid-1 970s. One of the few exceptions was the 1 978 
Koror mayoral race (the magistrate of Koror was called mayor) in which Ibedul 
Gibbons defeated three challengers in a competitive election that pitted 
ambitious youth against established older leaders. 
22 Richard, United States Naval Administration, vol. 3, p.391 .  
23 Trust Territory o f  the Pacific Islands, Palau District, Office o f  the Civil Administration, 
'Report No. 3-48', 1 948, Enclosure (A), p. 1 0. Hamilton Library, University of Hawaii at 
Mano a. 
24 Because a field-trip vessel was not available to serve the south-west islands of Sonsorol and 
Tobi, and because the whole concept of election was culturally foreign, Chief Nestor and 
Chief Marino served as magistrates of those small islands. Taro was elected magistrate of 
Sonsorol the following year, but Marino wasn't elected until late 1 950 or early 1 95 1 .  
25 Palauans who made these trips were high chiefs lbedul Mariur and Reklai Brel; Charlie 
Gibbons, Eusevio Termeteet, Calarbai and Damaso as interpreters; Benjamin Mersai and 
Takeo Yano as auditors; Hildelbul and Martin as sanitation inspectors; and Belsam, Vicente, 
Bolis and Yoshita as boat crewmen. 
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The position of magistrate disappeared when Palau's municipalities reorganized 
themselves into states in the early 1 980s .26 After 35 years, the military rhetoric of 
self-government and indigenous definition of political structure finally became 
substance in Palau with the formation of state governments. 
A New Legislature 
The Palau Congress had no legislative power; it met for only four or five days 
each year in a purely advisory capacity. Recognizing its powerlessness, the 
Congress repeatedly registered its wish 'to assume more responsibility in the 
administration of the (Palau] District'.27 
Joseph Tellei and Rubasch Fritz, then leading members of the Palau Council, 
worked in 1 954-55 with the district government's Island Affairs Officer, Sidney 
Siskind, to define the structure and function of a new and more powerful 
legislative body.28 Although Palau's two paramount chiefs-Ibedul and Reklai­
were members of the influential Palau Council, neither they nor the fourteen 
other leading chiefs were official members of the Palau Congress.29 However, 
the hereditary leaders had been influential in Congress affairs and their influence 
continued into the new body, officially chartered as the Olbiil Era Kelulau Era 
Belau, (literally, Palau's place for whispered decisions) . Joseph Tellei claimed that 
both the Palau Congress and the OEKEB 'were houses controlled mainly by the 
chiefs'. 30 Assuming this was true, the hereditary leaders could determine who 
was elected to congress, who became magistrates in the village domain, and 
what was acceptable legislation. 
26 On 25 January 1 981 , Airai municipality became Airai State under the leadership of 
Governor Roman Tmetuchl. The system of state government defined by the Airai 
Constitution is a mixed parliamentary-traditional Palauan system which, at that time, was 
controlled by Tmetuchl and his colleagues. During 1 98 1 ,  the municipalities of Koror, 
Ngchesar, Melekeok, Ngatpang, Ngarchelong, Ngaraard and Ngaremlengui held 
constitutional conventions to become states. The remaining eight municipalities became as 
states soon after. 
27 Palau Congress Resolution No. 9-53, in Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, Resources 
and Development Division of Land Management, 'Palau District Legislature Acts and 
Resolutions, 1 953-1 965', Republic of Palau National Archives. 
28 Takeo Yano, Koror, Palau, 25 Feb., 1 98 1 ,  and Thomas Remengesau, Saipan, Mariana 
Islands, 6 Aug., 1 981 , personal interviews. 
29 The southwest islands of Sonsorol and Tobi, closer to Papua New Guinea than to Koror, 
are linguistically and culturally different from Palau. The hereditary leaders of these two 
islands, both titled Tamor, have been included with the fourteen Palauan chiefs on a co-equal 
basis. For all practical purposes, however, the Tamor generally defer to the Palau chiefs. 
30 Joseph Tellei, personal interview, Koror, Palau, 21 Dec., 1 980. 
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Structurally the OEKEB consisted of the sixteen hereditary leaders, the Rubekul 
Be/au, sixteen magistrates, and some thirty-seven Chadal Olbiil (elected 
representatives), one of whom was chosen by his colleagues to be Bedul Olbiil or 
president. This officer had a group of advisers called Tebechelel Olbzil whom he 
appointed with the approval of the entire OEKEB and the American district 
administrator. 31 The advisory group consisted mainly of younger meteet (high 
ranking clansmen) who were generally employed in the district government 
administration. Ironically, it was Siskind, an American, who insisted that Palauan 
names be used for the various offices. 
Role of Hereditary Leaders 
Functionally the OEKEB had considerably more authority than the Palau 
Congress. The new body could collect taxes, authorise expenditures, receive and 
administer real and personal property, and legislate by resolution. Although all 
members could propose resolutions, only the Chadal Olbiil (elected members) 
could vote on their passage. Anthropologist Robert McKnight maintained that 
this denial of voting privilege was a slight to traditional authority, putting such 
authority in 'a back seat structurally' and inhibiting indigenous modernization.32 
Given that hereditary leaders by weight of their influence controlled who won 
seats in the OEKEB, McKnight's claim seems an underestimation. 33 Further 
reports issued by Francis B. Mahoney-a former Island Affairs Officer and 
Assistant District Administrator and District Administrator, 1 9  51-6 1 ,  and a 
trained anthropologist-indicated that there were no serious cleavages between 
the hereditary and elected members during the years 1 954--60. In his 1 956-57 
report Mahoney wrote: 
Palau's present leaders are anxious for progress as much as possible within the 
traditional framework as witness the Olbiil era Kelulau 's concern for salaries not 
only for elected officials but for hereditary chiefs.34 
The hereditary leaders had not given up their mantle of leadership to the elected 
31 The Tebeche/e/ O/bii/ was a continuation of the Palau Administrative Council whose members 
had been appointed by the American District administrator. Though the membership did not 
change substantially from the old group to the new, the locus of appointment authority 
moved from American to Palauan hands. This was of significant symbolic importance. 
32 Robert K. McKnight, 'Rigid Models and Ridiculous Boundaries', p.44. 
33 Ibid., p.49. McKnight himself maintained that nominees for the position of magistrate 
'were those who were approved by the traditional leadership because they would cooperate . . .  
or might enhance the position of the chief. 
34 Francis B. Mahoney, 'Annual Summary Report of Political Activities, Palau District', Koror, 
Palau, 1 April 1 956-31 March 1 957, p.6. 
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group. They held sacred titles . The chiefs remained powerful leaders, particularly 
in Palau's rural areas . 
Elected Leaders 
Throughout the eight-year life of the OEKEB (1 955-63) ,  a new group of 
younger men, most of whom were born between 1 920 and 1 926, entered the 
political limelight. The second Bedul Olbiil (president) was Roman Tmetuchl, 
then just 30 years old. Toribiong Uchel, Tmetuchl's older brother, was the last 
president of the Palau Congress and the first president of the OEKEB. 
Following Tmetuchl as president were Takeo Yano, Jonathan Emul, Thomas 
Remengesau Sr. , and David Ramarui. All these men had attended Japanese 
schools before the war and had post-war educational experience overseas in 
either Guam, Hawaii, or the Philippines. 
Returning to Palau with English language fluency, ideas, energy, and the prestige 
of overseas travellers, these elected leaders began making their mark on the 
Koror political scene. They and their followers recognized that with the 
establishment of the American system of elected government, Palau's arena for 
political manoeuvering was suddenly much larger than it had been under the 
traditional system or during the Japanese administration. The franchise 
broadened the leadership pool far beyond that of the hierarchical traditional 
system. As noted by Mair, a social anthropologist, 'This is one of the 
implications of the word democracy that is most congenial to men with 
ambitions. New fields are open for the attainment and exercise of power, and 
new men enter them-people who see how to take advantage of a new 
situation.'35 Given this new enlarged political arena and the Palauan tendency for 
competitive, manipulative behaviour, the political situation soon became fluid 
and dynamic. These changes soon began to erode hereditary authority. 
Changes in the relationship between the younger elected leadership and the 
older hereditary leadership became evident in the new attitudes displayed by the 
former. Some of the new acculturated leaders developed a disdainful attitude 
'toward out-of-town leaders (the chiefs) who "couldn't read English and didn't 
understand democracy'" . 36 The elected leaders were disparaging of the chiefs 
and the chiefs felt they were being rudely ignored by the younger elected leaders. 
Unlike the political style of the bai (traditional men's meeting house) where only 
elder titled men spoke in whispers and through messengers, the legislative halls 
35 Lucy Mair, Anthropolo!!)I and 5 ocia/ Change (London: Athlone Press, 1 969), p.33. 
36 Francis B. Mahoney, 'Annual Summary of Political Activities, Palau District', 1 April 1 957-
31 March 1 958, p.6. Hamilton Library, University of Hawaii at Manoa. 
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were dominated by outspoken and sometimes abrasive younger men as Roman 
Tmetuchl and Jonas Olkeriil. 37 These men were familiar with legislative 
procedures and sometimes used the meetings as a stage for manoeuvres and 
strategizing that was characteristic of traditional Palauan politics.38 The OEKEB 
sometimes had the atmosphere of a young men's club house, the traditional 
training ground for future community leaders. 
David Ramarui was Beduf Ofbiif at the time when the chiefs threatened to walk 
out of the legislature's chambers. He succeeded in persuading the hereditary 
leaders to remain by saying to them that their advice and consent were essential 
to the proper conduct of legislative deliberations.39 The chiefs agreed to remain. 
Seven years later, however, the chiefs in a dramatic move, walked out of the 
Palau Legislature-the successor to the OEKEB. Again, they felt their authority 
was being ignored. Commenting on the 1 961  walkout, Reklai Lomisang said, 
'We allowed the creation of the present legislative body, and although we are 
not able to vote, we are still the rulers of Palau.'40 
A New Legislature and Political Parties 
In 1 963, two important events happened in Palau, both of which were 
welcomed by the younger generation of political leaders. In that year political 
parties were formed, and the Palau legislature was established. With sixteen 
chiefs, sixteen magistrates, 37 elected members and an ideological cleavage, the 
OEKEB was too unwieldy to get much important political or practical work 
done. In eight years of deliberation it had passed less than seventy resolutions. 
The younger elected members agitated for a streamlined and more powerful 
organisation. As noted above, in 1 961 the hereditary leaders dissatisfied with the 
'new ways' gave notice of their intent to withdraw from the assembly. Also in 
1 96 1 ,  the younger membership engineered the passage of a bill to eliminate the 
magistrates on the grounds that they were part of the executive administration. 
The High Commissioner disapproved this action. Other amendments to the 
OEI<EB charter were proposed, however, and this drive for change culminated 
37 Tmetuchl had been a member of the Palau Congress since the early 1 950s. He had a UN 
fellowship (1 954-55) to study law and sociology in the Republic of the Philippines. Jonas 
Olkeriil won election to the OEKEB in either 1 960 or 1 961  and became locally famous for 
his outspoken and unorthodox behaviour. 
38 McKnight has described seven Palauan political strategies in 'Proverbs of Palau', Journal ef 
Amen.can Folklore, 8 1 :  319  (1 968) ,  pp.29-31 .  
3 9  David Ramarui, personal interview, Koror, Palau, 24  July 1 981 . 
40 'Chiefs walk Out', DidilA Chais, 1 : 1 6  (21 Oct. 1 968), p.5. 
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in a new charter.41 
The new charter for a Palau legislature was written mainly by Lazarus Salii, then 
a fresh University of Hawaii graduate who had majored in political science, and 
approved by the High Commissioner. Since 1 955, Koror's representation in the 
OEKEB had increased from five to nine members. Besides Tmetuchl, the other 
Koror representatives were David Ramarui, Jonas Olkeriil, Lazarus Salii, Minoru 
Ueki, Moses Mokoll, Toribiong Uchel, Benjamin Mersai, and Indalecio 
Rudimch. These men were anxious for change. Their assertiveness prevailed in 
that the charter reduced elected membership to 28 by omission of the 
magistrates and nine elected member seats. The hereditary leaders, however, 
retained their position as non-voting members. 'They were too well-entrenched 
to be rooted out', recalled Lazarus Salii.42 The term of office, previously two 
years, was extended to four. The charter called for redefined electoral districts 
and a mechanism for reapportionment every ten years. 
The new legislature's legal authority included all those powers of the OEKEB 
and was extended to include the power to override a veto by the district 
administrator (an American until 1 970 when Thomas Remengesau became 
Palau's first and last Palauan district administrator) and to restrict his veto 
authority on appropriation bills to individual i tems. Further, the Tebechelel Olbiil 
was abolished because it was perceived to be working too closely with the 
American-dominated district government administration. 43 Four standing 
committees were formed in place of this council of advisers and the local 
flavour of the OEKEB was eliminated in two ways. Siskind's Palauan titles were 
dropped in favour of English ones, and compensation, instead of being 
determined by a legislator's local constituency, was established by law (i.e. , by 
the legislators themselves) . Furthermore, the hereditary chiefs continued to be 
marginalized because they were unskilled at parliamentary procedure and 
unaware of the many complexities of dealing with the High Commissioner's 
office and larger issues of the day. 
In anticipation of the October election for seats in the first Palau Legislature, 
political parties formed in 1 963 . Traditionally, Palauan political activity took 
place in a bipolar arena, making competitive dualism a dominant feature of 
Palauan political culture. Therefore, the establishment of two political parties 
41 The charters for the Palau Council (1 948), the Palau Congress (1 948), the OEKEB (1 955), 
and the Palau Legislature (1 963) are contained in Norman Meller, The Congress ef Micronesia 
(Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1 969) , pp.426-38. 
42 Lazarus Salii, personal interview, Koror, Palau, 21 July 1 981 . 
43 Meller, Congress ef Micronesia, p.80. 
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'nicely satisfied traditional American norms and neatly coincided with the 
parallel structuring of competition traditional to Palauan life. '44 It also began an 
interesting experiment in indigenous political education. 
Manuel Godinez, appointed under the Kennedy administration to the position 
of Palau district administrator in 1 962, was a native of Puerto Rico. After he had 
been in Palau for a year, he gathered Palau's major political leaders together in 
May 1 963 and suggested they form two political parties. Drawing on his 
experience of Puerto Rican politics in the late 1 950s, Godinez suggested the 
names 'liberal' and 'progressive'. Indalecio Rudimch, assisted by David Ramarui, 
agreed to head up the Progressive Party and Benjamin Mersai, assisted by 
Toribiong Uchel, accepted chairmanship of the Liberals. Both Rudimch and 
Mersai had been politically active since the establishment of the Palau Congress 
in 1 94 7. In his 1 1  June 1 963 report, Godinez expressed pride in this 
achievement. He perceived it in American terms. For him the parties had 
solidified themselves around a dominant issue-that of future political status: 
'The Liberal party, under the Chairmanship of Benjamin Mersai, champions 
independence for Micronesia; the Progressive party under the chairmanship of 
David Ramarui prefers commonwealth status for Micronesia.'45 
Godinez, however, spent more time fishing and enjoying himself than he did at 
his government duties and thus was often ignorant of the true state of affairs 
prevailing in Palau. Much of the day-to-day work and the formulation of policy 
to deal with new problems was carried out by William 'Vit' Vitarelli, Lazarus 
Salii, and Takeo Yano. In the passage quoted above, Godinez was wrong on two 
points. First, the Liberals favored greater self-government but saw independence 
as an achievable status 'sometime in the future'.46 Second, the first chairman of 
the Progressive Party was Indalecio Rudimch-David Ramarui was his 
assistant.47 
Several personal factors hovered in the background that reinforced the decision 
to establish political parties. As a political science student at the University of 
Hawaii, Salii had campaigned for John F. Kennedy and Patsy Mink, a candidate 
for the US House of Representatives, in 1 960. Salii and Ramarui were the only 
44 Ibid., p.263. 
45 Manuel Godinez, 'Palau District Monthly Report for May 1 963', 1 1 June 1 963, p.4. 
Republic of  Palau National Archives. 
46 Meller, Congress of Micronesia, p.263. 
47 As a 1 958 University of Hawaii B.A. graduate in anthropology, Ramarui was sensitive to the 
decline of hereditary leadership and the tension between the old and new political leaders. He 
recalled that it was Ramarui who persuaded the traditional chiefs not to walk out of the 
OEKEB in 1 96 1 .  
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two college graduates active in politics at the time and they were brimming with 
ideas and political models: 'I wanted to practice what I had learned in the 1 960 
presidential campaign', Salii said when reflecting on the formation of parties. 48 
Besides this enthusiasm for active political campaigning, political leadership was 
the force that attracted loyalties. John 0. Ngiraked recalled that Palau's two 
parties originally were formed around personalities and not ideologies. 'Those 
with Rudimch represented one type of personality and those with Mersai and 
Toribiong another. '49 Initially the parties were loose configurations built around 
key individuals rather than around carefully worked out political platforms. 50 
Also, parties provided an outlet for political energies that previously found 
expression in church activity. The Seventh Day Adventist (SDA) group, of 
which Mersai, Toribiong, and Tmetuchl were leading members, was very active 
throughout the 1 9  50s and early 1 960s. During this period the SDA leaders 
consolidated a strong following and built an elementary school and large church 
near the site of the first Palau Congress building. Party activity provided an 
avenue for taking politics out of religion and religion out of politics .  According 
to Salii, 'The feeling was that if we wanted to play politics, than we ought to play 
in political parties rather than involving the various religious groups.'5 1 
US interests in Micronesia have always been driven by the strategic imperative: 
nuclear tests, secret training bases, strategic denial. Strategic needs dominated 
the years 1 945-65, and the development obligations spelled out in the Trusteeship 
Agreement received little attention and few resources. Nevertheless, after the 
Pacific War US Navy officials introduced the idea of elected government that 
many Palauans found attractive. During the late 1 940s and into the 1 960s, 
elected Palauan officials gained progressively more authority in their home 
affairs. After eight years of an advisory Palau Congress that had no authority, 
elected leaders took the initiative to write a new charter to form the Olbiil Era 
Kelulau Era Be/au. In 1 963, two very significant events took place: the Palau 
Legislature was formed to replace the OEKEB and two political parties were 
established. These developments perpetuated the schism between traditional 
48 Lazarus Salii, personal interview, Koror, Palau, 21 July 1 981 .  
49 John Olbedabel Ngiraked, personal interview, Koror, Palau, 23  Jan., 1 981 . 
50 Meller, Congress ef Micronesia, p.263. 
51 Lazarus Salii, personal interview, Koror, Palau, 28 Feb., 1 981 .  
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and elected authority and provided a significantly wider arena in which Palau's 
first generation of elected leaders cut their political 'teeth' and established their 
leadership styles. 
1 1 0  
Post-War Development Proposals for the Gilbert 
and Ellice Islands Colony 
Susan Woodburn 
This paper exammes two proposals for the post-war administrative 
reorganisation and development of the British-administered Central Pacific 
group of islands constituting the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony (now the 
independent nations of Kiribati and Tuvalu) . The first of these was prepared in 
1 943 by the war-time appointee as Western Pacific High Commissioner and 
Governor of Fiji, Philip (subsequently Sir Philip) Mitchell, and the second in 
1 945 by H.E. (Harry) Maude, a long-serving Colony official then working as 
First Assistant Secretary within the High Commission. Though prepared in 
response to specific immediate circumstances and without direct consultation 
with the people of the islands, both were wide-ranging in scope and had the 
potential to 'define' their future. But while these proposals were both officially 
endorsed at some level, neither was comprehensively or effectively adopted into 
practice. It would seem that this had as much to do with internal considerations 
and the vagaries of bureaucracy as with the actual content or virtue of the 
proposals themselves. 
This paper arose out of a larger study of the career of Harry Maude as a Pacific 
colonial administrator (and, subsequently, Pacific historian) which involved 
extensive readings of his personal and semi-official correspondence along with 
the official memoranda and despatches. 1 Such a perspective highlights 
consideration of the human element, individual knowledge and experience, 
competing demands and caprice at all levels of the colonial bureaucratic 
establishment in policy creation and adoption. While one cannot draw general 
conclusions from this instance2, it seems nonetheless to provide a useful caution 
both to acceptance of the operation of some cohesive imperial 'colonial policy' 
and to our tendency as historians to pay too much attention retrospectively to 
the 'evidence' of policy documents, without consideration of the complexities of 
their authorship and context or their actual reception and implementation. 
The war-time and immediate post-war interest of the colonial powers in the 
1 Susan Woodburn, Where our hearts still lie: Harry and Honor Maude in the Pacific Islands (Adelaide: 
Crawford House, 2003). 
2 Although the papers delivered at the 2003 workshop by Ian Campbell and Donald Denoon 
both suggested the significance of the individual, their personality and their position or 
standing within the administrative establishment in getting policy adopted. 
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Pacific islands and their future extended even to the small and remote 
conglomeration of Central Pacific islands then known as the Gilbert and Ellice 
Islands Colony. The Colony had originated with a somewhat reluctant British 
imperial declaration of a protectorate over the islands of the Gilbert and Ellice 
groups in 1 892. This was expanded to incorporate phosphate-rich Ocean Island 
(Banaba) in 1 900 and in 1 9 1 5  the two groups were proclaimed a Colony with 
Ocean Island, Fanning and Washington islands being added in 1 9 1 6  and the 
potentially strategic Phoenix Islands being added precipitately in 1 937.3 
For 50 years after the declaration of the protectorate, the islands were of 
minimal interest to the Colonial Office, whose energies were only occasionally 
engaged by issues relating to the exploitation of the Ocean Island phosphate 
deposits . In the 1 930s there was some concern at American and Japanese 
interest in the region, but this had the effect of encouraging further territorial 
claims (or at least 'effective occupation') rather than affecting the aims or style 
of colonial administration. Then, immediately following their entry into the war 
with the bombing of Pearl Harbour, the Japanese made bombing raids on 
Ocean Island, established a base on Butaritari and briefly landed at Tarawa, 
returning with a significant force in August 1 942 to occupy Banaba and, in 
September, Abemama. It had always been made clear that British military 
resources would not be diverted to protect the Pacific territories, and though no 
damage or casualties were sustained in the initial bombing of Ocean Island, the 
colonial administration and most British and other expatriate traders and 
missionaries were evacuated from there and all the other islands shortly after the 
first Japanese raids, and all direct administration in the islands stopped. 
For some time the Colony service personnel were scattered, in Australia, in New 
Zealand, on active military service, or seconded to other colonial services-but 
with the easing of the early threat to Fiji most were based at the Western Pacific 
High Commission headquarters in Suva. By mid-1 943 plans were well advanced 
for the re-taking of the occupied Gilbert islands (which was done on 1 9  and 20 
November) , and in September 1 943 Colony officials returned to set up 
headquarters in Funafuti in the Ellice Islands, which had not been troubled by 
the Japanese. 
With this resumption of some form of 'normality', the Western Pacific High 
Commission began to get into gear for post-war planning. Two formal 
3 The complex political/ diplomatic background to the establishment of the protectorate and 
subsequent proclamation of the colony is traced in Doug Munro and Stewart Firth 'Towards 
Colonial Protectorates: the case of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands', Australian Journal of Politics 
and History, 32: 1 (1 986) , pp.63-7 1 .  
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proposals were put forward for the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony. The first 
was by Sir Philip Mitchell, sent as a secret despatch to the Colonial Office on 30 
September 1 943, and the second was issued in June 1 945 by Harry Maude, who 
had served as Assistant Secretary within the Commission for much of the war 
and before that as District Officer and Lands Commissioner within the Colony. 
Mitchell, who had replaced Sir Harry Luke as High Commissioner in mid-1 942 
essentially to put Fiji on a war-time footing, had served for 30 years previously 
in Africa (in district administration in Nyasaland and Tanganyika and as 
Governor of Uganda from 1 935), and had never visited any of the islands that 
comprised the Colony. Essentially he was concerned with its future as an 
administrative problem: a remote dependency with a small and scattered 
population that cost more to run than its anticipated future revenues could 
sustain-this predicated on the assumption that revenue from Ocean Island 
phosphates would disappear 'at an early date'. 4 His comments were blunt 
(including implied criticism that Colony staff were largely mediocre and self­
interested) and his recommendations focused on cutting the costs of running 
the Colony-indeed, he made it clear that personally he would have liked to 
remove its independent status as a Colony altogether and merge it with Fiji. 
Mitchell's 'solution' was to transfer most administrative, financial and technical 
responsibilities as soon as possible to the islanders themselves (who of course 
could be paid less) ,  and to have a much pared-down expatriate administrative 
staff whose functions would be primarily educational and supervisory. Even 
these would be largely appointed on secondment from the Fiji or general 
Colonial Administrative Service, with no permanent headquarters or other base 
in the islands but rather operating as a 'sea-borne' group from one or more 
Colony vessels, visiting the islands principally to oversee the activities of the 
island governments. A native legislative authority was vaguely outlined in the 
proposals and Mitchell conceded that a native executive authority capable of 
taking over responsibility for groups of islands, and perhaps eventually for the 
Colony as a whole, would have to be devised. 5 Provision for increasing the 
responsibilities of native governments was not new: before the war much 
consideration had been given by some members of the Colony staff-including 
Maude-to modification of the more authoritarian and intrusive elements of 
4 P.E. Mitchell, [untitled printed 'Secret' Memorandum on the future administration of the 
Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony] (Suva, Government Printer, 30 September 1 943). Copy in 
the Maude papers, Barr Smith Library, University of Adelaide. The proposals are well 
summarised and discussed in Barrie Macdonald, Cinderellas of the Empire:towards a history of 
Kiribati and Tuvalu (Canberra, ANU Press, 1 982), pp. 1 60-1 63. 
5 Mitchell, op.cit. 
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Colony laws and regulations, and to giving islanders greater responsibility for 
their own affairs generally: efforts that were ultimately embodied in the Native 
Governments Ordinance no.4 of 1 941 , 'to provide for the administration by 
native governments of native affairs in the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony' -
though its implementation was deferred with the onset of war. 6 Mitchell's 
provision for an elective executive authority for the Colony as a whole was a 
significant new element, though sufficiently vague and futuristic not to be 
alarming, the time frame considered to be at least ten to twenty years.7 
Essentially what Mitchell was proposing was to prepare the islanders to run their 
own lives in the islands, but at the minimum possible cost that would enable the 
British Government to discharge its perceived obligations before eventually 
getting out, and on the unquestioned assumption that the legislative, 
administrative and judicial models that had been imposed over the life of British 
administration in the islands would be retained, and that other factors like 
acceptance of a subsistence economy and relative isolation would also continue 
in the post-war era. 
One can only guess at the flurry created among Colony staff by this radical and 
in some respects bizarre and ill-informed despatch, especially as its author was 
both new to the region and already unpopular among Commission and Colony 
staff: 'a vigorous man of strong personality . . . who quickly knows what he 
wants and proceeds quickly to get it' the Pacific Islands Month!J had quoted one 
source on his appointment; less diplomatically, Mitchell was a man of 'swollen 
self-importance' according to Philip Snow, a contemporary in the Fiji service.8 
His despatch was, however, apparently accepted by the Colonial Office without 
demur, returned and circulated as a Secret draft in June 1 944 and printed in 
October as the official High Commission s tatement on 'Policy and 
administration after the war'.9 
A new element in this final official Policy statement-or at least a subtle 
modification of Mitchell's blunt comment about doing the minimum to 
discharge Britain's obligations without leaving a legacy of discontent-was the 
suggestion that the policy statement was influenced by considerations of the 
6 Macdonald, op.cit. p. 1 39; Woodburn, op.cit. p. 1 40. 
7 An Executive Council was finally established in 1 963. Even then all members were 
appointed by the Resident Commissioner, and it was not until a new constitution was 
introduced in 1 967 that an elected House of Representatives was provided for. 
8 Pacific Islands Month/y, July 1 942, p. 9; Philip Snow, The years of hope (London: Radcliffe Press, 
1 997) ,  p.235. 
9 P.E. Mitchell, Poliry and administration efter the war (Suva: Government Printer, 4 October 
1 944). Copy in Maude Papers. 
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perception of Britain as a colonial power on the international stage. The 
statement ended: 
We have an opportunity such as seldom comes the way of Colonial 
Administrators to promote the future happiness and security of a fine 
people and to give an example to a critical world of what we mean 
when we claim to be the trustees of backward people; we must not 
fail in it. 10 
This may have been added within the Colonial Office-if so, it is the only 
indication in the Western Pacific context of the new directions and 
considerations in policy that were being implemented in India and Africa. The 
final statement also omitted some of the details of administrative costs and, 
indeed, strategically removed the emphasis on costs as the primary basis or 
motivation for policy-but otherwise the essential principles were as in 
Mitchell's original despatch. Thus official Colonial Office imprimatur was 
apparently given to a smaller, largely temporary and sea-borne Colony 
administration, and to native governments (in future to be called island councils) 
being given additional financial responsibility-they would be assigned various 
sources of revenue, prepare an annual budget for the approval of the Resident 
Commissioner, and take responsibility for most local services-though the 
statement was still very short on detail and justified costings. The statement did 
not deal with land policy or prescribe the requirements for health and education 
services-these were to be the subject of subsequent memoranda-only in 
general terms indicating the problems of population saturation for the existing 
resources, and that if the Government was to maintain a level of content, it 
needed to provide improved social services. 
At the time Mitchell's proposals were being drafted and considered by the 
Colonial Office, Maude was working at Western Pacific High Commission 
headquarters in Suva as First Assistant Secretary. He had joined the colonial 
service as a cadet in 1 929 on graduation from Cambridge and had served as 
District Officer and as Lands Commissioner throughout the islands for more 
than a decade. His immediate personal response to Mitchell's proposals is not 
recorded, but it must have been mixed. Certainly he would have felt antipathy to 
the idea of visiting itinerant staff rather than dedicated permanent staff with 
local knowledge and experience, and probably he would have experienced anger 
and insecurity as a member of a group that was being presented as largely 
mediocre and unnecessary. But he had been deeply involved throughout the 
1 930s in the policy revisions that had won recognition of the principle of 
1 0  Ibid. 
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increased responsibility of native governments embodied in the Native 
Governments Ordinance, and would have agreed with the establishment of the 
island councils. Moreover, Mitchells' proposals and the subsequent official 
policy statement left open the issues closest to his own heart-such as land 
regulation and re-settlement or colonisation schemes. 
When he was asked to prepare a memorandum on post-war land settlement 
policy to flesh out Mitchell's own sketchy references to this important area, 
Maude was clearly influenced by the apparent Colonial Office endorsement of 
Mitchell's general line of argument. Thus he went totally against his own 
experience and judgement in endorsing the transfer of responsibility for the 
settlement of land disputes to the locally elected island councils, as against 
separate land courts consisting of the magistrate and kaubure and native 
members of the Lands Commission provided for in the draft Native 
Governments Ordinance. Nonetheless he used the opportunity to put forward 
his own long-held conviction of the need for migration and colonisation as the 
long-term solution to land problems, despite the clear reservations about 
migration possibilities in Mitchell's original proposals. 11 When Mitchell was 
appointed Governor of Kenya a few months later, and left the Pacific as 
suddenly as he had arrived, Maude took heart once more, and began to prepare 
his own comprehensive Memorandum on post-war reorganization and 
administrative policy. 
It is probable this memorandum was at least partly prompted by the revival of 
Maude's ambition to advance personally within the service on Mitchell's 
departure-an opportunity to show the new High Commissioner his depth of 
knowledge of Colony affairs-and to advance his ideas for the Colony in the 
position of either Resident Commissioner or High Commission Secretary, both 
of which were soon likely to fall vacant through the retirement of the 
incumbents. 
It is also clear that Maude had been planning a composite reorganisation report 
with fellow officer Paddy Macdonald (then Assistant Secretary at the 
Commission) for some time: Macdonald had written to him early in 1 942 
regretting they would not be able to collaborate on it as he had been seconded 
to Barbados and urging him to 'do the whole thing' on his own. 12 He may also 
have wanted to pre-empt or counter an anticipated reorganisation report by the 
Resident Commissioner, Vivian Fox-Strangways-his immediate superior-
1 1  Memorandum [on] Lands Settlement in the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony: Post-War 
Policy (Suva, 29 June 1 944) . Copy (typescript) in Maude Papers. 
12 Macdonald to Maude 1 4  April 1 942 (Maude Papers Series J correspondence) . 
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whom he thought inept and from whom he differed on most things to do with 
Colony administration. Maude had written a number of  separate reports on 
aspects of administration during his time at the Commission, not only the 
general Lands Settlement policy statement requested by Mitchell but also a 
proposal for colonisation of Caroline and Flint islands and further reports on 
Colony cooperatives and trade schemes . On Mitchell's departure he had quickly 
begun to indicate areas of opposition to his proposals, writing to the Resident 
Commissioner in March arguing the need for permanent Colony headquarters 
and ridiculing Mitchell's conception of staff 'peregrinating in perpetuity round 
the archipelago as one big happy family'. 1 3 
Maude's final memorandum, drafted and printed while he was in New Zealand 
in June 1 945 was much more comprehensive than Mitchell's-38 closely printed 
pages dealing most extensively with administration and staffing but also with 
general economic and commercial matters, the location of Colony headquarters, 
the future of the Banabans and the establishment of a Council of 
Representatives. 14 In the preamble Maude declared that the general lines 
suggested were largely based on the principles set out in Mitchell's original 
despatch and subsequent official Policy statement, 'deliberately and from a 
genuine conviction that Sir Philip Mitchell's proposals offer the most practicable 
method of ensuring the progressive advancement of the Colony and its 
peoples' . 1 5  Overtly it was in accord with Mitchell's proposals, specifically those in 
support of the potential of native governments, the stemming of the growth of 
the central group of European officers, the training of islanders to take over 
positions, and the proposed institution of a Council of Representatives. But in a 
personal letter sent with the first draft to H.H. Vaskess at the High Commission 
Maude had stated that: 
It represents my own personal views, as gradually built up during the 
last few years from the experience gained during my earlier service in 
the field, and I do not expect that anyone would agree to all the 
recommendations without modification or amendment. 1 6  
Thus-sometimes subtly and sometimes openly-Maude modified and 
undermined Mitchell's proposals, showing for example that revenues were 
unlikely to support even the current minimal expenditure, so island 
13 Maude to Fox-Strangways 16 March 1 945 (Maude Papers Series J correspondence) . 
14 H.E. Maude, Memorandum on Post-War Reorganization and Administrative Poliq (Auckland: June 
1 945) . Copy in Maude Papers. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Maude to Vaskess 1 1  June 1 945 (Maude Papers Series J correspondence) . 
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governments would need to draw on grants from the central government, and 
that a central Colony government would still be needed for colony-wide services 
and infrastructure and to coordinate the work of the local governments, and 
that this would have to be European until islanders had been trained. He 
devoted much attention to fixing the location of the Colony headquarters that 
Mitchell had declared should not exist, and to the additional costs involved in 
Mitchell's supposedly cost-saving exercise of using officers on temporary 
secondment from Fiji. The Memorandum was also a vehicle for Maude's own 
particular hobby-horses of colonisation and cooperative schemes that were 
absent from or poorly considered in the official policy statement. He also took a 
side-swipe at the limited discussion on land in the official policy by prefacing his 
proposals regarding the Lands Commission with the comment: 
It will be generally agreed by all who have more than a superficial 
acquaintance with the Colony that by far the greatest problem to be 
faced by the administration is that of native lands . . .  and pointing out 
inconsistencies in Mitchell's proposals.17 
Sir Alexander Grantham, who had succeeded Mitchell as High Commissioner, 
sent copies of Maude's memo to the Colonial Office in October, with the 
comment that he agreed with it as a statement of policy and, 'subject to 
modification on points of detail', that it should be worked to. But it appears to 
have fallen on deaf ears at the Colonial Office-not being just delayed, but 
disappearing without trace. Soon afterwards, Maude was appointed to the 
position of Resident Commissioner-not to the position of Secretary to the 
High Commission that he would by then have preferred, and where he might 
have been able to pursue an official response. He effectively retired from the 
Colony in 1 948, on secondment to the South Pacific Commission, physically 
exhausted, isolated from his colleagues at Tarawa (where the new Colony 
headquarters had been established, contrary to his own preference), and 
frustrated by what he saw as the sabotage of his colonisation schemes by the 
man who succeeded him as Lands Commissioner. 
Although Maude was involved in the creation of the official postwar ten-year 
plan of reconstruction and development and had begun to implement some of 
its modest aims in his short tenure as Resident Commissioner, reconstruction 
was slow and other developments went almost totally in the opposite direction 
17 Apart from the fact that the settlement of native land disputes by Europeans is contrary to 
the general plan of training native organisations to take over their own affairs, it is obvious 
that the Administrative staff of the Colony, even though assisted by a permanent specialist 
officer, could not cope with the work. 
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to his proposals over the next two decades. While island councils with local 
responsibilities were provided for when the Native Governments Ordinance 
was finally enacted in 1 948, the 1 950s and 1 960s saw strong centralist tendencies 
in administration, with an increase in the authority of the Resident 
Commissioner. In contrast with the expectations of the 1 940s, money was fairly 
liberally thrown at the Colony, and developments in services and infrastructure 
were funded by grants that were beyond the level the island economies could 
hope to support, and that saw an increase in the number of Europeans in charge 
of projects and in the civil service. There was a lack of funding for education 
and a mismatch of training and employment prospects, uneven economic 
growth, increasing reliance on remittances from overseas labour, and the 
urbanisation of-and massive movement of population to-south Tarawa (an 
increase from 1 640 in 1 947 to 1 7,000 in 1 977) . 1 8 The only 'new' colonisation 
schemes were the resettlement in the Solomon Islands of the Gilbertese and 
Ellice Islanders from the Phoenix Islands Settlement Scheme that Harry had 
organised in the late 1 930s, which was thus implicitly branded as a failed 
undertaking. Later, education programs, the growth of a local civil service and a 
cash economy would erode the traditional role of the elders and of land as the 
basis of society-the foundations of Gilbertese society that Maude had sought 
to maintain. 
Given that Maude's and Mitchell's Memoranda did not significantly influence 
long-term policy for the Colony, why are these proposals now worth re-visiting? 
From my own perspective, as curator of the Harry and Honor Maude papers 
and author of an account of their life, they have intrinsic interest for their 
content and authorship. But their major interest in this forum is in what they 
reveal about colonial policy planning as a bureaucratic process-an aspect that 
has been implicit in many of the papers presented over these last two days, and 
worth specific discussion-and, incidentally, about the dangers of the uncritical 
use of official documents in the writing of history. 
In terms of content and authorship, it will be evident that these memoranda 
were not a 'vision for the future'. Mitchell was responding quickly to a rapidly 
assessed set of immediate circumstances with a view to solving a funding 
problem rather than contributing to the future of the islanders. The ideas in 
18 For fuller discussion of the post-war developments, see Barrie Macdonald, 'Local 
government in the Gilbert and Ellice Islands 1 892-1 969 ', Journal ef Administration Overseas, X:4 
(Oct. 1 971) ,  pp.280-92; and XI: l (Jan. 1 972), pp. 1 1 -27. See also Macdonald's Cinderellas ef the 
Empire, p.1 60ff; Kiribati, aspects ef history (Suva: Institute of  Pacific Studies, University of the 
South Pacific, 1 979) ; and Kiribati, a changing ato/f culture (Suva: Institute of Pacific Studies, 
University of the South Pacific, 1 985) ,  pp. 1 76-8. 
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Maude's Memorandum were deeply conservative, in the sense that Maude's 
principal concern was to maintain a traditional way of life based on land 
ownership and use and the reinforcement of traditional authority structures, 
overcoming the inherent limitations of island resources in the face of population 
growth not by introduced 'development' but by arranging for new settlements, 
where traditional lifestyles could be maintained. Was this unrealistic and 
sentimental? Maude had not been back to the islands for four years when he 
wrote his Memorandum, had not seen the effects of Japanese occupation on the 
people or on the likelihood of resumption of phosphate and copra production, 
and could not yet know what impact the British abandonment of the islands and 
islanders during the war and the American 'liberation' and subsequent extended 
stay on Tarawa might have had on local perceptions . At the same time Maude 
himself had not been out of the islands for fifteen years nor (beyond a brief and 
entirely unhappy few months in Pemba) had he experienced other styles or 
models of colonial administration. Certainly he would later be suspect (usually 
implicitly but more recently openly challenged) for his failure to endorse the 
economic and political modernisation that would be seen as the logical end of 
'development'. But perhaps it was not unlikely, as Maude believed, that in the 
immediate post-war period many islanders would have wanted a return to the 
known and relatively benign paternalistic structure of the colonial administration 
after the uncertainties or trauma of their war-time experiences. 
Beyond the documentation of the views of these officials about the future for 
an island community, Maude's and Mitchell's proposals reward study for what 
they reveal about colonial planning in general. For what has been most striking 
about the papers on policy and planning at the workshop is how deeply this was 
(with the exception of Palau, where an administration was being created, not 
reconstituted) a centralised bureaucratic process, often remote from the ground, 
and influenced by factors that had very little to do with island realities . 
Questions about why, for example, administrators in the Solomon Islands and 
PNG didn't learn from each other, miss the reality that (at this time at least) 
each colonial administration worked within its own strict linear and hierarchical 
world, and did not seek advice or exemplars from outside. Reports and 
proposals were generated by, and themselves generated, other reports and 
proposals: they might become policy with little discussion (as Mitchell's), be 
long deferred (as Marchant's on the future of the Solomon Islands) or fall into a 
hole, as with Maude's, but the end result might have as much to do with the 
vagaries of Colonial Office receptivity, individual official interest, work flows 
and other demands, as with the worth of the proposals themselves .  
Harry Maude knew this as  well as  anyone from his years within the Secretariat, 
and indeed in the early 1 930s had resigned himself to periods at Ocean Island 
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headquarters as an opportunity to put some of his own ideas into practice. This 
particular occasion, where he was seemingly faced with the situation of having 
to accept and implement policies with which he disagreed, presented him with 
the dilemma that anyone involved with government or universities over the last 
30 years will recognise: whether to resign, bunker down and wait for a more 
sympathetic climate, battle it out head to head with those in power, or join them 
and hope to obtain concession and change from within their ranks. Conflict and 
direct opposition didn't come naturally to Harry Maude, and his time in the 
service and especially at the Secretariat had reinforced a personal diffidence. 
Indeed, he was to say at this time that he had been acting so long for so many 
people that he had become if anything too used to thinking and working along 
lines set by others. The depth of Harry's disagreement with Mitchell's policy was 
also obscured by a particular personal quirk of elaborate deference when 
opposed to the ideas of a superior (a peculiarity evident later at the South Pacific 
Commission in his dealings with Ralph Bedell and, I understand, during his time 
at the Australian National University when he disagreed with Jim Davidson) ,  
which requires one to  read closely between the lines of his official 
communications. 
In writing about colonialism and the transition from colony to independence 
historians and others have tended to give most attention (and support) to those 
who have acted or spoken for change, rather than those who have worked from 
within to maintain the status quo. Maude and his role in the Gilbert and Ellice 
Islands Colony administration have rarely been directly criticised, but there are 
certainly suggestions in Barrie Macdonald's history of Kiribati and Tuvalu, 
Cindere!las of the the Empire1 that he was suspect as one who did not have the 
agenda of the 'inevitability' of not only self-government but political 
independence. His colonisation schemes of the 1 930s were later seen as flawed 
and he has taken a pasting (along with others) in Katerina Teaiwa's recent 
doctoral thesis on Banaba for his 'strategic' role in the Banaban 'solution' and 
for attempting to 'freeze' Gilbertese culture. 19 But one of the most interesting­
and to me heartening-aspects of an investigation like this is to see how little all 
19 Cinderellas ef the Empire, op.cit.; R.D. Bedford, 'Resettlement: solution to economic 
problems in the Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony' (M.A. thesis, University of Auckland, 
1 967);  Martin Silverman, Disconcerting issue: meaning and struggle in a re-settled Pacific community 
(Chicago, University of Chigago Press, 1 971) ;  Katerina Teaiwa, 'Tirawata irouia: re-presenting 
Banaban histories' (M.A. thesis, University of Hawaii, 1 998) ,  'Visualising te Kainga: History 
and Culture between Rabi, Banaba and Beyond' (PhD thesis, Australian National University, 
2002). It should be noted, however, that Maude was recently (as part of the 25th anniversary 
celebrations of the establishment of the Republic of I<iribati) awarded further honour and 
recognition for his contribution to recording and preserving 1-I<iribati history and culture. 
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this mattered in the long term: the drama, with all its pain and tensions for those 
involved, was played out in the very limited arena of the Colony administration. 
As historians we probably give too much weight to these formal proposals 
simply because they exist as documents and are easy to use as 'evidence'. So we 
examine minutely memos and reports that possibly had very little influence 
beyond the narrow confines of the bureaucracy that created them. When we 
look at the reality of the creation of such documents, and see the myriad and 
very human elements of conviction, experience, theoretical leanings, personal 
ambition, insecurities, conflicting demands and imperatives that went into their 
creation and adoption, it provides a nice counterfoil to cliched views of some 
monolithic power called colonialism or colonial policy against which historians 
of particular periods and other post-colonial critiques have been wont to rage or 
moralise. 
In truth, neither Maude's 1 945 Memorandum, nor that of Mitchell or the later 
ten-year Colony plan, were seminal. Rather than the immediate post-war period 
being defining years for the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, or even the refining years 
of some existing clear conceptual plan for the Colony, things muddled along for 
30 years with numerous changes of direction and focus . In this instance there 
was enough good intention, funding and mutual goodwill and respect to allow a 
peaceful transition to independence without radical or irrevocable alteration of 
the society or alienation of the people. This may be about as  good an outcome 
from colonialism as is possible. In Kiribati� aspects of history, written by I-Kiribati 
under the guidance of Ron Crocombe as part of the achievement of 
independence in 1 979, there is very little mention of Harry Maude, a conflation 
of Mitchell's and Maude's reports as if they had some unity of purpose, and a 
relatively minor place given to the whole period of colonial rule generally. Harry 
Maude the colonial administrator might have minded such an omission, but 
Harry Maude as a historian, and as someone with a deep and sincere affection 
and respect for the Gilbertese, should I think be content. 
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in Post-War Fij i  
Jacqueline Leckie 
If any word sums-up post-war health strategies in the Pacific it would be 
modernity, or at least the faith in an illusion of modernity. Health policies and 
practices have been a cornerstone of this especially within the colonial setting. 
After World War II the regional health initiatives of earlier years 1 were 
developed. Modern health programmes sought to probe and restructure 
intimate personal spaces.2 However, the label 'programmes' may seem grandiose 
when the realities and complications of grassroots development are 
reconstructed. This becomes apparent when addressing one of the most 
intimate and diffuse areas where the state, legal and medical agents and lay 
people extended control, care and possible cure: that is over the disordered 
mind. This chapter explores this in Fiji. 
It is problematic to assign the period after World War II until Fiji's 
independence in 1 970 as defining years in health, especially in mental health. 
There were, however, highly significant discursive and technological changes 
during this period. This was not, as is often assumed, a top-down process 
initiated by hegemonic policy but was initiated from 'experts' in the field. The 
most significant new technologies were shock and drug therapies, then 
considered modern and revolutionary in the treatment of the equally 'modern' 
ailments of madness . These technologies were highly experimental and medical 
experts had a relatively open arena in which to explore these. By 1 970, these 
technologies were entrenched within Fiji's psychiatric hospital, St Giles, but this 
was in a society in which development was uneven and in which health facilities 
were under resourced. 
1 Annie Stuart, 2002, 'Parasites Lost? The Rockefeller Foundation and the expansion of health 
services in the colonial South Pacific, 1 9 1 3- 1 939', unpublished PhD thesis, University of 
Canterbury. 
2 John Comaroff and Jean Comaroff, Ethnograpry and the Histon·cal Imagination (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1 992) ; Margaret Jolly, 'Other mothers: maternal "insouciance" and the 
depopulation debate in Fiji and Vanuatu, 1 890-1 930'. In K. Ram and M. Jolly (eds), Maternities 
and modernities. Colonial and postcolonial experiences in Asia and the Pacific (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1 998) ,  pp. 1 77-21 2; Ann Stoler, 'Making Empire Respectable: The Politics of 
Race and Sexual Morality in Twentieth-Century Colonial Cultures' in L. Lamphere, H. 
Ragone and P. Zavella (eds), Situated Lives: Gender and Culture in Everydqy Life (New York: 
Routledge, 1 997) ,  pp.374-399. 
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It is suggested here that medical technology reflects broader issues of social 
history and the contradictions of late colonial modernity which emphasised 
individual responsibility (the concept of a normal individual) as well as national 
or group conformity. These tensions are common to modernity but have special 
resonance within Pacific societies during the post-war period. Madness 
disrupted such agendas. We begin this chapter with an assessment of mental 
health services in Fiji after World War II and then explore some principal trends 
in mental health transition during the defining years, 1 945- 1 970. These include 
the radical technologies and changing discourses associated with mental illness, 
the localisation of mental health workers and broader expert analyses of this 
transitional period in mental health demographics ,  diagnosis and treatment. 
These analyses are especially pertinent to the general themes of this volume and 
indicate how experts assessed contemporary change and resultant problems in 
the Pacific during these years. 
Fiji's post-war mental health services: diagnosis and prognosis 
With a designated mental health facility, Fiji's institutional mental health services 
were relatively more developed compared to the rest  of the Pacific Islands and, 
indeed, to many other colonies. This facility started in 1 884 as the Public 
Lunatic Asylum, but by World War II it had been renamed the Suva Mental 
Hospital.3 By the end of the 1 960s, the name had changed to St Giles Hospital. 
Mental health provisions and legislation were considered more modern and 
humane in Fiji than in many other British colonies with, for example, a 
separation of criminals and those certified insane. Fiji, unlike many other 
colonies, did not follow the practice of establishing separate hospitals for 
Europeans, although inside hospitals, including the asylum, there were separate 
spaces and programmes for Europeans and non-Europeans. Mental health 
recovery programmes especially centred on work therapy, allowing patients to 
contribute to the hospital's maintenance. In 1 946 Fiji's Governor was 'impressed 
by the cleanliness and generally cheerful atmosphere: almost unique, I imagine, 
in an institution of  its kind.'4 
The Governor was presented with institutional tidiness during pre-arranged 
inspections, but impromptu visitors reported a more disturbing environment. In 
1 9  5 1 ,  Edward Woodward, Chair of the Board of  Visitors, arrived during a 
tropical downpour to find sixty men and women, many without blankets or 
3 Jacqueline Leckie, 'Modernity and the management of madness in colonial Fiji, Paideuma', 
Mitteilungen zur Kulturkunde, 50 (2004) . 
4 CP (Colonial Paper) 1 /48, Annual Report Mental Hospital Suva (AR), 1 946. 
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mattresses, sleeping on exposed verandahs .  5 This report raised the ire of 
unofficial members of Fiji's Legislative Council. 6 Other poor conditions 
included bars in all the wards, open drains through the centres of the Native 
wards and a severe shortage of bed space.7 Separate facilities for Europeans and 
Natives continued. Coercive regimes still predominated in the treatment of 
patients. Restraints included solitary confinement, withholding food, using 
straight jackets for confinement and water blasting patients (the 'hosepipe 
treatment') . 8 
Drugs were primarily administered for sedation and control or to alleviate 
conditions such as epilepsy and syphilis .  During the early 1 9  50s death rates were 
still high in Fiji's mental hospital, reflecting substandard institutional conditions 
and the incapacitated physical state of several patients upon arrival. Despite this, 
growing numbers of admissions and low discharge rates resulted in severe 
overcrowding in the mental hospital. 9 Bed space was officially limited to 80 
patients, but by 1 955 there were 143 patients resident in the hospital. 
Overcrowding was considered not only inhumane but was regarded as being 
conducive to encouraging violence and homosexuality: 'over-crowding of 
mentally deranged patients on verandahs requires constant supervision if the 
perils of homosexuality are to be prevented. '10 
Along with these negative diagnoses, the prognosis of the future of Fiji's 
growing mentally ill population shifted after World War II with the introduction 
of 'shock treatments' and the 'pharmacological revolution'. This gave optimism 
that some patients could be restored to 'normality', but the primary agenda was 
to reduce overcrowding and return patients to the community. Subsequently 
work therapy came to be renamed 'occupational therapy', considered more 
possible with the new technologies that controlled but allowed a degree of 
permissible 'normal' functioning. J okapeci Koroi, Matron of the Colonial War 
Memorial Hospital, observed this in 1 964: 'most of the patients out on a picnic, 
remaining ones playing games in the recreation room. What vast progress in the 
treatment of these people. ' 1 1  But the modern post-war technologies lauded so 
much in mental health were equally accused of numbing patient motivation, so 
5 Unpublished AR, 1 954 (St Giles). 
6 F48/524, Complaints re treatment of patients, Director Medical Services to Colonial 
Secretary, 4 Oct. 1 955. 
7 Oral testimony has confirmed these accounts. 
8 F48/4/5, AR, 1 938. 
9 CP 1 2/ 68, AR, 1 966. 
10  AR, 1 954. 
11 Medical Case Book, St Giles, 6 October 1 964. 
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that in 1 967 Dr Macgregor, Superintendent of St Giles, identified a lack of 
occupation as a major problem for patients . 1 2  
After World War II the demographic profiles of patients certified as mentally ill 
shifted radically. Increasingly a higher percentage of admissions were ethnic 
Fijians, compared to Inda-Fijians and other ethnicities. 1 3 Even more striking was 
a gendered shift. Before World War II, women comprised about 25 percent of 
admissions but between 1 955 and 1 960 males and females had almost equal 
admission rates. Ethnicity also was significant with more Inda-Fijian females 
admitted to St Giles than Fijian females. Indeed between 1 955-60 more Indo­
Fijian females than Inda-Fijian males were certified under mental health 
legislation. 
These ethnic and gender patterns become even more sharply defined when age 
is considered. The post war years saw a much greater number of young patients 
being admitted to the hospital than before. Records indicate that between 1 94 7 
and 1 962 at least 25 young people aged sixteen and under were admitted to St 
Giles. The youngest was an Inda-Fijian girl admitted in 1 96 1  aged seven with a 
diagnosis of post-encephalic dementia. Indeed the majority of these young 
patients were female Inda-Fijians, although most were older. Diagnoses ranged 
from paranoia to schizophrenia, to hysteria, to idiot. One thirteen year old was 
deemed a psychopath. 
It is beyond the scope of this chapter to fully understand these patterns. An 
obvious question is why some Inda-Fijian females approaching menarche were 
certified as insane and admitted to the mental hospital? Very young individuals 
can be seriously disruptive to self and others and require intensive care. Perhaps 
in post-war Fiji some families and communities increasingly accessed medical 
and state institutions like the mental hospital, rather than keeping 'madness in 
the family. '  Dr Sell, Superintendent of St Giles, observed this trend in 1 969: 
'Ironically, the more adequate provision of facilities for the care and treatment 
of the mentally ill increases the rate of hospitalization.' 14 
Localisation of mental health workers 
A defining feature of the public service in the Pacific during these years was the 
12 AR, 1 967. 
1 3 Demographic patterns discussed here have been drawn from my analysis of over 2500 
admissions to St Giles between 1 884 -1 964. 
14 C48/1 7, Sell to Director Medical Services, 29 June 1 969. 
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move towards the 'localisation' of public sector workers. 1 5  As in other sectors, 
this had contradictory implications for health services. The commitment to 
localise health personnel tended to be at lower and middle levels, while 
expatriates retained increasingly more specialised roles, both as scientific experts 
and in exercising executive authority. To a limited degree the rhetoric of 
localisation had some reality but it was haphazard, slow and reinforced 
expatriate authority. This precipitated the strong unions that emerged in the 
public sector in Fiji after independence. 1 6  
The primary front line staff at the mental hospital had always been the 
attendants. They were also referred to as warders and, by the 1 940s, as orderlies 
and as 'nurses' by the 1 960s. The 1 950s and 1 960s were in a sense defining years 
in the transition between the custodial function of the institution to the 1 980s 
when modern psychiatric clinical nursing was introduced. Two processes 
became entwined during this period: the modernisation of nursing care for the 
mentally ill and the localisation of nursing staff. 
Long before World War II, Samoans had established their dominance in the 
custodial and caring roles at Fiji' s mental hospital. This drew concern from Fiji's 
Great Council of Chiefs which in 1 940 urged government to employ more 
Fijians and Indians as warders. 17  In 1 9  54 this policy was entrusted to the newly 
appointed Head Attendant Charlie Sachs, so that by the 1 960s very few 
Samoans were employed at the hospital. Despite the high proportion of Indo 
Fijian patients, an Indo Fijian attendant was not appointed until 1 966. Sachs was 
also dedicated to improving nursing and physical conditions and was 
instrumental in the radical decline in death rates at the mental hospital. 1 8 
According to Dr Macgregor before 1 95 1 ,  1 0-30 percent of patients died within 
two years of admission to the hospital but after Sachs' arrival this rate fell to five 
percent and by 1 96 1 ,  one percent. 19 He energetically worked with the new 
modern technologies so patients were discharged much earlier than before. 
Before 1 96 1 ,  only 35-65 percent of patients were discharged within two years 
but after the new drug regime was implemented in 1 96 1 ,  97 percent left the 
15 Jacqueline Leckie 1 997, To Labour with the State; The Fiji Public Seroice Association (Dunedin: 
University of Otago Press, 1 997), pp.41 -2. 
16  Ibid: 49-72. 
17  F29/ 1 59, Extract, Proceedings Council of Chiefs 1 940, resolution 4. 
1 8 CP 1 2/68, AR, 1 964. 
19  D.F. Macgregor, 'Notes of a Meeting Between Three South Pacific Psychiatrists', in South 
Pacific Commission, Mental Health In The South Pacific: Report ef a meeting ef experts held at Suva (Fiji) 
from 23 to 27 Mqy. Technical Paper no 1 54. (South Pacific Commission, Noumea, 1 967) ,  pp. 1 -
1 0. 
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hospital within two years. Sachs also encouraged work and occupational therapy 
for in-patients. 
Post World War II mental illness technologies in Fiji 
From a European standpoint, Fiji may have been considered an island in a 
distant sea, but local medical experts were in touch with global psychiatric 
modernity, notably through the application and experimentation of highly 
invasive therapies. These relied upon diagnosis . Mental health strategies 
therefore echoed the globally increased faith in, and the use of, testing in 
medicine after World War II.20 Tests became more prevalent in diagnosis and 
also represented the application of scientific measurement to determine normal 
and abnormal bodies, minds and social behaviour. Discourse in social service 
agencies now included delinquency and deviancy. Fiji's first qualified 
psychiatrist, Dr Macgregor, recognised that mental illness differed from one 
country to another but 'it was something capable of being measured or counted 
once it had been defined. '21 In Fiji tests were primarily orientated to finding an 
organic cause and possible treatment of madness. Blood, sputum, stool and 
venereal tests were common for most new admissions to the mental hospital 
after World War II. This was an adjunct to, and sometimes replaced by, the 
subjective and lay evidence provided in earlier admission papers for patients. 
The Kahn blood test was favoured during these years as it was relatively 
inexpensive, considered valid in diagnosing syphilis (despite its instigator later 
dismissing this test as inaccurate) and could screen for tuberculosis, malaria, 
leprosy and dietary deficiencies, such as anaemia. The regular testing of  patients' 
physical conditions in the mental hospital probably contributed to declining 
death rates there. 
In contrast to the utilisation of organic tests for mentally ill patients, there were 
few of the psychological tests favoured in institutions elsewhere, notably the 
USA. Such tests were expensive, time consuming, required expertise for 
administration and analysis and problematic when applied to languages and 
cultures outside the tests' norms. Limited psychological testing was applied 
during the 1 960s in Fiji: 
20 Testing was also increasingly administered to measure intellectual normality during this 
period. By 1 937 the Fiji Test of General Ability attempted to measure the intellectual 
capabilities o f  school children in Fiji. By the 1950s the Fiji Institute of Educational Research 
was concerned with the standardisation of attainment tests. M. Bennett, 'Patterns of 
psychological test response as indicators of cognitive growth in Fiji' (delivered 1 3  October 
1970),Transactions and Proceedings of the Fiji Sociery far the Years 1968 to 1972, 1 2(1 978), p.96. 
21 Macgregor, 1967: 1 .  
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On testing he stated that he knew what a proverb was but could not 
be bothered to explain what he meant. There was a drift towards 
concretization (horrible word) in his attempt to explain the 
meanings of proverbs. The 1 00-7 was performed rather slowly -with 
a break in the 60's -but he carried on to the end. He was able to 
repeat 7 digits forwards after studying the figures for 1 1 /2 minutes 
but could not repeat them backwards though he understood what 
was required22 
During the mid-twentieth century, shock and coma therapies had a radical 
impact upon mental health therapy throughout the world. These were 
enthusiastically applied to Fiji where convulsions to the brain were induced by 
Cardiazol (Metrazol) and electro-convulsive therapy (ECT) . Cardiazol, along 
with insulin therapy, soon had limited use in the technologies of global 
psychiatry.23 This was partly because of the dangers and severe side effects from 
insulin and Metrazol and the apparent ease and acceptance of ECT. The 
experimental nature of these technologies meant that one method quickly 
superseded another. 
A few people in Fiji were administered insulin coma therapy, but fortunately 
when this was introduced to Fiji in 1 955 it was under the rubric of modified 
insulin therapy. This was important because insulin coma therapy had a very 
high mortality rate and required intensive and skilled medical supervision. 
Modified insulin therapy still carried potentially life-threatening risks. Although 
it required trained nurses, attendants who were not qualified nurses oversaw 
insulin therapy at St Giles. Patients were not supposed to fall into coma or 
experience seizures, but records from St Giles show that some did. The dosages 
of insulin administered sometimes exceeded twice the international guidelines. 
Experimentation continued with selected patients being injected with Cardiozol 
to induce convulsions. An early experimental subject was Mrs DV,24 an Indo­
Fijian woman who was initially diagnosed with hysteria sixteen days after 
childbirth. Her diagnoses changed to schizophrenia and later manic depression 
during a lifetime of convulsive and drug therapies. This began in 1 948 with a 
course of 22 Cardiozol injections. This form of therapy was traumatic: 
the patient does not lose consciousness before the onset of the 
22 Medical Superintendents' files, St Giles. 
23 Edward Shorter, A History of P[Jchiatry; From the Era of the A[]lum to the Age of Prozac (New 
York/Toronto: John Wiley & Sons, 1 997), pp.207-21 7. 
24 This is the author's abbreviation. 
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convulsion, which starts several seconds after the injection. During 
this interval he experiences a very unpleasant feeling of impending 
death and precordial sensations which are remembered as a 
frightening experience, and the fear derived therefrom is a severe 
setback for subsequent treatments . . .  Failure to obtain a convulsion 
makes the patient very apprehensive and uncomfortable.25 
Mrs DV undoubtedly would have undergone these terrifying experiences 
especially as she did not always have convulsions after being injected. Her veins 
thrombosed and she regressed and strongly resisted injections towards the end 
of her Cardiozol therapy. Although she was discharged, her mental condition 
worsened and she was readmitted to St Giles for ECT therapy. 
ECT for humans had developed from experiments with pigs in a slaughterhouse 
in Rome. By the 1 940s-1 9 50s it was being extensively used in the treatment of 
schizophrenia and depression. Dr Oldmeadow introduced ECT to Fiji in 1 94 7 
amidst acclaim from the mental hospital's Board of  Governors: 'this public­
spirited service on the part of Dr. Oldmeadow deserves commendation.'26 ECT 
was at the forefront of other modern scientific therapies applied to the mentally 
ill in Fiji. Besides insulin and Cardiozol, other modern therapeutic trials at St 
Giles included 'deep sleep' or Pentothal (thiopentone) narcosis (1 947) and 'acid' 
treatment (1 954).27 
ECT, like many other modern medical technologies, gave as many problems as 
therapeutic benefits. During the early years of its application in Fiji, electric 
currents were difficult to control and anaesthetics and muscle relaxants were not 
used. Some patients sustained injuries such as broken teeth and bones. 
Undoubtedly there was memory loss and trauma; in 1 968 a patient remained 
unconscious for three hours following convulsions from ECT. The rationale for 
such intervention was 'treatment', but oral and written evidence indicates that 
the new technologies were also a threat or means of control and punishment. 28 
The medical superintendent's handwritten reports during the early 1 950s clearly 
25 Lothar B. Kalinowsky, 'Convulsive Shock Treatment', in Silvano Arieti (ed.), American 
Handbook ef P!]chiatry Volume 2 (New York: Basic Books, 1 9  59), p . 1 500. 
26 F48/ 1 0, Board of Visitors, annual report, 1 949. 
27 It is not clear what this was. Modern psychiatric treatments during the 1 940s administered 
nicotinic acid and glutanic acid, along with vitamin therapy treatments to treat confusion and 
delirium, especially with senile psychoses. See A. Ferraro, 'Organic Conditions: Senile 
Psychosis', in Silvano Arieti (ed.), American Handbook ef P!Jchiatry Volume 2 (New York: Basic 
Books, 1 959), p . 1041 . 
28 c.f. Joel Braslow, Mental Ills and Bodify Cures; P!]chiatric Treatment in the First ha!f ef the Twentieth 
Century (Berkley: University of California Press, 1 997), pp. 1 04-1 1 1 .  
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state that ECT was administered to pacify 'rowdy' patients. Shock therapy 
appears to have been widely administered to patients with a wide range of 
conditions, including epilepsy. Records indicate that patients were separated 
according to their suitability for ECT. Gender also appeared to underscore the 
application of shock treatments. Fiji probably reflected global patterns where 
women more than men were more susceptible to such therapy. 29 
A major breakthrough came when the 'pharmacological revolution' of 
psychotropic drugs offered the possibility for seriously mentally ill patients to 
participate more in institutional treatment and in the community outside the 
institution. This usually required passivity and being able to work. Some new 
psychotropic drugs were dispensed in Fiji from the late 1 940s but the major 
shift came in 1 955 with the introduction of Largactil (chlorpromazine) , only two 
years after its adoption in Western Europe and the USA.30 Largactil was both a 
major sedative and an anti-psychotic drug, offering the potential for severely 
disruptive mentally ill people to function within institutional and community 
environments . Dr Macgregor articulated this when he outlined the 'therapeutic 
revolution of 1 961 ': 
The regime used was that of bringing patients rapidly under control 
with large doses of the appropriate drug, followed by a gradual 
reduction to the minimal dose compatible with social integration 
within the hospital environment. Provided that the patient remained 
reasonably well on this maintenance dosage, he was retained in 
hospital for as long as improvement of his condition continued and 
was then, wherever possible, released on trial to continue therapy on a 
domicillary basis.31 
This quotation also indicates how 'curative drugs' such as Largactil could be 
used to restrain patients in Fiji, as was the practice in hospitals elsewhere.32 
The adoption of pharmaceutical technology as a mainstay in the treatment of 
Fiji's mentally ill necessitated a shift in expertise among primary mental health 
workers. By the 1 980s, primary mental health workers were being designated as 
'nurses' rather than attendants or warders. Although many still lacked formal 
29 Elaine Showalter, The Female Malaefy. Women Madness, and English Culture, 1830- 1980, (New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1 985), pp.205-207. 
30 Medical Case Book, St Giles, 14 March 1955. 
31 CP 39/62, AR, 1 961 : 1 0. 
32 Diana Gittens, Madness in its Place: Narratives of Severalls Hospita� 1913-1997 (London/New 
York: Routledge, 1 998) ,  pp.210-21 1 .  
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trammg in the new technologies , they had a primary role as nurses with the 
application of shock and drug therapies. Mental health attendants witnessed the 
profound side effects of ECT and drugs: 33 
Indeed, this greater emphasis on nursing, rather than discipline and 
restraint, required from the staff was brought about, in part, by the 
side affects of the drugs used, since some patients felt these effects to 
quite a marked degree.34 
The new technologies of testing, drugs and shock therapies represented Fiji's 
arrival in psychiatric modernity, but this was often at odds with the wider social 
and economic environment. Contrary to initial expectations, admission 
numbers, particularly re-admission numbers, did not fall. The numerical decline 
of in-patients was fleeting. Instead, a revolving door scenario emerged whereby 
patients were hospitalised for shorter periods than before. They were then 
released on trial but many were soon readmitted to the mental hospital. The 
primary cause was attributed to patients defaulting on their medications. Fiji 
lacked infrastructure outside the hospital to provide adequate community care 
for the mentally ill. Social therapy programmes, or psychotherapy, were non­
existent. By 1 963, authorities recognised that patients were being discharged 
prematurely from the hospital: 'it is becoming apparent that in the less 
sophisticated social climate of Fiji, a more conservative attitude is required.n5 
Medical supplies were unreliable, especially in outlying areas. This applied 
particularly to psychiatric drugs. Moreover, there was almost no training in 
psychiatric medicine and nursing. While at some levels Fiji's mental health 
services were in a transitional stage, the new expertise did not filter down to 
community levels and tended to remain the preserve of expatriates. 
Cultural understandings of madness also contributed towards the limited 
success of the new technologies .  Madness was often interpreted as punishment 
for a wrongdoing by an individual, family or community. Within many Indo­
Fijian families, public acknowledgement of a mental illness tended to bring 
dishonour upon the family. Like elsewhere, silence and denial often surrounded 
33 Side effects could include syndromes that were antichorinergic, extrapyramidal, 
parkinsonism-like and which could eventually result in tardive dyskinesia. The effects on the 
patient could range from dry mouth to blurred vision, constipation, urinary hesitance, falls, 
bizarre muscle contractions, sedation, emotional blunting, withdrawal, apathy, shuffling gait, 
akathisia (motor restlessness), involuntary bizarre grimacing, lip smacking and tongue 
protrusion. The effects depended upon the severity and length of medication and whether or 
not counter-active medication was prescribed. 
34 CP 39/62, AR, 1 961 :  1 0. 
35 AR, 1 963. 
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mental illness in Fiji. Even when family support was forthcoming, education 
about the effects of the new medications was usually absent. Compounding 
these problems were the physiological implications of the new neuroleptic drugs 
on patients. Rather than returning a person to normality, medication side effects 
often accentuated their difference and inhibited acceptance back into the 
community. A sudden cessation of high levels of psychotropic drugs could have 
a rebound effect and accentuate the primary mental condition. As Michael 
Goddard observed with the introduction of psychiatric technologies in Papua 
New Guinea, there was no community level 'capitulation to authoritative 
discourse about mental illness'. 36 Instead, the medical-scientific treatment of 
madness depended on the ability of doctors and technologies to return 
individuals to social normality. Once that normality appeared restored there was 
little motivation for families to insist upon individuals continuing with 
medication. 
Despite the need for community support, the responsibility for compliance with 
drug regimes increasingly became an individual's responsibility. For example, in 
1 948 Prakash, aged nineteen, was diagnosed with schizophrenia. He was treated 
with Cardiozol injections and had to sign a statement upon discharge promising 
to return for further 'injections as directed by the doctor and attendants'. He 
had to agree 'that the injections are necessary and are for my own good and I 
intend to keep on having them for as long as my doctor advises'. Prakash 
ignored this contract and when readmitted to the hospital his diagnosis had 
shifted to depression.37 
Expert analyses of mental health transition 
The development of regional initiatives in Pacific health policies after World 
War II followed earlier initiatives of the Rockefeller Foundation.38 The South 
Pacific Commission (SPC), established in 1 947, was pivotal in this regional 
approach. Policies based on scientific research and expertise were increasingly to 
the fore in identifying and rectifying problems linked with modernisation in the 
Pacific. The tenth session of the SPC in 1 952 'was concerned about the 
problems of mental health which would undoubtedly become more and more 
acute in the years to come' and adopted a causal, environmental model of 
36 Michael Goddard, 'Psychiatry in Papua New Guinea; A Critique', unpublished PhD thesis, 
University of Auckland, 1 988, p. 190. 
37 Admission papers, St Giles. Prakash is a pseudonym. 
38 Stuart, 2002. 
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mental illness.39 This linked the expansion of urbanisation and associated urban 
perils with a rise in mental disorders and 'the rapid and irreversible acculturation 
of islands peoples'.40 This paradigm echoed the detribalisation model in vogue 
with anthropologists in African colonies during these years. The sixth South 
Pacific Conference held at Lae in 1 965 recommended 'that Governments 
inquire into the causes of urbanization and promote measures to minimize the 
serious social and sanitary problems (physical and mental health) which it 
creates'.41 As a result three leading psychiatrists in the South Pacific, Drs D. F. 
Macgregor, B. G. Burton-Bradley and G. Zeldine met in Suva and Noumea 
during 1 966. Macgregor and Burton-Bradley were respectively employed by the 
colonial governments of Fiji and the Territory of Papua and New Guinea, but 
Macgregor's expertise lay in clinical psychiatry while Burton-Bradley's penchant 
was ethnopsychiatry. 42 Zeldine, a psychiatrist with the French Army in New 
Caledonia, preferred a public health model and quantitative research. They all 
endorsed the linkage between pathological mental states, urbanisation and 
modernity: 
[I] t is logical to direct our efforts at those causes of tensions known to 
us to be stressful conditions of urbanization as contributing factors of 
mental disorders; these, in our territories, have included such things 
as over-urbanization, interterritorial migrant rootlessness (anomie), 
discriminations, educational and accultural disparities of spouses, 
problems of retirement, intergenerational conflicts, faulty race 
relations, and certain deleterious consequences, on the psychiatric 
level, of tourism.43 
Delinquency, alcoholism and prostitution were also correlated with mental 
illness. During the following decade some ethno-psychiatrists added 
decolonisation to the list of psychological stress factors.44 
Medical experts, therefore, represented the post-war decades as a period 
39 South Pacific Commission, Mental Health In The South Pacific: Report of a meeting of experts held 
at Suva (F!Ji)Jrom 19 to 22 Mqy and at Noumia (New Caledonia) from 23 to 27 Mery. Technical 
Paper no 1 54. (South Pacific Commission, Noumea, 1 967), p.vi. 
40 Ibid, p.v. 
41 Ibid, p.vi. 
42 B.G. Burton-Bradley, I_,()ngLong: Transcultural Prychiatry in Papua New Guinea (Port Moresby: 
Public Health Department, 1973); B.G. Burton-Bradley, Stone Age Crisis: A Prychiatric Appraisal 
(Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1 975) .  
43 South Pacific Commission, 1 967, p.vii. 
44 H.B.M. Murphy, Mental Health In The South Pacific: Report on a Tour of Pacific Tem'tories, 
September 1977-March 1978 (Noumfa South Pacific Commission, 1 978) ,  pp.39-40. 
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conducive to stress, manifested through what were considered to be social and 
mental pathologies. This model juxtaposed modernity with a stress free 
'primitive' world. Goddard suggests this derived from early functionalist 
anthropology that depicted primitive societies to be in a state of equilibrium.45 
Madness functioned as a 'safety valve' to restore harmony. 
The wisdom of ethno and cross-cultural psychiatry was also used to explain 
mental disorders during the post-war years. Fiji's ethnic complexity provided an 
ideal social laboratory for ethno-psychiatry: 'As a meeting place of three or more 
very different cultures, the Fiji Islands form an ideal natural laboratory for the 
sociologist'.46 This perception was in keeping with the pervasiveness of race as a 
category for organising social, economic and political structures in Fiji. 
Macgregor refined the 'modernisation and mental stress' model with his reading 
of social change and race. A rise in Fijian admissions to the mental hospital after 
1 95 1  reflected :47 
The history of the Fijians over this period has been one of sustained 
resistance to urban and commercial influences, weakening since the 
war, but still a major source of conflict between traditionally minded 
Fijians and those wishing to take advantage of the technological and 
educational opportunities which are now open to them.48 
The urbanisation model also provided explanation for a post-war rise in the 
admission of lndians49 who, by 1 95 1 ,  'had already established their pre-eminence 
in all business matters and their numerical preponderance in urban centres' . 50 
This contrasted with an image of primitive harmony: 'Commercial folk in any 
country tended to be acquisitive, litigious, and hypochondriacal; the peace of 
mind of Fijians might be due to their unwillingness to enter the commercial 
"rat-race"'. 51 However, my research indicates that Fijians (and not necessarily 
middle class achievers and entrepreneurs) have been mental patients at the 
asylum since its inception. 
45 Goddard, 1 988, pp.81 -82. 
46 Glen D. Wilson, '"Europeanisation" and Admission to Mental Hospital in the Fiji Islands', 
New Zealand Medical Journal 64 (1 965) ,  p.364. 
47 Rates for young adult Fijian men trebled during 19 51 - 1 966 and doubled for young adult 
Fijian women between 1 956-1 966. See Macgregor, 1 967, p.4. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. Rates for young adult Indo- Fijian men almost doubled 19 56-1 966 while among for 
young adult Indo-Fijian women rates doubled between 1 951 -1966. 
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid, p.5. 
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Ethnic stereotypes also crossed over into the discourse and technologies of 
mental health in Fiji. Dr Karim, a medical officer at St Giles appointed in 1 96 1 ,  
told m e  in 1 999 that h e  had 'the impression working here that . . .  certain types 
of illnesses were more common in different races. '  He then qualified any 
correlation between ethnicity and psychiatric nosology: 'that was just 
impression, later on when we started looking at the figures and so forth it 
doesn't hold up. '  Dr Macgregor was also careful to emphasise the difference 
between outward presentation and psychiatric diagnoses along ethnic lines: 
I do not know why it is but here in Fiji I have found that depressive 
illness is very liable to present as something else: the Fijians start off 
with a fighting frenzy, the Indians with a paranoid reaction and the 
Europeans with a severe anxiety. 52 
Fiji's cultural complexity offered fertile ground for the global drug trials that 
proliferated during the pharmacological revolution. Patients at Fiji's mental 
hospital could be studied within a controlled environment where reliable 
statistics were recorded according to race. Medical consultants were keen to trial 
new products, especially drugs that were unavailable or not affordable in Fiji. In 
1 963, at the suggestion of pharmaceutical giant Searle, Fiji's Medical Department 
trialed a few patients with the anti-psychotic drug Serenace (Haloperidol) .53 Dr 
Macgregor suggested that 'we get as big a free sample as the makers will give us . 
I would undertake to report to them of its use if their response were generous 
enough.'  The following year Macgregor responded to literature from 
pharmaceutical multinational Roche promoting the sedative Mogadon, by 
requesting a sample to conduct an open, uncontrolled trial, before ascertaining if 
a fuller investigation was warranted. A visit to Suva in 1 965 by an expert from 
the Medical Trials Unit of May and Baker prompted proposals for a 
comparative trial of antipsychotic drugs Majeptil and Neulactil (pericyazine) in 
the control of 'acute maniacal excitement'.54 
Canadian transcultural psychiatrist, H. B. M. Murphy, visited Fiji in 1 973. He 
learned (as I later would through oral testimonies) that health workers tended to 
administer higher doses of Largactil to Fijians than Inda-Fijians. He offered to 
52 AR, 1967. 
531 2 Nov 1 964: Director Medical Services to Medical Superintendent St Giles MD 7 /7 / 1 .  The 
only patient who had 'considerable benefit' from this trial was classified as acutely mentally ill, 
in contrast to the other participants, considered chronically ill. The new medication offered 
little improvement to their mental states, as had been found with several earlier therapies 
administered to them. 
54 Correspondence from Dr Rowe to Macgregor, 8 November 1 965 (St Giles). 
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supply the drug Stelazine for trials with patients at St Giles. This followed from 
a conversation with Dr Hawley, Dean of the Fiji School of Medicine, in 1 973. 
Hawley's impression was that 'the Fijian, although relatively resistant to 
chlorpromazine, was very sensitive to phenobarbitone.'55 
This was also a period when ethno-psychiatry sought to validate its expertise by 
classifying 'culture bound syndromes' or mental states specific to certain 
cultures. 56 In his correspondence with the medical trials department of 
pharmaceutical company Roche, Dr Macgregor initiated the identification of 
Pacific mental syndromes: 
the commonest form of breakdown in the South Pacific is an acute 
excitement with insomnia. The insomnia often persists after the 
daytime excitement has subsided. The next commonest trouble is 
insomnia in expatriates unable to relax at night because of the 
discomforts and unfamiliar noises of tropical life.57 
Drs Price and Karim correlated a Pacific syndrome with the Fiji syndrome, 
locally known as Matiruku. This literally means 'low tide in the morning' and in 
research undertaken by Price and Karim, respondents considered that affected 
people would be most severely affected when the tide was very high or very 
low:58 
(P]ersons resident in this part of the world are liable for a variety of 
causes to burst out in a transient, paroxysmal, frenzied turmoil of 
excitement or confusion. With or without a corresponding degree of 
psychotic disturbance such as thought disorder, hallucinations, 
delusions and disturbances of the will. One is often surprised by the 
triviality of the cause, the speed of recovery and the absence of after­
effects; the rarity of major mental illness as a cause is also surprising. 59 
The Fiji Syndrome was eventually discounted, but like other culture-bound 
syndromes it represented a curious mix of cultural and environmental analysis, 
and faith in medical scientific technologies that often pervaded health discourse 
in developing countries. Although there were concessions to hybrid transitions 
55 Correspondence on STG 2/3, 4 October 1 973 (St Giles). 
56 See Roland Littlewood and Simon Dein, Cultural P[Jchiatry and Medical Anthropology. An 
Introduction and Reader (London/New Brunswick: Athlone Press, 2000). 
57 MS 8, 24 December 1 965 (St Giles) . 
58 J. Price and I., 1 978, 'Matiruku, a Fijian Madness; An Initial Assessment', British Journal ef 
P[Jchiatry 1 33 (1965), pp.288-330. 
59 CP 1 2/ 68, AR, 1 966, para. 108. 
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between local and introduced medical systems, the preference clearly fell to 
utilising modern technology. 
In tropical countries mental disorders are of sudden onset and short 
duration and it would be more economical if all medical officers knew 
how to treat psychiatric cases in emergencies with the drugs now 
available.60 
This advice did not address the discrepancy between instruction in the new 
technologies and the realities of how such resources were transferred to local 
sites, especially outside the capital cities. 
Madness and the Defining Years 
The post-war years in the Pacific accentuated ambiguities within colonialism and 
development that would erupt through the crises of postcolonialism. This 
chapter has touched on one aspect of this period: health services and specifically 
mental health. Mental health services within the Pacific Islands were extremely 
limited and mostly non-existent. The discourse and technologies of introduced 
mental health control and care is highly relevant because it concerns not only 
colonial subjects ' minds and bodies but also colonial definitions of normal and 
abnormal. Culture and ethnicity in Fiji complicated these definitions. 
After World War II, the promise of modernity and progress permeated modern 
Western medicine. Dr Zeldine declared: 'Psychiatry should feel honoured at 
being thus promoted from the "alchemy" of personal contacts between doctor 
and patient to the status of a necessary tool of public health in its preventative 
aspects. '  61 This vision reached out to colonies like Fiji. The prize was 
development yet experts such as Macgregor, Burton-Bradley and Zeldine 
echoed global discourse that the increase in mental illness was a corollary of 
modernization, urbanization and 'deculturation'. These processes were 
constructed narratives that attempted to make sense of the social, economic and 
political change during the post-war years. Modernisation was never complete, 
urbanization was haphazard in the Pacific and cultures were not lost but 
changed as people negotiated identities against the structural realities .  The 'mad' 
were too easily dismissed by experts as casualties of the broader social changes of 
the defining years. Regardless of the truth in that social narrative, mad people 
60 South Pacific Commission, 1 967 (above), p.viii. 
6 1 G. Zeldine, 'Preliminary Opinion Survey on Urbanization of Melanesians in Noumea (May 
1 966)', in South Pacific Commission, Mental Health In The South Pacific: Report of a meeting of experts 
held at Suva (Fiji) from 19 to 22 Mqy, and at Noumia (New Caledonia) from 23 to 27 Mqy, Technical 
Paper no 1 54. SPC, 1967, p.21 . 
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were controlled and treated as individuals who would respond to the new 
therapies. Despite the wonders of ECT and Largactil, the post-war years in Fiji 
could never really address the ambiguities between disordered minds being 
increasingly defined as individual subjects but also being perceived according to 
collective identities. Moreover, these individuals were expected to function 
within a society where resources were scarce and mental health was never a 
priority. 
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Education for citizenship or tool of evangelism? :  
All Saints' Anglican School, Labasa, 1952-1970 
Christine Weir 
In the middle of 1 958, All Saints' Anglican School in Labasa, the main town on 
Fiji's second island of Vanua Levu, welcomed a series of visitors, all of whom 
recorded their impressions in the school's log-book. 1 Bruce McCall, secretary of 
the Australian [Anglican] Board of Missions (the school's sponsors) , described 
the school as 'very impressive', Mr Gwilliam of the Colonial Office commented 
on the 'opportunities for lively and creative activity' and the Indian High 
Commissioner thought 'the discipline excellent and the girls and boys neatly 
dressed and well behaved . . .  they looked intelligent'. At the end of the year 
eighteen boys were accepted from Class 8 into secondary schools and the 
Headmaster Rev. K. Appasamy could reflect on a highly successful year. 
Indeed, the All Saint's school log-books of the 1 9  50s and 1 960s show a thriving 
school. At a constant enrolment of around 400 students in Classes 1 to 8, All 
Saints' was one of the largest schools in the district. It had a boarding hostel for 
around 20 boys, but most of the students were from the town and immediate 
surrounds-the children of shopkeepers, tradesmen and civil servants. With 
fees of 30 shillings a term, 2 it was beyond the financial reach of most small 
agriculturalists. This was acknowledged by the governing board, but they had 
little alternative if the school was to keep afloat financially. Rev. Appasamy 
commented in 1 956 :  'What we lose in quantity may be balanced in quality'. He 
noted with approval that in July 1 957 75 percent of the boys were wearing 
shoes, clearly a marker of affluence. 3 While it had a majority of Inda-Fijian 
students , All Saints' offered the relatively rare experience of a multi-racial 
education, with around 50-60 Fijian and part-European students, according to 
the few figures available of the racial composition of the school. Both Hindi and 
Fijian were taught alongside English. The school was co-educational in the first 
three years, the girls (or at least those whose parents allowed them to continue, a 
proportion which grew over the period) then going mostly to St Mary's 
1 The All Saints' School log-books for 1 924-39 and 1952-70 have been filmed by the Pacific 
Manuscripts Bureau, ANU. They are to be found at PMB 430 and are referenced hereafter as 
ASL. General information in this chapter, unless otherwise indicated, comes from these log­
books. 
2 This was the figure in 1 956. Boarding fees were then £1 0 a term, or £7 plus 60 lb of rice 
(ASL 27-1 1 - 1 956) . 
3 ASL 27-1 1 - 1 956, 28-6-1 957. 
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Anglican School, two miles away. 
It was a lively school. The school's scout troop went on regular hikes and 
camps: in 1 952 they climbed the peak of Bukalevu in March, and went on a 
'tramping and island camp' in June. In 1 958, and in later years, the school troop 
won the local proficiency challenge. There was a Brownie pack for the young 
girls. The school regularly displayed produce at the Young Farmers' Club 
Shows, sometimes winning prizes. The grounds were planted with shrubs and 
trees, for beauty and as an agricultural exercise. In 1 957 the boys planted 500 
sticks of cassava, 50 pineapple plants and a row of banana trees, and constructed 
a pergola with creepers to camouflage the septic tank, while the following year, 
under Augustine Sitaram's guidance, senior boys planted a row of trees for 
Arbor Day.4 Soccer and athletics were popular activities, All Saints' soccer team 
proving particularly successful in the early 1 9  50s when one of their teachers, 
Mohammed Yasim Khan, also played for the Labasa team. The students were 
regularly reminded of the Empire and their loyalties to it. Empire day school 
gatherings were addressed by the District Officer.5 Students attended films such 
as 'The funeral of George VI', 'Royal destiny' and 'A Queen is Crowned'.6 Year 
groups went on end-of-year picnics to Malau, Batiri or the Three Sisters. Nurses 
and doctors visited the school to inspect teeth-finding in the process a 
distressing number of dental caries-and inoculate children against tuberculosis 
and typhoid, and by the mid-1 960s, against the scourge of polio. All in all, this 
was a thriving and successful school. 
And it was a Christian school, following a long tradition of mission involvement 
in education. When the Methodists, the first Christian missionaries in Fiji, 
started village education, it was primarily to make their converts literate, able to 
read the Bible. Alongside this was the aim of 'civilising' Fijians and introducing 
'British values'. Both Christianity and literacy were readily adopted by Fijians 
and the small schools started by the Methodists soon become part of the village 
scene. Most were taken over by village committees during the 1 930s, while the 
Methodist mission maintained responsibility for teacher training at Davuilevu 
(near Suva) and some secondary and higher elementary schools, including 
Lelean Memorial School for boys, Ballantine Memorial School for girls, Lautoka 
Boys School and Jasper Williams' School for girls. 
In relation to the Inda-Fijians the situation was different. Until 1 90 1  the 
Methodist Church paid little attention to the gimJitjya, the indentured Indians. 
4 ASL 28-1 1 - 1 957, 24-2-1 958. 
5 ASL 23-5-1 952. 
6 ASLl l -7-1 952, 7-5-1 953, 1 - 1 0-1 953. 
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Although the Indian catechist John Williams arrived in 1 892, the Mission Board 
in Sydney saw evangelising girmit!Jas as low on their list of priorities. 7 What 
concerned missionaries was the influence of Indians on their Fijian converts 
who had accepted Christianity at the hands of the Methodists , but who were as 
yet 'babes in the faith', had not reached Christian maturity and might be easily 
subverted by 'evil'. The relative success of the mission to the Fijians, especially 
when the converts themselves became missionaries, to New Britain in 1 875 and 
later to Papua, led to a particularly proprietorial attitude on the part of 
Methodist missions. European Methodist missionaries referred to 'their' Fijian 
converts, reacting to both successes and failures in a particularly personal 
manner. This is clear in the 1 9 1 0  comment of a Methodist visitor to Fiji, Mr. 
Morley: 'If we do not Christianize these Indians, they will Paganize our Fijians' .8 
While those who worked with Indians-particularly Hannah Dudley, John 
Burton and Richard Piper-saw their conversion as an end in itself, the view 
that it was merely a means to the end of preserving the faith of Fijian Christians 
was prevalent amongst Methodists. 
Education amongst Inda-Fijians was initially, as amongst Fijians, an aid to 
conversion and to enable the reading of the scriptures. But few conversions 
took place and Indians showed little interest in Christianity. Evangelism proved 
fruitless and frustrating, indeed so frustrating that in 1 91 9  the Methodists 
handed over their Indian work on Vanua Levu to the Anglicans and 
concentrated their efforts on Viti Levu. This explains why the non-Catholic 
Christian schools for Inda-Fijians in Labasa were run by the Anglicans. All 
Saints' School was started in 1 924 by Miss Irene Cobb, an Australian lay 
miss10nary. 
However the girmit!Jas, while resisting attempts to convert them to Christianity, 
showed great interest in the education offered by the missions. This remained 
true throughout the twentieth century. Although the ginniryas early recognised 
that education was their best means of economic advancement, indeed even 
survival, the colonial government was not much interested in providing such 
education. Until the 1 9 1 8  establishment of (government-run) Natabua Indian 
School, mission education was the only education available to Inda-Fijians and 
7 For details of the Methodist catechists, teachers and missionaries to the Indo-Fijians see 
Morven Sidal, Hannah Dudlry, Haman Maa: Honoured Mother, Educator and Missioner to the 
Indentured Indians if Fiji, 1864- 193 1  (Suva: Pacific Theological College, 1 997) ;  A. Harold Wood, 
Overseas Missions ef the Australian Methodist Church, vol.2 - Fiji-Indian and Rotuma, (Melbourne: 
Aldersgate Press, 1 978) ;  Andrew Thornley, 'The Methodist Mission and Fiji's Indians: 1 879-
1 920', New Zealand Journal if History, 8:2 (1 974), pp. 1 37-53. 
8 Missionary Review, Feb. 1 9 1 0, p. 1 3. 
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it remained important, especially at the higher grades. In 1 944, 63 percent of 
those Inda-Fijian children attended committee schools (schools set up by a 
committee, which was responsible for the buildings, made up of parents, 
community leaders and/ or local religious groups; the government supplied the 
teachers) . Seven percent attended government schools and 30 percent attended 
Christian mission schools.9 While the absolute number of lndo-Fijian children in 
school was higher in the 1 9  50s, the proportions in the various types of school 
remained fairly constant. Some writers have suggested that Indians resisted 
mission education;10 certainly the Hindu reformist group the Arya Samaj worked 
to develop schools for Fiji's Indian population in the 1 920s. But while many 
Inda-Fijians might have preferred it to be run by groups other than Christian 
missions, they welcomed any high-quality education. As the Anglican priest 
C.W. Whonsbon-Aston put it: 'The Indian of today in Fiji .. .is healthy and eager 
for education and filled with the growing pains of emancipation'. 11 Clearly 
Indians worked hard to establish their committee schools in the 1 920s and 
1 930s, they welcomed the involvement of the Hindu groups Arya Samaj and 
Sanatan, and advocated the establishment of more Government schools. Indian 
opinion welcomed the Stephens report (1 944), which suggested gradually 
abolishing the 'voluntary system' (whereby the colonial government gave grants­
in-aid to mission and committee schools rather than establish their own 
schools) . This would have secularised education and, Stephens envisaged, would 
have encouraged multi-racial schools . 1 2  But when the government rejected most 
of Stephens' recommendations, there was little Indians could do about it. In 
practice any high quality education was accepted, and most mission education 
was academically good. The Christian schools such as Marist Brothers High 
School Suva and other Catholic schools, the Methodist schools in Lautoka and 
Suva, and the Anglican schools on Vanua Levu were always oversubscribed. 
From the point of view of the missions-Methodist, Catholic and Anglican­
church schools had a twofold purpose: they were a way to expose students to 
9 F.B. Stephens, Report on Education in Fiji, Fiji Legislative Council Papers 1 944, Cmd 1 8, 
p. 1 2. For further discussion of lndo-Fijian educational demands and provision, sec Brij V. 
Lal, Broken Waves: a History of the Fiji Islands in the Twentieth Century, (Honolulu: University of 
Hawaii Press, 1 992), pp.83-86, 1 02-07 and 1 58-63. 
10 E.g., Padmini Gaunder, Education and Race &lations in Fiji 1835- 1998 (Lautoka, Fiji: 
Universal Printing, 1 999) ,  p.36. 
1 1 ABM &view (the monthly journal of the Australian Board of Missions, Sydney), Oct. 1 953, 
p.1 51 .  
1 2  Stephens, Report on Education, pp.58-60. The Stephens report is also discussed in Clive 
Whitehead, Education in Fiji: poliry, problems and progress in primary and secondary education, 19 39-
1973, (Canberra: ANU Press 1 978), chapters 4 and 5. 
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Christianity in the hope that they might convert, and they were in themselves a 
service to the community. The hope of conversion was always present, but the 
very low success rate meant that arguments in justification of Christian schools 
were developed which acknowledged that most students were-and remained­
non-Christian. These arguments centred on the 'moral uplift' Christian 
education offered to all who were exposed to it. Few in Fiji expressed the issue 
as succinctly as the Education Committee of the World Missionary Conference 
(held in Edinburgh in 1 91 0) when discussing Christian education in India, where 
the issues were similar. In India and Ceylon, Christian mission schools and 
colleges were maintained not just for the education of converts, indeed it was a 
matter of concern that few Christian children were in school. Rather, there was 
a perceived need to change general attitudes in India-to introduce Christian 
morals and ethics, if not belief. The report writers put it this way: 
So far as the ideals of "the new India" are Christian or sem1-
Christian; so far as the conceptions of Divine Fatherhood and 
human brotherhood, and Christian moral ideals, have come to 
prevail; so far as caste distinctions have weakened and the true 
position of women recognised; so far as prejudice against Christ 
and Christianity has been broken down,-it is to the education 
given in mission schools and colleges that a great part of this good 
result is attributed. 13 
This was called the 'leavening' or diffusion principle. It was acknowledged that 
most pupils in Christian schools and colleges were not Christian, but 
missionaries hoped that increased 'spiritual influence' might lead to a greater 
moral awareness and concern for other people which would lead to a better 
society. 
The same ideas can be seen at All Saints' .  In 1 939 the Headmaster of All Saints', 
Rev. R.L. Crampton, wrote in the log-book: 
As a teacher one is aware of the great responsibility involved in 
preparing young Indians to take their places in the community of 
this Colony. Firmly believing that our Lord's teaching is the best 
foundation in life, we endeavour to hand on this teaching. 
Or as Canon W.G. Thomas, in a general article on Fiji for an Australian 
audience, wrote: 
13 World Missionary Conference, Report of Commission I II - Education in Relation to the 
Christianisation of National Life (Edinburgh, 1 9 10) ,  p . 1 1 .  
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In [the Labasa Anglican schools] many hundreds of young men 
and women have been helped to become good and useful citizens 
and the influence and example of dedicated mission teachers have 
helped to shape their characters . 1 4  
But the argument for church schools could be developed beyond the 'leaven 
principle'. During the 1 920s, influenced in part by the principles behind the 
Covenant of the League of Nations, Christian scholars began to argue that for 
moral and humanitarian reasons they should prepare 'less-developed peoples' 
for self-government and the end of colonialism, primarily through education. In 
other words, assisting the secular education of Pacific Island peoples could be 
seen as a Christian duty. In Fiji there were two aspects of education where the 
missions believed they possessed unique insights rooted in Christian ideals-in 
running multi-racial institutions and in the education of girls . Most mission 
schools, on principle, at least attempted to attract students from varying ethnic 
backgrounds, though language difficulties could make this difficult at the 
primary level. Christian missions had long regarded the respectful treatment and 
advancement of women-in theory at least-to be a marker of Western 
Christian culture. Both Methodists and Catholics emphasised the importance of 
girls' education; the Methodists prided themselves on the success of Dudley 
House School, Suva and Jasper Williams School, Lautoka in attracting and 
educating Indian girls. 
The Anglican mission felt it important that All Saints' remain a multiracial 
school, even with a large Inda-Fijian majority, and made considerable efforts to 
have one Fijian teacher on the s taff, teaching Fijian language, even though the 
turnover in such a position was high. While it was predominantly a boys' school, 
the acceptance of girls in All Saints' junior classes was an attempt to encourage 
girls' education, for it was believed that parents would be more likely to let their 
girls go to school if they could accompany their brothers while small. The 
Anglican mission took as much care and effort over staffing and equipping St 
Mary's Girls' School as All Saints'. Indeed missionary teachers were employed at 
St Mary's for considerably longer. 
It was, however, debatable whether schools were effective as evangelistic 
institutions. The expense of running high-quality schools , with little evangelical 
'success', had long worried the Methodists. In 1 922 the Mission Board 
expressed 'alarm' at 'the huge and growing expenditure on education in Fiji, 
especially in the Indian work' and 'the impossibility of maintaining such 
expenditure'. It was suggested that more emphasis should be placed on 'the 
14 ABM Review, Sept. 1 954, p.140. 
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education of the Christian community in Fiji for Christian leadership' rather 
than the general education of the non-Christian population. 1 5  This was a cause 
taken up with vigour (and indeed partly instigated) by Richard Piper, the 
enthusiastic and somewhat maverick missionary in Lautoka. Piper was 
convinced that Indians would respond more favourably to medical than 
educational initiatives and that the Methodists should abandon all but two or 
three 'good central schools'. For 'one mission hospital at the present time would 
do more to commend Christianity than all our schools . It is LOVE IN 
ACTION'.16 
Piper's arguments centred around the need, as he saw it, to make the Inda-Fijian 
church self-sustaining and self-governing. Influenced by the writing of Ronald 
Allen, who advocated the rapid development from 'missions' to indigenous 
independent churches, 17 Piper believed that Christian schools should be run 
primarily 'in the interests of CHRISTIAN children', they should be 'centres of 
evangelistic life', using the vernacular rather than English and including 
theological training. Instead, the Methodist Mission had been seduced by 
government grants into providing secular English-medium education. This 
might be what the government wanted but was not, in Piper's opinion, what was 
needed by the embryonic Inda-Fijian Christian community. 18 Piper's proposals 
were opposed by the rest of the mission staff and, more tellingly, by Indian 
Christians themselves. 19 For the moment mission policy was unchanged, but 
concerns about cost and about the lack of converts remained. 
In the 1 940s the Methodists, facing the same issues as in the 1 920s, re­
considered their education policy. A questionnaire was sent out from the 
Methodist office in Sydney to all involved in the Indian mission attempting to 
ascertain why there were so few conversions amongst Inda-Fijians. Reasons 
suggested by missionaries for the lack of interest in Christianity included the 
growth of Indian nationalism, the arrogance of European missionaries resulting 
in perceived discrimination against Indians, the growth of the Arya Samaj, and 
disunity and bickering amongst Indian Christians. Questions were also asked 
about the effectiveness in evangelism of the schools . Stanley Andrews suggested 
15 Board Minutes, 31 Jan. - 3 Feb. 1922, Methodist Overseas Mission archives (hereafter 
MOM), file 206, Mitchell Library, Sydney. 
1 6 Richard Piper, 'Indian Reorganisation: Is the Indian Mission on the Right Lines?', paper to 
Synod, 3 Sept. 1 922, MOM 238. Piper was somewhat addicted to the use of capital letters. 
17 Roland Allen, Missionary Methods: St. Pauls or Ours? (London: Butterworth Press, 
1968(1 913)). 
1 8 Piper, 'Indian Reorganisation'. 
19 Wood, Overseas Missions, vol. 2, p.49. 
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that 'the influence of Christian teaching and example is remarkable ... no-one 
leaves hostile to Christianity.' 20 Ivy Lapthorne commented on 'the educated, 
happy children in the schools' and especially noted the number of girls 
undertaking nursing courses after Christian education. 21 Norman Wright saw 
schools as having 'the advantage of systematic Christian teaching and the 
opportunity to show the poverty and inadequacy of  the old thought'. But he 
also noted how rare conversions were: between 1 922 and 1 944 1 ,021 boys had 
passed through Lautoka Boys School, but only 24 had been baptised as a result 
of their Christian education.22 In general the missionaries advocated more direct 
evangelism-more public preaching, home visiting and systematic Bible study. 
Ramsay Deoki pointed out that most Indian Christians, certainly 'the most 
satisfactory and staunchest supporters of our work', had converted after direct 
evangelism rather than through the schools. 23 In general, direct evangelism was 
increased by the Methodists in the 1 940s and 1 950s. No new Indian schools 
were opened, though existing ones developed their secondary classes, and two 
of the existing schools were handed over to committee control in the 1 9  50s. 
Established schools seem to have accepted that while conversions were unlikely, 
in the words of A. Harold Wood 'the schools were respected in the community 
for their integrity of purpose and the quality of their teaching'. 24 A commentator 
in 1 954 noted that although, in the face of government reluctance, the 
Methodist Church 'had of necessity' to provide education to Inda-Fijians and 
could in doing so impart a useful ethical grounding, 'the Christianity of the 
schoolroom is hardly the Christianity which brings a church to life and 
nourishes it in the Faith'. 25 While the Methodists may have come to this 
conclusion by the 1 950s, the Anglicans, later in the field, were still struggling to 
assess the effectiveness of church schools; in many ways the story of the 1 950s 
and 1 960s at All Saints' is the story of the Anglicans coming to terms with the 
limitations of schools as evangelistic institutions . 
In part the missions' dilemma arose from the dual role of Christian schools : 
while originally founded to teach Bible literacy they were also effectively acting 
as agents of  the state. They accepted grants from the government, especially for 
teachers' salaries, in return for a certain level of supervision. The Stephens 
Report (1 944) had expressed grave concerns about this 'voluntary system'. It 
20 Stanley Andrews to Rev. Dr. J .W. Burton, 29 Sept. 1 941 , MOM 238. 
21 Ivy Lapthorne to Burton, Oct. 1 941 , MOM 238. 
22 Norman Wright to Burton, MOM 238. 
23 Ramsay Deoki to Burton, Dec 1 941 , MOM 238. 
24 Wood, Overseas Missions, vol. 2, p.52. 
25 A.W. Loy, 'The Church among Indians in Fiji', International Review ef Missions, 43 (1954), 
pp.83-4. 
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saw 'the almost complete lack of integration' as the main defect, with 
'overlapping . . .  resulting in excessive and wasteful expenditure' and also 'gaps 
which it [is] nobody's responsibility to fill' .26 Stephens was also concerned that to 
encourage religious bodies to run schools was to perpetuate a racially-divided 
education system-a fear the Christian schools did their best to dispel. 
However, the colonial government rejected Stephens' call to end the voluntary 
system. This was largely on grounds of cost-mission and committee schools 
had to find most building and capital costs themselves, costs which would 
otherwise fall to the government-but also from the ideological position, 
prevalent in Britain, that the religious voluntary-aided sector was a valid part of 
educational provision. Indeed, in many respects government and missions had 
similar aims, which included multiracial education and the education of girls as 
well as academic excellence. Between 1 944 and the early 1 9  50 the level of 
supervision and integration of all types of schools increased, with teacher 
training centralised at Nasinu Teachers' College in 1 94 7 and most teachers 
becoming civil servants in 1 948.27 The All Saints' log-books show the regularity 
of visits from various education inspectors (especially to observe the work of 
first-year teachers), agricultural advisers and health workers. Since the 
government was increasingly footing the bill, it believed it should set the rules . 
Missions and school committees were suppliers of education to the colonial 
government. These rules did not on the whole limit the freedom of the schools 
to appoint the staff they wanted or to have religious instruction, but they did 
limit some initiatives. In 1 956 Rev. Appasamy opened an evening class for 
'average, over-age boys'; that is, boys over 1 6  years who had not qualified for 
secondary education, and were now in work. But by March he had to close the 
class, as the Education Office regulations would not support it.28 
In spite of many aims in common there remained a tension within church 
schools between their role in preparing children for secular citizenship, as 
desired by both government and mission, and the exclusively mission role of 
evangelism. This tension showed itself over two practical issues: Christian staff 
recruitment and religious holidays. Until 1 960, the headteacher of All Saints' was 
a missionary, usually a European priest, though from 1 953-55 a New Zealand 
woman missionary, Miss Margaret Young, was in charge and from 1 956-59 the 
head was India-born, US-educated Rev. K. Appasamy. A Fellow of the Royal 
Geographic Society with degrees from Hartford and Boston, it is not clear why 
26 Stephens, Report on Education, p.58. 
27 W.W. Lewis-Jones, 'A Historical Survey of the Development of Education in Fiji', 
Transactions and Proceedings of the F!Ji Society, 6 (1 957) ,  p. 1 22. 
28 ASL 9-2-1 956, 12-3- 1 956. 
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Appasamy was in Labasa; the Indian High Commissioner certainly thought he 
was wasting his time in a provincial primary school. Headteachers aimed to have 
Christian staff, but scarcity made this difficult. Because they could not find 
sufficient Christian teachers, the Anglicans surrendered two small schools on 
Vanua Levu to committee control in 1 949.29 In most years only 3 or 4 members 
of All Saints' staff were Christian, though others, like R. Chellappa Gounden, 
were married to Christians.30 As Rev. Wallace commented in 1 952: 'the only way 
to get a Christian staff is to have our own Christian boys stay on as recognised 
teachers' (i.e. as unqualified teachers) . He readily took on j airam who has 
recently been baptised' and had just left Class 8. 31 There was competition 
between Christian schools for the few qualified Christian teachers. J agdish Ram 
Sahay, a new teacher at All Saints' in 1 961 , left after two years to gain wider 
experience with the Methodists and became headteacher of Dudley High School 
in the late 1 970s. 
Since most students and staff were non-Christians, their desire to celebrate their 
own religious holidays became a contentious issue. A pragmatic man, Wallace 
closed the school in 1952 for the Holi festival and for Ram Lila. When Muslim 
teachers and students asked for leave for Eid, they were told that 'they were free 
to join in the worship of the festival and should count that their duty instead of 
coming to school, but that those who did not attend the festival should go to 
school. '32 Miss Young found herself in conflict with her staff when she tried to 
enforce only Christian holidays. She disapproved of teachers taking a day off for 
Holi, and when they requested leave for Diwali she refused, telling them it was 
not a school holiday. Three members of staff took absence regardless and were 
reported to the Education Officer Northern, the colonial government official in 
charge of education in Vanua Levu. 33 Appasamy, was more pragmatic; faced 
with the choice of making Diwali or All Saints' Day (1 November) a school 
holiday he chose Diwali because, he wrote, if he chose All Saints' Day most of 
the school would be absent on Diwali anyway and more time would be wasted.34 
In 1 960 the first local, Mr Jwala Prasad Singh, was appointed as Headmaster. A 
Christian, he was married to Ethel, daughter of the Methodist minister Ishwari 
Prasad, and they had both taught at All Saints' since 1 947. In 1 953 Jwala Singh 
was sponsored by the Anglicans to go to Auckland University for a year's study 
29 ABM Review May 1 949, p.71 . 
30 ABM Review, May 1 956, p.76. 
31 ASL 2-6-1 952. 
32 ASL 24-6- 19  52. 
33 ASL 1 2-1 1 -1 954, 1 5-1 1 - 1 954. 
34 ASL 1 - 1 0- 1956. 
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at undergraduate level, and on return gained promotion to Grade 1 teacher. In 
some ways his promotion surprises the reader of the school log-book, as it is 
clear there were conflicts between Appasamy and Singh. Critical of Singh's lack 
of classroom preparation and inaccurate register, Appasamy claimed that Singh 
'caused plenty of trouble', though his main complaints centred on challenges to 
his own authority. 35 Highly educated, Appasamy may have expected more 
deference than Singh was prepared to grant him. 
As Headmaster from 1 960 to 1 962, Jwala Prasad Singh appears to have run a 
successful school-with an immaculate log-book. The government inspectors 
praised his administration, and the visiting teacher Moti Lal wrote, 'a very good 
start has been made by the present Head Master. Discipline has vastly 
improved.'36 Secondary Entrance results improved from eight passes in 1 960 to 
thirteen in 1 961 and twenty in 1 962. In practice places at the less prestigious 
secondary schools were available to some children who had completed Class 8 
but failed to pass all subjects in the Entrance Examination, so the numbers 
continuing on to secondary schools were somewhat higher. No fewer than four 
visiting clerics wrote glowing reports of the school in the log-book between 
September and December 1 962. Singh ran his school with moderation and 
pragmatism; there were few disputes over religious matters, good relations with 
government authorities epitomised the way the voluntary system was supposed 
to work. 
There were, however, occasional dissenters from this view, as the story of All 
Saints' in 1 962-63 makes clear. In September 1 962 the 'senior Indian Christians' 
raised unspecified complaints to the Bishop against Singh and pressured for his 
resignation. The cause of the controversy is unclear, given the glowing 
testimonials and good results. In the log-books there is, for example, no 
suggestion of financial or sexual misdemeanor. But the resolution removing 
Singh had as its last clause the request 'that a missionary Headmaster be 
sought'. 37 It seems that Singh had failed to maintain a sufficiently strong 
Christian presence in the school and that the emphasis developed was too 
academic and secular. His successor, Rev. Peter Thirlwell wrote in the log in 
January 1 963 : 'After a year of much trouble and unpleasantness, it is the hope of 
the mission staff that All Saints' will once again become an effective instrument 
in the evangelization of this island'.38 The school day was extended to allow for 
fifteen minutes of divinity for all students daily, though this soon proved 
35 ASL 5-2-1 959, 26-4-1 959, 5-8-1 959. 
36 ASL 1 0-3- 1960. 
37 ASL, footnote to the entry of 6-1 2-1 962, dated 'September'. 
38 ASL 1 - 1 - 1 963. Emphasis in the original. 
1 5 1  
Christine W cir All Saints' Anglican School, Labasa, 1 952-1 970 
problematic since there were only three Christian teachers on staff. When 
students and teachers were absent for Holi they were reprimanded with the 
comment that 'this school observes Christian holy days'. May Day was 
'observed in the Christian tradition as a day of our Lady' with a sermon from 
the vicar and a hymn singing competition, and Ascension Day was similarly 
marked. All Saints' Day became the school holiday of choice, and when Hindu 
teachers requested leave for Diwali they were refused it. Half the students were 
absent anyway and the Hindu teachers complained to the Education Officer 
Northern-who was not inclined to become involved. The new regime did not 
last. In many ways it was untenable, given the lack of Christian staff and the 
desires of the majority of parents, as opposed to the 'senior Indian Christians' 
who were understandably concerned by the lack of converts. Thirlwell left in 
under a year, and his term can be seen as a last evangelical fling before the 
school settled down to being an academic school, without undue emphasis on 
religion. 
During the 1 950s and early 1 960s the Anglicans, like the Methodists, had 
changed their evangelistic policy to place more emphasis on direct approaches 
to the Inda-Fijian community, rather than relying on the indirect influence of 
schools .  Mr. Jivaratnam, who had been the woodwork and Hindi teacher at All 
Saints', left teaching to become a full-time evangelist with the Anglican Mission 
in 1 955, and by 1 958  a woman evangelist was being sought from India.39 It was 
now recognised that concentrating on the children was not enough, adult 
evangelism, bible study, home worship and village meetings were critical.40 These 
years saw other Anglican initiatives with the development of the Bailey Clinic in 
Suva, and Sister Betty Slader's evangelism and medical work around the Rewa 
Delta from 1 960. These projects, rather than the schools, were seen as the 
future of Anglican evangelism to the Inda-Fijians. The acceptance at St John's 
College, Suva, of Edward Armogam, the first Inda-Fijian Anglican ordination 
student, was a matter for great rejoicing.41 
Back in Labasa, R. Kalyan Chandra, another Indian Christian, was appointed 
Headmaster at the beginning of 1 964. He ran a regime much like Jwala Singh's. 
Visitors again commented on the high standards of academic and agricultural 
work, comments which suggest such standards may have slipped under the 
previous regime. Nonetheless, Chandra's administration satisfied the religious 
authorities .  Bishop John Vodder, visiting in late 1964, noted: 'I have been very 
impressed with the appearance of the grounds and the School, which I believe 
39 ABM Review, June 19 58. 
40 ABM Review, Aug. 1 958, p .1 04. 
41 ABM Review, Junc 1 960, p.74. 
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to be the outward appearance of a good spirit'. After only nine passes in the 
Secondary Entrance Examination in 1 963 under Thirlwell results steadily 
improved again; sixteen out of seventeen students passed in 1 964 and all 28 
candidates were successful in 1 966. The new South Pacific Commission Tate 
reading scheme was introduced. All Saints' students won essay and other 
national competitions. In short, by the mid-1 960s, the Anglican mission seems 
to have accepted the inevitability of very limited evangelical success, and 
concentrated on academic excellence and the extension of the school to 
secondary level in the mid-1 970s. Its main task was now seen as the preparation 
of its charges to be good citizens of the new independent Fiji. Indeed the 
school, its evangelical role now subordinate, was conforming to the 
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